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The Impact of Managerial Traits on Corporate Investment  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the impact of the firm’s dominant structure and ability on 
corporate, financing and investment activities. Particularly, CEO duality is examined as a 
structure whose power and board supremacy provides a single agent with highly centralized 
power. Second with the use of Demerjian et al. (2012) managerial ability index, CEO 
managerial ability is quantified and assessed in the context of corporate activity and 
performance.   
The empirical analysis shows that the impact of CEO duality engages to misallocations 
which affect investment efficiency and verifying that such regime increases unprofitable 
investment which is detrimental to the firm value. Furthermore, this thesis provides strong 
support that the adverse impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency prevails only among 
firms that face high agency problems, as captured by high free cash flows, firm complexity, 
staggered board structure, low board independence, and medium-sized board.  However, 
CEOs’ equity-based compensation, high managerial ability, as well as the occurrence of 
externally promoted CEO curb the negative effect of CEO duality on internal capital allocation 
efficiency.  
Furthermore, this thesis evinces a positive relation between pre-crisis managerial ability 
and crisis period investments. This occurs because of the capacity of firms with higher pre-
crisis managerial ability to secure greater financing and to keep their firms less vulnerable to 
financial constraints, which in turn help mitigate severe underinvestment problems evident 
during the financial crisis. Interestingly, the positive relation between managerial ability and 
investments holds only for firms with CEOs who have general managerial skills (generalists) 
rather than firm-specific skills (specialists). When looking at the value implications of the main 
findings, it is observed that the stock market positively assesses crisis period investments, yet 
this effect is solely evident among firms characterized by high levels (i.e., above-median) of 
pre-crisis managerial ability. 
Overall the evidence in this thesis informs, for the first time, the agency theory 
regarding the mechanism through which CEO duality is destructive for internal capital markets 
and firm value, and sheds light on the importance of certain moderators that can mitigate the 
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negative impact of CEO duality on investment allocation and efficiency. Regarding the 
management team as a whole, the findings of this thesis show that managerial ability can 
ameliorate inefficiencies during distress times, through gaining access to more resources, 
investing at greater levels and more efficiently than less able peers, thus, adding to the value 
of firms.  
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Introduction 
 
 
1. Contextual Background and Motivation 
 
To understand power and control within a firm, more than 80 years ago Coase (1937) 
paralleled the way decisions are taken in the broader economic system and the marketplace 
with the way decisions are taken within the firm. Referring to price movements which are 
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions in the market, Coase argued that such 
movements are evident in the economic system and are the ones that determine and direct 
production. He then suggested that in the firm setting, these exchange transactions are 
substituted by the “entrepreneur- coordinator” who also has the responsibility to control and 
direct production. Thus, contrary to the marketplace in which the price mechanism controls 
decisions, the decision control in a firm is a consequence of power within the hierarchy. 
Implicit in this notion is that firms vary significantly in the skills and resources needed to 
function efficiently and profitably. This variation influences the costs of transaction performing 
within the firm. In the modern firm, Coase’s “entrepreneur- coordinator” role refers to the apex 
of the firm hierarchy, whose control role now is considerably larger and far more complex in 
determining overall performance and value (Chemmanur et al., 2011; Chemmanur et al., 2009; 
Demerjian et al., 2012).  
Perhaps a strong evidence on the importance of decision control and power in the 
modern firm is the substantial heterogeneity in firm financial policies and outcomes 
(Chemmanur, Paeglis, & Simonyan, 2009; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2004). Such 
heterogeneity largely calls for a better understanding of the roles and responsibilities of 
executives and board members. Most importantly, the recent global economic turmoil brought 
to the surface several concerns regarding certain firm structures which provide executives with 
excess power. Such concerns point to the weakening role of board monitoring associated with 
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powerful executives which is at several times the cause of investment, financing, and value 
related decisions that significantly deviate from the first best alternative which would benefit 
shareholders. At the same time, the global financial crisis has called for an identification of 
managerial factors that could immunize the firm from suffering from potential underinvestment 
problems because of limited access to external and internal finance. Consequently, this thesis 
places emphasis on the dominant figure and the dominant coalition within the firm, both 
considered in explaining investment, financing, and other strategic decisions. The role of CEO 
duality as a powerful structural regime and the board’s dominating role, along with the ability 
of the management team are examined, with an expectation to yield stronger explanations of 
organizational outcomes than what has been already provided in the literature.  
2. Main Research Questions  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the effects of CEO duality and managerial ability 
on firm investment, financing, and valuation outcomes. CEO duality is a leadership regime that 
grants the CEO with the legislative right to exercise power over the board and the executive 
team, therefore it is considered as the role in the apex of the frim that is determinant in such 
firm outcomes. Additionally, prior literature has pointed to superior managerial ability which 
serves as a guarantee to the firm, securing greater resources, conducting more investments and 
safeguarding the firm’s performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003, Chemmanur and Paeglis, 
2005, Demerjian et al. 2012).  
The thesis assesses the above-mentioned relations with the adoption of specific settings 
which are deemed as suitable to enable a thorough investigation of research questions. The 
focus of chapter one and chapter two on firm investment efficiency and segment investment 
allocation respectively, requires data on investment expenditures at the segment level. The 
attention on internal capital markets of diversified firms is considered as the only way to 
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observe capital allocations and assess their overall valuation effect. Such attention facilitates 
an investigation of intra-firm mechanisms that are activated when decisions are taken at the top 
level of hierarchy under a CEO that holds the position of the board chairman. Internal capital 
markets are created when capital is allocated internally from a diversified firm’s headquarters 
to the different segments that make up the firm. Unlike single-segment firms which are solely 
dependent on external capital markets for funding, the internal capital markets created in 
diversified firms enable the transfer of capital between segments circumventing any frictions 
that exist in external capital markets (Hovakimian, 2011; Ahn et al., 2006). Such financial 
flexibility has been proved to benefit or detriment a firm’s investment efficiency (Rajan et al., 
2000; Scharfstein, 1998; Shin and Stulz, 1998). In this respect, research on internal capital 
markets offers a good starting point for gaining initial insights into how CEO duality leads to 
certain investment decisions, whether the investments are efficient, and whether they translate 
into firm value. Second, diversified structures endow CEOs with additional discretion in 
allocating resources across business segments, so it is of interest to investigate how the dual 
role of the CEO produces the allocation of resources and affects the value of firms, as well as 
whether certain moderators alter these relations. Therefore, in this context the critical research 
question arising is whether such flexibility creates a fruitful environment for entrenchment and 
rent extraction in which investment misallocations, inefficiencies and value distractions are 
evident acts of dual CEOs. Besides, given what is highly cited in the literature that the 
implications of CEO duality on firm financial outcomes are complex and contingent on several 
variables (Krause et al., 2014; Boyd 1995), and may well vary conditionally on the level of 
firm performance, a second research question arises on whether certain firm, CEO and board 
characteristics can alleviate the investment misallocations or inefficiencies caused by CEO 
duality. 
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Chapter 3 adopts the recent financial crisis as a natural experiment to examine the 
capacity of pre-crisis managerial ability to secure internal and external financing and overcome 
underinvestment problems likely to occur during such burdensome periods. The financial crisis 
constitutes an exogenous shock on firm policies because of the difficulties it caused in 
obtaining credit lines, accessing external capital, and generating sufficient internal capital. 
Thus, such a setting is deemed as ideal in investigating the impact of managerial ability on firm 
policies, because it provides a natural experiment suitable to alleviate endogeneity concerns 
usually evident in empirical analyses in the corporate finance literature. The research questions 
arising in chapter three, relate to the critical matter on whether managerial ability could be one 
of the main factors that can alleviate potential underinvestment problems evident in firms 
affected by financial crises. Still two more research questions stemming from this; first whether 
this alleviation is due to greater capacity of more able managers to secure greater internal and 
external financing during these times, and second, whether the stock market positively values 
crisis investments undertaken by higher managerial ability. 
3. Contribution 
 
The initial contribution of this thesis is that it considers the investment mediations 
through which CEO duality and managerial ability affect firm value. In the case of chapter one 
and two this mediation relates to the investment allocation and efficiency of CEO duality. Prior 
literature failed to consider the means through which CEO duality affects firm value; therefore, 
chapter 1 contributes to strategic leadership literature by identifying this mediation and by 
looking at specific investment related valuation outcomes rather than generic performance 
measures which have been identified to constitute an impediment in prior studies relevant to 
the performance consequences of CEO duality. Furthermore, provided that the implications of 
CEO duality are contingent on an array of factors (Boyd, 1995; Krause & Semadeni, 2013), 
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the main contribution of chapter 2 is the identification of certain agency cost moderators, 
arguing that value destructive tendencies and inefficient investment are only prevalent in firms 
that are potentially exposed to agency problems. 
In a similar vein, investments which seem to be highly valued by the stock market, 
appear to constitute the mediation through which managerial ability affects firm value in 
financial crises periods. As a result, this finding in chapter 3 contributes to the extant literature 
(e.g., Graham et al., 2013; Falato et al., 2015; Malmendier and Tate, 2007; Francis, 2008) by 
highlighting the differential way managerial ability impacts firm value. Findings in this chapter 
also contribute to the literature which focused on how firms managed liquidity shortfalls during 
such times (e.g., Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010; Campello et al., 2011), suggesting 
that higher managerial ability is one important factor because of its capacity to secure more 
financing and offset crisis period underinvestment problems that enhanced firms’ value. Lastly, 
chapter 3 contributes to the recent literature highlighting importance of general versus firm-
specific skills, showing that generalists CEOs are the ones able to mitigate underinvestment at 
times of constraining economic conditions (e.g., Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004; Custodio et al., 
2013; Brockman et al., 2016). Perhaps this can justify why generalist CEOs earn significantly 
higher annual pay premiums compared to their specialist peers.  
4. Structure of the Thesis 
 
Three essays are incorporated in this thesis. The first chapter assesses CEO duality in 
the context of corporate diversification and examines its impact on investment effciciency and 
valuation. Empirical results provide evidence that dual CEOs make inefficient investments 
which incrementally reduce firm value. Findings also evince that the marginal value of 
investment is lower for firms managed by CEO duality, substantiating the argument that such 
regime increases unprofitable investment which is detrimental to the firm value. 
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To dig deeper into the findings of this thesis’s first chapter, the second chapter puts its 
lens on the investment impact of CEO duality studying particularly the firms’ internal capital 
allocation efficiency. With the addition of an array of corporate governance and CEO control 
variables, results provide strong support for the agency theory, which postulates that CEO 
duality weakens board monitoring and increases managerial power, suggesting that boards 
should be independent from the management to prevent managerial entrenchment (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). Most importantly the chapter adopts a contingent approach 
on the impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency, to show that the documented negative 
relation exists only in firm contexts with potentially high agency problems, as captured by high 
free cash flows, firm complexity, staggered board structure, low board independence, and 
board size. Nonetheless it seems that CEOs’ equity-based compensation, high managerial 
ability, and the occurrence of externally promoted CEO moderate the negative effect of CEO 
duality on internal capital allocation efficiency.  
Given the intriguing results in the second chapter particularly with regards to the CEO 
attributes appearing to alleviate the negative impact of CEO duality on internal capital 
allocation, the third chapter attempts to gain more insight into how managerial ability and skills 
affect corporate investment. This attempt is done with the adoption of a natural experiment, the 
financial crisis, and its main finding demonstrates a positive relation between pre-crisis 
managerial ability and crisis period investments. This is because of the capacity of firms with 
higher pre-crisis managerial ability to shield greater financing and to keep their firms less 
vulnerable to financial constraints, which helps mitigate severe underinvestment problems 
evident during the financial crisis. Since the CEO is the most influential figure in corporate 
decision making, and the one who most likely affects corporate investment, the chapter focuses 
on CEO skills and shows that the positive relation between managerial ability and investments 
holds only for firms with CEOs who have general managerial skills (generalists) rather than 
 18 
 
firm-specific skills (specialists). Lastly, it seems that the stock market greets positively crisis 
period investments, yet, only for firms characterized by high levels (i.e., above-median) of pre-
crisis managerial ability. 
  
 19 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
CEO Duality, Investment Efficiency, and Firm 
Value 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 20 
 
CEO Duality, Investment Efficiency, and Firm Value 
 
1. Introduction 
Executives have a central effect on firm outcomes if they have power over critical 
decisions. According to Finkelstein (1997), settings in which the chief executive officer (CEO) 
exerts dominant power, may constitute an adequate source of information on which inferences 
on executive power can be drawn. This chapter considers the capacity of the CEO to also hold 
the position of the chair of the board as a leadership regime that provides the CEO with the 
legislative right to exert power over the board and the executive team. Such polarization of 
power provides additional influence over decisions, since the chairman often has a catalytic 
role in decision-making, and therefore, on firm outcomes. 
CEO duality—the act of a sole individual as both CEO and chair of the board—has 
produced one of the most prolific and contentious issues in the field of strategic leadership 
(Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella; 2009).  The recent 
global turmoil has raised oppositions against CEO duality by activist shareholders, institutional 
investors, proxy advisory firms, and regulators, with a view to achieving independent 
leadership on the board. Yet, current evidence shows a clear preference by firms to maintain a 
dual CEO regime. Proponents of the dual role argue that it fosters a more cohesive decision 
making emphasizing unity of command and speed of decision making as crucial aspects 
afforded by the combined structure (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  
Academic research on CEO duality maintained an equally unsettled character.  
Notwithstanding the lack of comprehensive evidence supporting the existence of a relation 
between CEO duality and accounting or market-based performance, the theoretical ground for 
such a relationship is substantial (Dalton et al., 2007). According to Dalton and Dalton (2011), 
despite voluminous empirical attention, there is little consistency in studies relating CEO 
duality to financial performance; hence, any inferences drawn so far are still in a premature 
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stage and command for more scholar research using a multilevel examination. In accord with 
this view Krause et al. (2014) argued that research should consider moderating variables which 
alter the strength or direction of the relationship, or mediating variables that explain the 
circumstances under which the relationship occurs. This ongoing academic scholarly attention 
renders the need for deeper examination of CEO duality on corporate policies and firm 
performance an empirical issue of significance, which is considered by this study. 
The notable conflicting evidence in both the professional and academic arena, along 
with the need for an identification of new ways and contexts to explore this multidimensional 
strategic leadership aspect constitutes the main motivation of the proposed chapter. 
Specifically, this chapter examines the investment efficiency implications of CEO duality and 
the valuation consequences of these investments. Findings provide compelling empirical 
evidence that CEO duality has a detrimental role in firm investment efficiency, causing an 
overall loss in firm value. Despite the extant research on certain organizational implications, 
this is the first study attempting to examine the investment implications of CEO duality as well 
as the valuation consequences emanating from these investments. Prior literature failed to 
consider the mediation through which CEO duality affects firm value; therefore, the chapter 
contributes to strategic leadership literature by identifying this mediation. An important aspect 
of the study is that it looks at the valuation consequences of investments by specifically 
adopting models that concentrate on the value added to the firm by its investment mediation 
and avoids the use of generic performance measures which reflect other types of firm efficiency 
other than investment. In addition, given that the implications of CEO duality are contingent 
on several factors (Boyd, 1995; Krause & Semadeni, 2013), only some of which are already 
identified, the results of the study also underscore the importance of certain agency cost 
moderators, and suggest that conditions prohibiting agency risk can have a determinant role in 
ameliorating value destroying and inefficient investment decisions made by CEO duality. By 
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assessing this moderation, the study sheds light on the importance of certain factors cultivating 
higher agency risk settings in investment efficiency and firm valuation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details relevant literature to 
provide a foundation for the testable hypotheses, pertaining to the relations among CEO 
duality, investment allocation, and the efficiency of investment allocation. Section 3 describes 
the sample and key variables used in the empirical analyses. Section 4 presents the results, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
2.1. CEO duality and firm performance 
 
In academia and particularly in management literature, the impact of CEO duality on 
firm performance has received increased attention. Noting the complexity and conflicting 
nature of the effects of CEO duality on firm performance, Rechner and Dalton (1989) attempted 
to compare the shareholder returns of firms with and without dual CEO roles, but this early 
study uncovered no significant differences over the entire period under investigation. Even 
more notably, no such differences arise in any given year, in the form of higher or lower 
abnormal returns. Rechner and Dalton (1991) then sought to focus on accounting-based 
measures, but the results were clearly dissimilar from those stemming from their first study. 
That is, with the same sample, they found that firms with non-dual CEO roles significantly 
outperformed firms with CEO duality in each year, in explicit support of agency theory 
predictions. Intrigued by these inferences, multiple authors tested their assertions across 
various assumptions and predictions providing different perspectives. Donaldson and Davis 
(1991), applying stewardship theory to the board leadership debate for the first time, concurred 
that firms with CEO duality should be more effective and outperform those with separated 
roles, because the mean shareholder return was significantly larger for the former. Therefore, 
a critical implication of the study was that CEO duality is desirable because it enhances firm 
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performance. Daily and Dalton (1992, 1993) also addressed the impact of CEO duality on the 
performance of small firms, predicting that the impact of this combined leadership role would 
be more pronounced in smaller firms, because larger firms tend to be more inertial. Yet, the 
accounting and market-based performance measures they used exhibited no significant 
relationship. Across all these early studies, the empirical analysis remains relatively simplistic, 
so they serve mainly as a backbone for current scholarly research on this topic. 
With a meta-analysis of empirical studies of board composition and board leadership 
structure, Dalton et al. (1998) find no evidence of a relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance. Rather, the different performance metrics in the available studies meant the 
direction of the relationship flipped at times. Accounting-based metrics exhibited a negative 
correlation between duality and firm performance; market-based measures suggested a 
somewhat positive link. Neither correlation was large enough to provide meaningful inferences 
for or against agency and stewardship theories though. Instead, these results informed the 
research field that different metrics have varying impacts, depending on the circumstances.  
This uneven disposition seemed stop there, with Dalton et al.’s (1998) meta-analysis. 
But the more complex interactions and different outcomes associated with CEO duality suggest 
the need for investigations that go beyond an agency versus stewardship polarity.  
2.2. CEO duality and investment efficiency        
 
The over-reliance of CEOs on a single source which provides them with income, 
reputation, and human capital, shows that their positions may be over-invested in the firms they 
run, compared with firm shareholders. If CEOs cannot diversify their employment risk, they 
may commit to investments that best serve their personal motives to entrench themselves and 
make their replacement much costlier to the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Yet headquarters 
still are endowed with residual rights of control that provide the CEO with the authority to 
choose the level of funding for individual projects (Stein, 1997). Overall then, the value created 
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from investments in a firm depends significantly on the efficiency of the allocation of capital 
across various projects, but the ability to allocate these corporate resources to projects or 
business segments gives self-interested CEOs a ready opportunity to extract private benefits, 
by misallocating corporate resources.  
Studies of CEO investment decisions consider the presence of “pet” projects that 
generate unduly high private benefits for the CEO (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Shin and Stulz, 
1998). As Shleifer and Vishny (1989) show, managers have an incentive to allocate the firm’s 
resources to investments whose value is higher under them than under the best alternative. This 
result reflects an aspect of the classic agency problem, that is, excessive investment in assets 
that are complementary to managers’ skills, background, or experience, even when such 
investments are unprofitable for the firm. For example, managers may be intrigued by 
investments that require their specific human capital and thus entrench them against potential 
replacement threats or increase their chances for a compensation raise. In that vein, self-
interested CEOs have incentives to channel more resources to such segments, even if the 
marginal investment has a negative net present value. 
Managers pursuing their own private goals and benefits also might tend to engage in 
empire building (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen 1986, 1993;; Xuan, 2009). Stein (1997) 
challenges this idea though, because conditional on the level of investment, any allocation of 
resources should work toward enhanced efficiency. The power and prestige associated with 
managing a larger firm (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990) or managerial compensation related to firm 
size (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) remain efficiency-destructing motives for CEO investments 
though.  
In a diversified firm, the CEO also derives private benefits of control from all divisions, 
whereas divisional managers extract private benefits only from their own divisions. Scharfstein 
and Stein (2000) account for both kinds of agency conflicts in their examination of resource 
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misallocation and rent payments by the CEO to divisional managers, who unjustifiably receive 
a greater share of resources for their divisions. That is, CEOs can distil their private benefits of 
control by engaging in inefficient cross-subsidization, funding value-destroying projects, and 
ceding to rent-seeking efforts by divisional managers (Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; 
Scharfstein, 1998). Duchin and Sosyura (2013) also consider the influence of managerial ties, 
measuring social connections that reflect mutual qualities or experiences between the CEO and 
divisional managers. Their findings suggest that under weak corporate governance, managerial 
ties tend to result to lower investment efficiency and firm value (Duchin and Sosyura, 2013). 
Glaser et al. (2013) also uncover mechanisms by which more powerful, better connected 
divisional managers realize greater capital allocations in a financially slack environment. Such 
problems are more likely when decision management and decision control are delegated to the 
same agent; in these circumstances, board monitoring weakens, and external monitoring, which 
seemingly could discipline CEO actions, is trivial, because the internal capital markets provide 
CEOs with means to avoid monitoring from external financial markets.  
Building on such emerging evidence, this study examines whether CEO duality leads 
to greater proneness to cultivate a domain for pursuing self-serving interests and engaging in 
opportunistic behaviours. According to Boyd (1995), the combined role—chair of the board 
and CEO of the firm—is detrimental to the balance between the CEO and the board because it 
limits the board's efficacy in monitoring managerial actions. The CEO’s excess power, because 
of the combined leadership structure, provides additional legitimacy to the board's control 
function and promotes a fruitful environment, in which the CEO can engage in managerial 
actions that deviate from shareholders’ interests. In the absence of a clear, separated 
hierarchical structure, resulting from the distinction between CEO and chairperson positions, 
the board’s role in overseeing managerial opportunism is minimized.  
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In summary, a board may fail to interfere in CEO investment decisions as a result of its 
weak role when a CEO is too powerful, due to his or her simultaneous position as the chair of 
the board. Then CEO duality can lead to investment inefficiencies which incrementally erode 
firm value.  
Hypothesis 1: Firms with combined CEO and chair positions make inefficient 
investments. 
2.3. CEO duality and the impact of agency problem factors 
 
Following the meta-analysis of Dalton et al. (1998), scholars agreed that CEO duality 
has an important role that differs with the circumstances. Duality can produce both positive 
and negative consequences in different market settings (Boyd, 1995) and when the CEO and 
board have varying characteristics (Krause et al., 2014). Drawing on both management and 
finance literature, this study argues that agency problem factors moderate the relation between 
CEO duality and the firm's investment allocation and efficiency. Following the extant 
literature, free cash flow and compensation incentives are employed to characterize the severity 
of agency issues within the firm. 
Firms with excess free cash flow encounter major agency problems (Chung et al., 
2005), especially if their investment opportunities are limited (Gul, 2001). Excess cash, may 
urge management to act opportunistically and derive personal gains from unnecessary value 
destroying investments. Such resource misallocations may offer personal rewards, at the 
expense of shareholders. Limited free cash flows instead inherently reduce managerial 
discretion, so managerial waste and inefficiencies should be reduced, such that the limited free 
cash flows act like disciplining forces on CEOs who might be prone to misuse resources to 
pursue their private goals. The degree of free cash flow availability thus should moderate the 
relationship among dual CEOs, and overall investment efficiency.  
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Past literature also highlights the effects of compensation on managerial incentives 
(Lambert et al., 1991; Carpenter, 2000). Aligning executive incentives with shareholder 
interests is a direct way to mitigate agency problems; the absence of a relevant connection 
between CEO compensation and firm performance may raise questions about whether 
investments can be managed efficiently enough to enhance shareholder value. Mehran (1995) 
and Palia (2001) suggest that increasing executives’ equity-based incentives creates value, and 
Hall and Liebman (1998) indicate a tripling of the median exposure of CEO wealth to firm 
value between 1980 and 1994. These trends may have exerted prevention impacts on prodigal 
empire building (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006), such that firms with CEOs who are more 
incentivized, due to the connection of their overall compensation with stock prices, exhibit 
greater alignment with the interests of shareholders. Thus, proper incentive provision, 
particularly equity-based compensation, should alleviate actions such as ceding to rent-seeking 
behaviours by divisional managers to extract private benefits or entrenchment efforts. Instead, 
these CEO might be motivated to decide upon more efficient investments. 
Another important effect of compensation on managerial incentives arises from the 
sensitivity of option-based compensation to stock prices. This exposure gives CEOs an 
incentive to reduce the systematic and idiosyncratic risk of their firms, though the effect thus 
far has remained theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, it encourages CEOs to decrease 
their firms’ systematic and idiosyncratic risk while increasing their own exposure to their firm’s 
risk (Coles et al., 2006), but on the other hand, it can motivate CEOs to take risks that promise 
to increase firm value (John and John, 1993). With their empirical findings, Armstrong and 
Vashishtha (2012) support a strong positive relation between the sensitivity of option-based 
compensation to stock prices and the level of idiosyncratic risk, perhaps suggesting that the 
sensitivity of option-based compensation to stock prices incentivizes CEOs to invest more in 
positive net present value projects, which eventually increases their ﬁrms’ idiosyncratic risk. 
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Certain forms of option-based compensation thus may help alleviate the adverse impact of 
CEO duality on investment efficiency. Taking all this evidence together, we argue:  
Hypothesis 2: Agency problem factors moderate the negative relationship between 
CEO duality and firm investment efficiency, such that the relationship is weaker among firms 
with lower agency problems. 
2.4. CEO duality and firm value 
 
Notwithstanding Dalton,et al. (1998) meta-analysis coming to an absence of an 
empirical association between CEO duality and firm performance, the debate over this highly 
discussed theme still continues among professionals and academics. Firm performance 
receives substantial attention in prior studies that attempt to capture the overall impact of CEO 
duality on the firm by combining accounting and market-based performance measures. Faced 
with equivocal support though, researchers also have called for the consideration of other 
outcomes associated with CEO duality that are more proximal than firm performance (He and 
Wang, 2009; Krause et al., 2014). For example, in relation to the investment channel through 
which CEO duality affects firm value, a specific valuation model is needed that can incorporate 
this mediation mechanism. Such incorporation can help identify the differential value of dual 
CEOs investments and reveal the availability of valuable marginal investment opportunities. 
To address the aforementioned debate, this study predicts that CEO duality is a corporate 
governance regime that drives unprofitable investments and erodes firm value. The ability to 
allocate corporate resources presents the CEO with an opportunity to extract private benefits, 
at the cost of misallocating corporate resources. In these circumstances, board monitoring is 
weak, so CEO duality leads to corporate and investment decisions that are detrimental to 
shareholder value. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3: Combined CEO and chair positions have negative effects on firm value.  
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3. Sample and variable description 
3.1. Sample 
 
Three sets of databases serve to construct the sample with the required data: Standard 
& Poor’s Execucomp, firm-level financial data from Compustat, and segment-level financial 
data from the Compustat Industrial Segment (CIS) database. The focus on the investment 
efficiency of dual CEOs means that the primary tests require data on investment expenditures 
at the segment level, the only way to observe capital allocations and their overall valuation 
effect. For this purpose, the study sample is restricted to diversified firms that report at least 
two segments, operating in different, three-digit, standard industrial classification (SIC) codes. 
This criterion is necessary for two main reasons. First, data about the allocation of capital 
expenditures across industries are available for diversified firms facilitating an investigation of 
intra-firm investment efficiency.  
The sample begins in 1992, which is the year Execucomp coverage commences. The 
initial sample for the time window of 1992-2013 from Compustat consists of 504226 firm year 
observations. To steer clear from distortions caused by small firms, because of having sales or 
assets near zero, total sales of at least $20 million are required.  Furthermore, financial firms 
(SIC codes 6000-6999), as well as any divisions that operate in these sectors are excluded 
because they are subject to capital structure regulations. Those lacking the required data at the 
firm level or segment level and those with operating and state segment records are also 
excluded from the sample (Ahn et al., 2006). Based on these restrictions, and on certain 
restrictions proposed by WRDS for the elimination of non-accurate observations, the sample 
is reduced to 43460 multi-segment firm years. Since sales are usually completely allocated 
among the reported segments of a diversified firm, it is also required that the summation of all 
segment sales should be within 1% of total sales for the firm (Berger & Ofek, 1995). The 
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attainment of a portfolio of single segment industry comparables for the sample of multi-
segment firms is a requirement.  For each division of a multi-segment firm five industry-
matched firms based on three-digit SIC code are required. The final sample, for the period 
1992–2013, the sample ends up with after accounting for missing observations on the 
independent variable, and control variables 11,403 segment-year and 5,480 firm-year 
observations. 
3.2. Model specification and variable definitions 
 
To measure the effect of CEO duality on internal investment efficiency and value added 
by capital allocations at the firm-level, we adopt the following regression equation: 
 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉 (𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑉𝐴)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  
                                     +𝛽3 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                   (1) 
where the dependent variable is either RINV as defined or RVA for firm i at time t. The firm-
level regression equation accounts for firm and year fixed-effects denoted by 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼𝑡, 
respectively. Further, the regression equation is estimated using robust standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level.   
The independent variable of interest in Eq. (1) is CEO Duality, defined to be a dummy 
variable set equal to one for firm-years during which the CEO also served as the board chair, 
and zero otherwise. The regression coefficient 𝛽3 measures the relation between CEO duality 
and overall investment (in)efficiency for the case of RINV, or firm value added (or destructed) 
by capital allocations for the case of RVA; thus a negative coefficient would provide empirical 
support for Hypothesis 1, using evidence from the capital allocation process of the firm as a 
whole. 
For firm investment efficiency two variables are used. The first measure attempting to 
examine internal capital market efficiency is the firm level measure of relative value added, 
RVA, as devised by Rajan et al. (2000). This measure adds the weighted transfer across all the 
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segments of a firm in a year to achieve a sum that represents the relative value added by 
allocation, capturing the overall value consequences of the allocation procedure of a diversified 
firm. To calculate RVA, firm- and industry-adjusted segment investment are weighted by the 
difference between the industry median Tobin’s q for that segment and the sales-weighted 
average q for the firm. The second firm level measure of investment efficiency is the relative 
investment ratio, RINV, defined as the sales-weighted sum of firm- and industry-adjusted 
investment in high q segments minus the sales-weighted sum of firm- and industry adjusted 
investment in low q segments (Ahn & Denis, 2004). Positive values for e RINV indicate that 
the firm invests relatively more in its high growth segments than in its low growth segments. 
Three agency problem moderators, are employed; (1) CEO equity-based incentives 
which rely on CEO compensation incentives as an inverse proxy for agency problems as in 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2005), (2) the CEO’s portfolio sensitivity of option-based 
compensation to stock prices, DELTA, as in Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002), and (3) 
the firm’s free cash flows FCF defined as the cash flows in excess of what is needed to fund 
all projects with positive net present values when discounted by the relevant cost of capital 
(Jensen, 1986).  
To assess the valuation consequence of investments, this chapter examines their 
marginal profitability, using the valuation regression procedure of Fama and French (1998). 
This approach is ideal, in that it allows for an assessment of the interplay between duality and 
investment and the marginal effect on firm value. Firm value refers to the total market value of 
the firm minus the book value of assets, all divided by the book value of the firm’s assets.  
Fama and French (1998) proposed that firm value is related to a set of firm characteristics like 
earnings, assets, R&D, interest expense, and dividends, and changes in these characteristics. 
These changes in variables are calculated -1 to 0 and 0 to +1 years relative to the current year. 
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In accord with Fama and French, variables are scaled by contemporaneous total book assets to 
avoid heteroskedasticity resulting from firm size differences.  
Detailed definitions of these variables appear in the Appendix. 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 reports the correlations for the study variables. Table 1 reports the correlations 
for the study variables. CEO duality shows significantly negative levels of relative value added 
(correlation with RVA is -0.032, p-value<0.05) and relative investment (correlation with RINV 
is -0.029, p-value<0.05). CEO duality, however, appears to be positively and significantly 
correlated to the spread of value (correlation with Marginal Profitability is 0.022, p-
value<0.10). The examination of correlation coefficients also exhibits that CEO duality is 
correlated with higher levels of industry adjusted Tobin’s q (correlation with firm Tobin’s q is 
0.025, p-value<0.05) and is associated with larger firms (correlation with Firm Size is 0.213, 
p-value<0.01). There is also a negative correlation between CEO duality and R&D spending 
(correlation with R&D is -0.042, p-value<0.01). Lastly, table 1 reveals that CEO duality 
exposes a tendency for significantly longer tenures (correlation with Tenure is 0.226, p-
value<0.01). It should be noted, that none of the correlations is high enough to raise any 
concerns for multicolinearity. This fact is further confirmed with the use of Variance Inflator 
Factor (VIF) test in Table 3. 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the firm characteristics, internal capital market 
efficiency measures, and CEO characteristics for the firm-years of diversified firms. On 
average, diversified firms include segments, resulting in a total of 11,403 segment-year 
observations. CEO Duality appears to be on average evident in 64% of the sample firms. The 
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firms have mean (median) Firm Size, of 7.6 (7.6); their mean (median) Marginal Profitability 
is 0.6 (0.3). The mean (median) relative value added, or RVA, is -0.04 (-0.01), and for the 
relative investment ratio, or RINV, the values are -0.15 (-0.05). The mean (median) values of 
Firm Tobin's q are 0.07 (0.02). With the assumption that industry Tobin’s q is a good proxy for 
the marginal q of the diversified firm’s segment, these values suggest that the sample of 
diversified firms allocate too little capital to their segments in high-growth industries. Thus, 
similar to earlier studies of investment policy in diversified firms, this sample of diversified 
firms indicates inefficient internal capital allocation, on average. Finally, an average dual CEO 
has a mean firm tenure of 7.5 (median 5.2) years.  
[Table 2 here] 
 
4.2 CEO duality and overall investment efficiency  
 
For an investment to be efficient, capital must be directed toward projects with superior 
investment opportunities and away from those with poorer investment prospects. To examine 
the relation between CEO duality and investment efficiency, this study undertakes a firm-level 
analysis, in which the dependent variable is relative investment efficiency (RINV). Following 
Ahn et al. (2006), RINV is utilized to account for a firm’s capital allocations across all the 
segments it operates in, by measuring whether (or not) allocations toward the relatively high-q 
segments outweigh allocations to its relatively low-q. RINV is an overall firm measure of 
investment efficiency; a positive (negative) value designates that the firm is investing relatively 
more (less) in its high q segments (Ahn and Dennis, 2004). Most importantly, to examine the 
overall value consequences of the firm’s transfers of capital to its various investment 
opportunities, it is important to investigate whether the segment-level investment inefficiency 
transpires in investment misallocations aggregated at the firm level. For this reason, a firm-
level measure of relative value added, RVA, is employed as proposed by Rajan et al. (2000). 
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The measure of RVA is of particular interest in this study since it directly captures the valuation 
impact resulting from the firm’s investment allocation. As aforementioned, rather than 
inheriting generic measures which do not particularly examine the investment consequences of 
CEO duality, a metric that can be regarded as a measure of the overall value added (subtracted) 
by the firm’s investment allocation is instead used. In essence, RVA postulates that firm value 
is created when segments with better growth opportunities than those that the firm is facing as 
a whole receive relatively more resources compared to segments with inferior growth 
opportunities than those that the firm is facing as a whole. The use of RINV and RVA as 
dependent variables allows discerning at the firm level the impact of CEO duality on, 
respectively, the firm’s value creation, and investment efficiency.   
Table 3 reports the variance inflation factor (VIF) to identify the presence of 
multicollinearity among the predictors in the two main regression factors with RINV and RVA 
as dependent variables. The largest VIF among all predictors is often used as an indicator of 
severe multicollinearity. All predictors have a variance inflation factor ranged between 1.0-3.9, 
which indicates that there is absence of multicollinearity between the predictors in the 
regression models. We additionally use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to 
account for possible heteroskedasticity, and all variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
values, to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers. 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Moving to the regression results, Table 4 reports estimates for the two regression 
models of investment efficiency. For both models, a set of control variables accounts for 
relevant firm characteristics in the context of the internal capital market efficiency of 
diversified firms. Specifically, the models include the industry-adjusted ratio of research and 
development to sales, R&D, which controls for the variation in information asymmetry across 
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sample firms. The industry adjustment for focused firms reflects a median focused firm 
operating in the same three-digit SIC code. According to Datta et al. (2009) high information 
asymmetry can give self-interested managers an opportunity to pursue their private benefits, to 
the detriment of shareholders, by hiding misallocation actions from the market. The models 
also control for the Number of Segments, to capture the breadth of diversification. Firm Size is 
a proxy for the overall effect of other firm characteristics. Other control variables include 
industry-adjusted Investment, CEO Tenure as a proxy for formal experience, and institutional 
ownership as a control for corporate governance. Consistent with Rajan et al. (2000) and Datta 
et al. (2009), the models include the sample firm’s industry-adjusted Tobin’s q to control for 
growth opportunities. As with the previous specifications, firm- and year-fixed effects provide 
further controls in the models and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
[Table 4, here] 
 
In Table 4, CEO Duality has negative and significant effect in model (1) on RVA. This 
finding confirms that CEO duality is a significantly negative determinant of internal capital 
market efficiency. In the sample firms, CEO duality thus leads to the allocation of relatively 
more capital to segments with lower growth opportunities, which incrementally reduces firm 
value, as captured by the RVA variable that represents the overall value added by the firm’s 
investment allocation process. The results of regression model (2) for RINV are aligned with 
the results for RVA, confirming that dual CEOs invest relatively more in low q segments and 
relatively less in high q segments. This investment pattern aligns with the predictions of rent-
seeking models by Rajan et al. (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000), implying that capital 
is inefficiently allocated across the segments of diversified firms. 
Regarding the control variables, a similar tendency arises in both models, such that the 
coefficient of the Number of segments is insignificant, in weak support of Rajan et al.’s (2000) 
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prediction that greater diversity of segment q leads to the misallocation of capital to 
investments and increased investment inefficiency. Firm size is positive and significant only in 
the estimation in which the dependent variable is RINV, indicating a strong relation between 
larger firms and relative investment. The industry-adjusted R&D to sales ratio is positive and 
significant in both models. That is, high information asymmetry does constitute a cover for 
CEO duality, enabling the misallocation of capital to gain private benefits. Though 
insignificant, the negative coefficient for Investment in models provides an indication that 
larger investments lead to less efficient allocations, because they give the CEO room for more 
self-interested allocations. Finally, CEO Tenure and Institutional Own emerge as insignificant 
throughout. 
4.3. Impact of agency problem factors 
 
If CEO duality leads to investment misallocation and inefficiency, are there also factors 
that can mitigate its impact? Do firms with key elements designed to mitigate agency problems, 
such as executive compensation, alleviate the documented negative relations? Table 5 presents 
the results of the tests of Hypothesis 2, which examine the potential moderating effects of three 
agency problem factors: CEO incentives, compensation sensitivity captured by the CEO’s 
portfolio Delta value, and the level of free cash flows FCF. With the baseline specification 
utilized in Table 4, Table 5 reports the regression results for the firm-level sample where RINV 
and RVA are the main dependent variables. The sample is divided into two sub-samples, 
whereby each sub-sample includes observations above or below the yearly median values of 
CEO incentives, Delta, and FCF, respectively. Because the distribution of Delta is right-
skewed, the natural logarithm transformation of the variable serves to break up the full sample. 
All agency problem factors are measured as of the year-end, prior to the year of the investment 
measures because their occurrence in the former year likely influences the internal capital 
allocation in the current year. If a CEO’s lagged CEO incentives, lagged Delta are greater than 
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the yearly median, the CEO is considered highly incentivized and sensitive to compensation. 
If these variables fall below the respective yearly median values, the CEO has low 
compensation incentives and sensitivities. Likewise, if a firm’s lagged FCF is greater than the 
yearly median, the firm has a high level of free cash flows and low levels if the lagged FCF 
falls below the yearly median. High agency environments are those with low compensation 
incentives but high free cash flows.  
[Table 5, here] 
 
Models (1), (3), and (5) in Table 5 show that in low agency problem environments, the 
adverse impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency disappears. High levels of CEO 
incentives and Delta and low FCF, associated with low agency problem environments, 
significantly moderate the negative relation between CEO duality and investment efficiency. 
These results are consistent with the literature on executive equity-based compensation, in 
which not only the slope but also the convexity of the equity-based payoff function is central 
to mitigating CEOs’ self-interest (Guay, 1999). The result for Delta is intriguing; high levels 
of Delta appear to encourage managers to work toward reducing inefficiencies, presumably to 
increase firm value. This result sheds light on the risk–value trade-off that executives face, and 
it confirms that dual CEOs are willing to increase firms’ idiosyncratic risk when faced with 
high Delta levels, for the sake of investing in projects with better net present value, even though 
this risk cannot be hedged. For low levels of CEO incentives and Delta but high levels of FCF, 
the results in models (2), (4) and (6) support Hypothesis 1; they confirm the negative and 
significant relation between CEO duality and RINV. There is compelling evidence that 
conditions of high agency problem allow dual CEOs to manifest agency behaviours that erode 
the firm’s investment efficiency. Collectively, these results support the notion that an adverse 
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impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency happens only in high agency environments 
characterized by poor compensation schemes or high levels of free cash flows.  
Results evince a similar pattern for RVA. In low agency problem environments, 
particularly models (1), (3), and (5), of Table 6, the negative and significant relation of CEO 
duality with RVA disappears. Dual CEOs do erode firm value in low agency environments. A 
consistent pattern also arises for high agency environments, as shown in models (2), (4), and 
(6) of Table 6. That is, CEO duality and relative value added are negatively and significantly 
related when CEO incentives and Delta sensitivities are low but FCFs are high. Overall, the 
evidence from the second sub-sample analysis in Table 6 substantiates the inferences about 
agency problem moderators in Table 5; it also comprehensively affirms that conditions 
cultivating or prohibiting agency problems can have a determinant role in ameliorating the 
value-destroying inefficient investment decisions that result from CEO duality.  
 
[Table 6, here] 
 
4.4. CEO duality and marginal profitability of investments 
 
The main findings show that CEO duality has a strong negative influence on investment 
efficiency and firm valuation. These results can be related to the marginal profitability of 
investments using the valuation approach of Fama and French (1998). Fama and French (1998) 
propose that firm value relates to a set of firm characteristics, including earnings, assets, R&D, 
interest expense, and dividends, as well as changes in these characteristics. The changes are 
calculated for –1 to 0 and 0 to +1 years relative to the current year. Marginal profitability is an 
appropriate valuation measure for this setting, because it refers to the marginal valuation effects 
of firms’ investments and focuses on contribution of the investment to the value of the firm. 
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The regression model in Table 7 aims to capture the expected effects of the explanatory 
variables on firm value. The dependent variable is Firm value, while the independent variables 
include features that prior literature identifies as having strong effects on the spread of value 
over cost (Fama and Frech, 1998; Denis and Sibilkov, 2007). The model includes prior and 
future changes in assets; earnings before interest and extraordinary items and after depreciation 
and taxes; R&D expenditures; interest expenses; and total dividends paid, as well as future 
changes in market value. Changes in these variables are calculated over a one-year period. The 
regression model also details current levels of earnings, R&D expenditures, interest expenses, 
and total dividends paid. All variables are deflated by contemporaneous total book assets. The 
primary independent variables of interest in the regression are the coefficients of the asset 
variables; the main focus is the interaction between CEO duality and asset variables, because 
these interactions record the impact of the investments of the dual CEO on firm value. 
Therefore, adding the interaction term between prior changes in assets and CEO duality, as 
well as between future changes in assets and CEO duality, captures the effect of CEO duality 
on the marginal profitability of past and future investments. Similar to the previous analysis, 
CEO Tenure, Institutional Own, and the breadth of diversification proxied by the Number of 
Segments are incorporated in the model too. Finally, the regression model includes industry- 
and year-fixed effects. 
[Table 7, here] 
 
The evidence in Table 7 indicates that both prior and future changes in assets are 
positively and significantly related to firm value; the marginal value of investment is positive. 
The interaction between these changes in assets and CEO duality also is significantly negative, 
so the investments by a dual CEO deteriorate firm value; this means that the firm’s investments 
are unprofitably exploited. The ability to allocate corporate resources provides the CEO with 
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an opportunity to extract private benefits, at the cost of misallocating corporate resources, such 
that he or she makes investment decisions that deteriorate shareholder value. Consistent with 
Fama and French (1998) and Dennis and Sibilkov (2007), earnings, investment, R&D, and 
dividends, as well as changes in these variables, relate strongly and positively to the spread of 
value over cost. Similar comments apply to the change in the spread of value over cost, which 
is strongly and negatively related to firm value, and the negative and significant coefficients 
for the current level of interest and its changes. Regarding the Number of Segments, the 
negative and statistically significant coefficient reveals reduced firm value with the increase in 
the breadth of diversification. 
To alleviate any concerns about sample selection bias, i.e. ensure that results are not 
driven solely by the choice of diversified firms as a sample in the study, a sensitivity check is 
performed whereby all potential firms (diversified and single segment firms) satisfying the 
restriction criteria imposed to diversified firms, are included in the sample. Table 8 reports the 
regression results of the relation between CEO Duality and the marginal profitability of 
investments. Similar to the results obtained in Table 7, the interaction term of CEO duality with 
prior and future changes in assets is negatively and significantly related to firm value. This 
outcome mitigates concerns relating to sample selection biases and verifies that 
comprehensively investments conducted by CEO duality are performed at the detriment of the 
firm’s value. 
[Table 8, here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
Building on evidence from agency theory and strategic leadership literature, this study 
shows empirically that CEO duality produces a governance context that may encourage CEOs 
to direct investment resources inefficiently, to the “wrong” segments, ultimately causing a loss 
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in firm value. Prior research on CEO duality has produced notable conflicting evidence, likely 
due to its rather monotonic focus on accounting or market-based performance outcomes. This 
study is the first to show the channel through which CEO duality exerts an adverse effect on 
investment decisions that lead to a loss of value. 
In particular, this study offers compelling empirical evidence that CEO duality leads to 
investment decisions that are detrimental to overall firm value. The evidence of investment 
inefficiency suggests that when board monitoring becomes weak (because power is 
concentrated in the hands of a sole agent) and external monitoring is trivial (because internal 
capital markets help the agent avoid monitoring from external markets), agency costs, in the 
form of risk reduction and managerial entrenchment manifest, to the detriment of the firm’s 
shareholders. Two important points arise from this study. First, low agency problem regimes 
can help eliminate investment misallocation and efficiency. Such regimes can be cultivated by 
high compensation incentives and sensitivities. Second, unlike prior literature that focuses 
mainly on direct relations with performance metrics, this study provides an investment 
perspective on CEO duality behaviour, which produces valuation consequences for this 
investment behaviour. These results add to both strategic leadership literature and internal 
capital markets literature, while also illustrating that agency problem factors are significant 
determinants and moderate the adverse effects that arise from CEO duality. 
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Tables 
             Table 1. Correlation Matrix 
           
 
Notes. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. CEO Duality           
2. Relative Value Added (RVA) -0.032**          
3. Relative Investment (RINV) -0.029** 0.760***  
       
4. Marginal Profitability 
        (Spread of Value) 0.022* -0.037*** -0.002        
5. Firm Size 0.213*** 0.011 0.012 -0.021***       
6. Number of Segments -0.008 0.019** 0.026*** 0.009 0.308***      
7. R&D  -0.042*** 0.042*** 0.004 -0.088*** -0.025*** -0.016***     
8. Investment -0.012 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.022** 0.013* 0.017** 0.037***    
9. Firm Tobin's q 0.025** -0.014 -0.008 0.646*** 0.369*** 0.109*** 0.089*** 0.042***   
10. CEO Tenure 0.226*** -0.008 0.012 0.046*** -0.095*** -0.002 -0.065*** 0.011 0.061***  
11. Institutional Own 0.015 0.013 0.001 -0.009 -0.112*** -0.040*** 0.014** 0.016* 0.012* -0.001 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
        
Notes. This table reports summary statistics for the sample of diversified companies included in the Compustat tapes at any 
time during 1992–2013 that operate in at least two business segments in different three-digit, standard industrial classification 
(SIC) codes. All variable definitions are given in Appendix.  
Variable Mean Minimum Median Maximum St. Deviation 
CEO Duality 0.642 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.480 
Relative Value Added (RVA) -0.037 -3.947 -0.005 4.236 0.803 
Relative Investment (RINV) -0.148 -16.204 -0.046 16.090 3.561 
Marginal Profitability 
(Spread of Value) 
0.649 -0.401 0.271 5.000 1.101 
Firm Size 7.614 2.848 7.597 10.882 1.445 
Number of Segments 3.037 2.000 3.000 7.000 1.076 
R&D /Sales -0.058 -1.394 -0.003 0.399 0.204 
Capx /sales 0.005 -0.402 -0.001 0.495 0.093 
Firm Tobin's q 0.071 -3.416 0.017 4.073 0.858 
CEO Tenure 7.529 0.496 5.240 37.996 7.373 
Institutional Own 0.366 0.000 0.351 0.982 0.179 
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Table 3: Multicolinearity Test 
 
 
    
 
Table 4. Investment efficiency and CEO duality 
 
Model 1 
RVA 
Model 2 
RINV 
Intercept 
 
-0.058 
(0.144) 
-0.916 
(0.581) 
CEO Dualityt-1 
-0.063* 
(0.036) 
-0.332** 
(0.157) 
Firm Size 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.111** 
(0.0482) 
Number of Segments 
0.016 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.082) 
R&D 
0.272** 
(0.129) 
0.735* 
(0.437) 
Investment 
-0.484 
(0.449) 
-2.741 
(2.410) 
Firm Tobin's q  
-0.044 
(0.028) 
-0.030 
(0.068) 
CEO Tenure t-1 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.015 
(0.010) 
Institutional Own t-1  
-0.005 
(0.101) 
-0.245 
(0.452) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 4,404 4,368 
R²  0.378  0.307 
Notes. This table reports investment efficiency regressions for the years 1992-2013. The adopted measure of investment 
efficiency is RVA in model 1 and RINV in model 2. To calculate RVA, firm- and industry-adjusted segment investment are 
weighted by the difference between the industry median Tobin’s q for that segment and the sales-weighted average q for the 
firm. RINV is the sales-weighted sum of firm- and industry-adjusted investment in high q segments minus the sales-weighted 
sum of firm- and industry-adjusted investment in low q segments. Both RVA and RINV are multiplied by 100. All variable 
definitions are given in Appendix. Regression models are estimated with calendar year dummy variables and firm fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of 
significance, respectively. 
 
              RVA 
             (VIF) 
                                  RINV 
(VIF) 
CEO Dualityt-1 1.109 1.109 
Firm Size 1.225 1.223 
Number of Segments 1.064 1.063 
R&D 1.007 1.007 
Investment 1.007 1.006 
Tobin's q  1.014 1.014 
CEO Tenure t-1 1.052 1.051 
Institutional Own t-1 1.068 1.066 
CEO Own t-1 1.001 1.001 
Firm Risk t-1 1.071 1.071 
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Table 5.Investment efficiency (RINV) and CEO duality: High versus low agency risk                                                                                                                                                                                                    
RINV as a proxy for investment efficiency                                                                                                                              
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Managerial Incentive Type: 
High Incentive 
Ratio 
Low Incentive 
Ratio 
High Log(Delta) 
t-1 
Low 
Log(Delta) t-1 
Low 
FCF t-1 
High 
FCF t-1 
Agency Risk Level: Low High Low High Low High 
Intercept 
0.975 
(2.670) 
2.339           
(2.707) 
-0.893  
(0.921) 
-0.810 
(0.775) 
-1.189  
(1.043) 
-0.749  
(0.693) 
CEO Dualityt-1  
-0.325 
(0.231) 
-0.591**    
(0.288) 
-0.207  
(0.201) 
-0.443**            
(0.226) 
-0.106  
(0.242) 
-0.494**        
(0.199) 
Firm Size 
0.094 
(0.327) 
-0.056      
(0.398) 
0.131*  
(0.070) 
0.073 
(0.077) 
0.205**  
(0.088) 
0.052  
(0.055) 
Number of Segments 
0.123       
(0.113) 
0.180       
(0.181) 
0.023 
(0.086) 
0.003 
(0.131) 
-0.146  
(0.165) 
0.110  
(0.076) 
R&D  
0.887            
(0.924) 
0.133         
(0.758) 
0.961*  
(0.581) 
0.312 
(0.517) 
0.197  
(0.805) 
0.922*  
(0.509) 
Investment 
-7.056**    
(3.598) 
-0.494           
(4.840) 
-0.643  
(3.191) 
-5.121 
(3.512) 
-0.609  
(3.110) 
-4.535  
(3.096) 
Firm Tobin's q 
-0.031         
(0.146) 
0.084           
(0.223) 
-0.059  
(0.095) 
0.017 
(0.096) 
-0.050  
(0.120) 
-0.024  
(0.079) 
CEO Tenuret-1 
0.006         
(0.016) 
0.073*       
(0.039) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.002  
(0.015) 
0.026**  
(0.012) 
Institutional Own t-1 
-0.145         
(0.815) 
-0.087      
(0.920) 
-0.211  
(0.707) 
-0.339 
(0.532) 
0.078  
(0.746) 
-0.455  
(0.571) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2120 2248 2176 2192 1633 2735 
R² 0.412 0.419 0.343 0.448 0.456 0.342 
Notes. This table reports investment efficiency regressions for the years 1992-2013. Panel A (Panel B) uses RVA (RINV) as a proxy for investment efficiency. Models 1, 3, and 5 use the subsample 
of firms with low agency risk, and models 2, 4, and 6 the subsample of firms with high agency risk. The dependent variable is RVA for the years 1992-2013. To calculate RVA, firm- and industry-
adjusted segment investment are weighted by the difference between the industry median Tobin’s q for that segment and the sales-weighted average q for the firm. RINV is the sales-weighted 
sum of firm- and industry-adjusted investment in high q segments minus the sales-weighted sum of firm- and industry-adjusted investment in low q segments.RVA and RINV is multiplied by 
100. High agency risk environments are found in firms with low lagged CEO Incentive Ratio, low lagged CEO log(Delta) and high lagged FCF. Low agency risk environments are found in firms 
with high lagged CEO Incentive Ratio, lagged CEO log(Delta) for their CEOs and low lagged FCF. All variable definitions are given in Appendix. Subsample is formed based on the yearly 
median values of each variable. Regression models are estimated with calendar year dummy variables and firm fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 6. Investment efficiency (RVA) and CEO duality: High versus low agency risk                                                                                                                                                                                                          
RVA as a proxy for investment efficiency 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Managerial Incentive Type: 
High Incentive 
Ratio 
Low Incentive 
Ratio 
High  
Log(Delta) t-1 
Low 
Log(Delta) t-1 
Low 
FCF t-1 
High 
FCF t-1 
Agency Risk Level: Low High Low High Low High 
Intercept 
0.450         
(0.645) 
0.798         
(0.502) 
-0.046  
(0.260) 
-0.098 
(0.162) 
-0.170  
(0.232) 
0.002  
(0.171) 
CEO Dualityt-1  
-0.075        
(0.057) 
-0.116**              
(0.056) 
-0.027  
(0.049) 
-0.085*  
(0.049) 
-0.009  
(0.050) 
-0.095**             
(0.045) 
Firm Size 
0.027        
(0.076) 
-0.052        
(0.075) 
0.013 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.015) 
0.048**  
(0.019) 
-0.007  
(0.016) 
Number of Segments 
0.020          
(0.031) 
0.040        
(0.042) 
0.016 
(0.021) 
0.016 
(0.028) 
-0.025  
(0.032) 
0.041*  
(0.021) 
R&D  
0.143                
(0.245) 
0.139            
(0.238) 
0.372**  
(0.158) 
0.064 
(0.166) 
0.351  
(0.243) 
0.235*  
(0.139) 
Investment 
-1.001      
(0.630) 
-0.324          
(0.796) 
-0.081  
(0.597) 
-0.950 
(0.620) 
-0.260  
(0.591) 
-0.706  
(0.533) 
Firm Tobin's q 
-0.023       
(0.058) 
-0.086         
(0.063) 
-0.062  
(0.039) 
-0.011 
(0.034) 
-0.073  
(0.049) 
-0.039  
(0.033) 
CEO Tenuret-1 
0.001       
(0.004) 
0.009              
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002  
(0.004) 
0.003  
(0.003) 
Institutional Own t-1 
0.284           
(0.214) 
0.014               
(0.162) 
0.103 
(0.164) 
-0.096 
(0.117) 
-0.050  
(0.149) 
0.029  
(0.130) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,134 2,270 2,183 2,221 1,643 2,761 
R² 0.471 0.457 0.417 0.470 0.489 0.443 
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Table 7. Marginal Profitability and CEO Duality 
 Coef. S.E. 
Intercept 0.581*** (0.151) 
Prior change in assets 0.356*** (0.097) 
Future change in assets 0.705*** (0.076) 
Future change in firm value -0.149*** (0.031) 
CEO Dualityt-1 0.037 (0.036) 
Prior change in assets  CEO Dualityt-1 -0.201** (0.097) 
Future change in assets  CEO Dualityt-1 -0.170*** (0.065) 
Earnings 0.001*** (0.000) 
Prior change in earnings 1.092*** (0.164) 
Future change in earnings 0.944*** (0.189) 
R&D expenditures 0.001*** (0.000) 
Prior change in R&D 7.376*** (1.226) 
Future change in R&D 11.632*** (1.563) 
Interest expense -0.003*** (0.000) 
Prior change in Interest -5.116*** (1.883) 
Future change in Interest -8.869*** (1.558) 
Dividends 0.001*** (0.000) 
Prior change in Dividends 11.679*** (2.639) 
Future change in Dividends 10.838*** (2.469) 
CEO Tenure t-1 0.002 (0.004) 
Institutional Own t-1 -0.030* (0.018) 
Number of Segments 0.112 (0.141) 
Year fixed effects Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  
N 5,480  
R² 0.422  
Notes. This table reports marginal profitability regressions for the years 1992-2013. The first column displays the coefficient 
estimates, and the second column the corresponding standard errors. The dependent variable firm value, defined as the level of 
the spread of value over cost. The spread of value over cost is equal to the total market value of a firm net of book value of its 
assets divided by the book value of its assets. The independent variables include prior and future changes in total assets, in 
earnings before interest and extraordinary items and after depreciation and taxes, in R&D expenditures, interest expense, and 
in total dividends paid, as well as the future change in the market firm value. Changes in variables are calculated over one-year 
periods. The regressions also include current levels of earnings, R&D expenditures, interest expense, and total dividends paid. 
All variables are deflated by contemporaneous total book assets. All other variable definitions are given in Appendix. 
Regression models are estimated with calendar year dummy variables and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level, and are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 8. Marginal Profitability and CEO Duality (Full Sample of Diversified and Non 
Diversified Firms) 
 Coef. S.E. 
Intercept 0.596*** (0.066) 
Prior change in assets 0.371*** (0.035) 
Future change in assets 0.605*** (0.023) 
Future change in firm value -0.119*** (0.007) 
CEO Dualityt-1 -0.027* (0.016) 
Prior change in assets  CEO Dualityt-1 -0.095** (0.044) 
Future change in assets  CEO Dualityt-1 -0.054** (0.026) 
Earnings 0.001*** (0.000) 
Prior change in earnings 1.639*** (0.076) 
Future change in earnings 1.177*** (0.066) 
R&D expenditures 0.001*** (0.000) 
Prior change in R&D 9.3919*** (0.386) 
Future change in R&D 1.831*** (0.494) 
Interest expense -0.003*** (0.000) 
Prior change in Interest -6.482*** (0.671) 
Future change in Interest -8.348*** (0.535) 
Dividends 0.002*** (0.000) 
Prior change in Dividends 14.790*** (0.950) 
Future change in Dividends 10.405*** (0.759) 
CEO Tenure t-1 0.004*** (0.001) 
Institutional Own t-1 0.288*** (0.048) 
Number of Segments -0.009*** (0.001) 
Year fixed effects Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  
N 19,915  
R² 0.404  
Notes. This table reports marginal profitability regressions for the years 1992-2013. The first column displays the coefficient 
estimates, and the second column the corresponding standard errors. The dependent variable firm value, defined as the level of 
the spread of value over cost. The spread of value over cost is equal to the total market value of a firm net of book value of its 
assets divided by the book value of its assets. The independent variables include prior and future changes in total assets, in 
earnings before interest and extraordinary items and after depreciation and taxes, in R&D expenditures, interest expense, and 
in total dividends paid, as well as the future change in the market firm value. Changes in variables are calculated over one-year 
periods. The regressions also include current levels of earnings, R&D expenditures, interest expense, and total dividends paid. 
All variables are deflated by contemporaneous total book assets. All other variable definitions are given in Appendix. 
Regression models are estimated with calendar year dummy variables and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level, and are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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CEO Duality, Agency Costs,  
and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The debate about whether to join or separate CEO and chair positions continues to 
receive considerable attention from both practitioners and academics (see, for example, 
Rechner and Dalton, 1989, 1991; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993; 
Dalton et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2009; Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Krause and Semadeni, 2013; 
Yang and Zhao, 2014; Krause, 2017). Despite a wave of proposals to eliminate CEO duality 
and achieve independent board leadership, corporate leaders and policy-making bodies appear 
reluctant to adopt such an obligatory separation that suggests a “one size fits all” approach 
(Krause et al., 2014).  Even as recent years have seen a doubling of the number of firms that 
have separated their CEO and chair positions, most firms in Standard & Poor’s Execucomp 
continue to uphold CEO duality. During 1992-2013 the proportion of firms with CEO duality 
rarely drops below 50%.  
Academic research on CEO duality focuses mainly on firm performance and to date 
remains rather controversial. The theoretical grounds for a link between CEO duality and 
accounting- or market-based performance are extensive, yet no comprehensive evidence is 
available to confirm it. According to Dalton and Dalton (2011), little consistency appears in 
extant studies that relate CEO duality to financial performance. Krause et al. (2014) accordingly 
call for research that considers moderating attributes that might alter the strength or direction 
of the relationship. Subsequently, Duru et al. (2016) uncover that board independence 
attenuates the negative effect of CEO duality on firm performance, while Yang and Zhao (2014) 
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show that when their competitive environment changes, CEO duality firms outperform non-
duality firms. 
Chapter 3 draws motivation from Chapter 2 main inferences on the negative relation 
between CEO duality and firm investment efficiency, thus, it digs deeper into investment 
allocation mechanisms and shows that it is only prevalent in firms that are potentially exposed 
to agency issues; particularly in the presence of high free cash flows, firm complexity and weak 
board governance. In addition, the results of Chapter 3 underscore the importance of CEOs’ 
equity-based compensation as an important internal governance device to align the interest of 
the CEO and the shareholders, and as such to curb the negative effect of CEO duality on 
investment efficiency. Lastly, this chapter identifies CEO ability, CEO succession origin, and 
longevity of business segments as additional important moderating attributes that moderate the 
(negative) effect of CEO duality on investment efficiency.  
The findings in this chapter provide strong support for the agency theory, which predicts 
that CEO duality reflects weaker board oversight and stronger managerial power, and suggests 
that boards should be independent from the management to prevent managerial entrenchment 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). The findings emphasize that the adverse impact of 
CEO duality on corporate policies affecting value is contingent on a firm’s board characteristics 
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Davidson et al., 2004; Duru et al., 2016); further, they support 
the notion about complementarities in corporate governance practices, which appear to be 
aligned with one another and mutually enhance the ability of those practices to achieve effective 
corporate governance (see, for example, Rediker and Seth, 1995; Aguilera et al., 2008). In this 
vein, executive compensation is a powerful internal governance mechanism, able to mitigate 
the CEO duality rent-seeking behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Datta et al., 2009). Finally, 
in the spirit of Dalton and Dalton (2011) and Krause et al. (2014), the findings suggest that any 
future attempts to advance research towards the strategic importance of this phenomenon should 
consider competing theories through the lenses of such moderating or mediating factors.  
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details relevant literature, to 
provide the theoretical foundation for the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample 
and key variables used in the empirical analyses. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development  
2.1. Literature review 
 
Prior literature proposes two main competing theories to understand the relation 
between CEO duality and firm performance: agency and stewardship theories (see, for example, 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Agency theory predicts 
that agents commit to opportunistic behaviour and indulge in excessive benefits for themselves, 
at the expense of shareholder’ interests. CEO duality is therefore undesirable from this 
perspective, because it grants excess power to a single executive, weakening board monitoring, 
fostering managerial entrenchment and negatively affecting firm performance (Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni, 1994; Dalton et al., 1998; Krause et al., 2014). This view appears widely supported 
by practitioners and a growing group of scholars advocating CEO and chair separation, arguing 
that CEO duality weakens corporate governance (for example, Lublin, 2009; Iannelli, 2013; 
Krause, 2017).  
In contrast, stewardship theory asserts that CEO duality can be beneficial for firm 
performance, because it ensures cohesive leadership, signals firm stability, and inspires 
confidence in firm management (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Expertise and knowledge can 
result from CEO duality, along with faster decision-making and status rewards for executives 
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Boyd, 1995; He and Wang, 2004). Therefore, a fundamental 
implication of stewardship theory is that CEO duality enhances firm performance by reducing 
costs and inefficiencies that can result from separating the two roles (Brickley et al., 1997). 
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Elsayed (2010) adopts a more nuanced view on the determinants of board leadership, 
and emphasizes that the optimal leadership structure varies with the context in which firms are 
operating (see also, He and Wang, 2009; Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010; Krause and 
Semadeni, 2013; Krause, 2017). An important implication of this perspective is that agency 
theory and stewardship theory are complementary viewpoints, which explain different parts of 
the same picture. 
Despite the strong theoretical predictions, the evidence for the impact of CEO duality 
on firm performance is at best mixed, with some studies providing empirical support for the 
agency perspective (for example, Rechner and Dalton 1991; Daily and Dalton 1994; Worrell et 
al., 1997), and others endorsing the stewardship perspective (for example, Donaldson and Davis 
1991; Boyd, 1995; Brickley et al., 1997), while many others are inconclusive (for example, 
Rechner and Dalton 1989; Daily and Dalton 1992, 1993; Daily 1995; Baliga et al., 1996). 
Dalton et al.’s (1998) meta-analysis of board composition and leadership structure reveals little 
supporting evidence for the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. Empirical 
research in more recent years has in consequence steered away from investigating the existence 
of a direct (and simple) duality-performance relationship, as researchers quest for new contexts 
that could help them demystify the strategic importance of CEO duality (Dalton and Dalton, 
2011; Krause et al. 2014; Yang and Zhao, 2014; Duru et al., 2016; Krause, 2017).  
In this vein, some studies consider new empirical approaches and moderating factors to 
investigate the performance effect of CEO duality. For instance, He and Wang’s (2009) findings 
show that CEO duality strengthens the already positive effect of innovative knowledge assets 
on firm performance. In another study, Ballinger and Marcel (2010) report that interim CEO 
successions are associated with lower performance during the period in which the interim 
serves, while CEO duality moderates the impact of this type of succession on firm performance. 
Similarly, Krause and Semadeni (2013) find that separation of the CEO and Chair positions 
positively (negatively) impacts future firm performance when current performance is poor 
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(high), with the effect being most dramatic for demotion separations. More recently, Yang and 
Zhao (2014) rely on an exogenous shock to industry competition to show that, when there is a 
change in the firm’s competitive environment, CEO duality firms outperform non-duality firms, 
with the difference in performance being greater for duality firms with better corporate 
governance. In a similar vein, Duru et al. (2016) show that the negative effect of CEO duality 
on firm performance is attenuated by the degree of board independence.  
To conclude this review, despite a very rich literature investigating either the direct or 
moderating effects of CEO duality on firm performance, it appears that evidence is still missing 
regarding the possible channel(s) through which CEO duality affects firm policies and impacts 
firm performance.  
2.2. Hypotheses 
 
This chapter adopts the agency perspective of the firm to consider the internal capital 
allocation policy as a potential channel through which CEO duality might be detrimental to firm 
value. Several studies show that misallocation of internal capital in diversified firms leads to 
investment inefficiencies that are value-destructive (for example, Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan 
et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Ahn and Denis, 2004; Ahn et al., 2006; Datta et al., 
2009; Hovakimian, 2011; Duchin and Sosyura, 2013). While offering a variety of important 
insights, these studies focus on agency problems that arise from managerial self-interest, 
irrespective of the board leadership structure and of how CEO duality influences the internal 
capital allocation policy. In this spirit, the two main hypotheses pertaining to the relationship 
between CEO duality and investment efficiency in diversified firms are derived. 
As already discussed in Chapter 2, agency problems arise from conflicts of interest 
resulting from the separation of ownership and control in large corporations. When the boards’ 
attention to monitoring is reduced and when incentive devices are not in place, managers will 
use the authority of the board chair role to entrench themselves against accountabity and might 
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undertake actions that maximize their own utility (see, for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) or simply enjoy the quiet life (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). 
In diversified firms agency theory maintains that CEOs can distil their private benefits of 
control by engaging in inefficient cross-subsidization, funding value-destroying projects, and 
ceding to rent-seeking efforts of divisional managers by overinvesting in weak projects at the 
expense of good ones (Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan 
et al., 2000). In support of this view, Ahn and Denis (2004) find that diversified firms allocate 
investment funds inefficiently. In a similar vein, Ahn et al. (2006) find that diversified firms 
invest more than their focused peers, this behaviour being driven by favouring overinvestments 
in low-growth business segments, to the detriment of segments with high growth opportunities 
that add value to the firm. Other studies (i.e. Duchin and Sosyura, 2013) consider managerial 
ties and social connection suggesting that under weak corporate governance, managerial ties 
tend to result in investment inefficiencies and lower firm value. Under these circumstances, a 
board may fail to interfere diligently in major corporate decisions because of its weak role when 
a CEO is too powerful. Accordingly, CEO duality can then lead to misallocation of capital to 
business divisions, including allocations of more investments to low growth, relative to high 
growth, segments.  
Hypothesis 1: Firms with CEO duality make inefficient investments, allocating more to 
low growth segments than to high growth segments. 
The aforementioned arguments confirm the substantial body of research to date on CEO 
duality. As has been documented, the overabundance of incongruous evidence followed by the 
comparatively decisive meta-analysis by Dalton et al., (1998) conclusively terminated the 
exploration for direct and simplistic relationships of CEO duality and firm performance. More 
critically, scholars identified that CEO duality should have important role that differs according 
to the circumstance. Duality can have both positive and negative consequences in different 
market settings (Boyd, 1995) and under different market characteristics (Boyd, 1995; Worrell 
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et al., 1997; He and Wang, 2009; Kraise, 2014), moderating attributes originating from CEO 
and board characteristics (Krause et al., 2014), and may well vary conditionally on the level of 
firm performance (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010; Krause and Semadeni, 2013; Krause, 
2017). For this reason, a revived interest in the topic has contemplated more complex settings 
and interactions of CEO duality, considering outcomes other than the performance outcome. 
The extant literature advocates free cash flow as a proxy for the existence of potential 
agency issues. Firms with excess free cash flow encounter major agency problems, especially 
if their investment opportunities are limited (see, for example, Jensen, 1986; Lang et al., 1991, 
Chung et al., 2005). The agency costs arise because, when the firm holds too much excess cash, 
a powerful CEO can act opportunistically and seize personal gains from unnecessary value-
destroying investments. Such resource misallocations may offer personal rewards, at the 
expense of shareholders’ interests. Limited free cash flows, on the other hand, do not allow for 
such managerial discretion; under lower free cash flows levels, waste and inefficiencies on 
behalf of management should be reduced, acting as disciplining forces for overpowering CEOs 
who are more prone to misuse resources to pursue private goals. Low free cash flows restrict 
dual CEOs ability to pursue opportunistic behaviors at the expense of shareholder value, thus 
mitigating the investment inefficiency problems caused by dual CEOs.  Zajac and Westphal 
(1994) point to the firm’s complexity as another firm-level factor that may intensify agency 
conflicts. They assert that when monitoring is more costly, i.e  under strategic complexity, the 
task of monitoring becomes harder, resulting to a less vigilant board. It is, therefore, argued that 
the degree of free cash flow availability as well as strategic complexity are important 
determinants of the magnitude of agency costs in a firm, thus, moderate the relation between 
dual CEOs, resource allocation and overall investment efficiency. 
Several management scholars argue that the performance impact of CEO duality is 
contingent on the board’s characteristics (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Davidson et al., 2004; 
Duru et al., 2016), and internal governance mechanisms can be substitutes for CEO duality 
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(Rediker and Seth, 1995). Three important board characteristics considered in the literature are 
a board’s independence, staggered boards, and board size. Independent board members, those 
with no ties to the company and its CEO, are better suited to improve the effectiveness of board 
monitoring and to sanction the CEO in case of underperformance (see, for example, Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988). Duru et al. (2016) emphasize that board independence 
amplifies the positive effect of CEO duality on firm performance and mitigates the associated 
costs, which in turn leads to a more profitable balance between strong leadership and better 
board monitoring. The implementation of a staggered board is another board characteristic that 
has attracted the interest of scholars in finance and management.1 A staggered board may 
exacerbate agency problems and lead to CEO entrenchment, as it potentially insulates the firm 
from the pressure of the market for corporate control (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Cohen and Wang, 
2013; Amihud and Stoyanov, 2017). Board size has also been found to influence the capacity 
of the board to vigilantly function. Relevant literature has largely supported that larger boards 
are ineffective in monitoring the CEO because of the presence of co-ordination problems and 
free rider directors (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992;Jensen,1993), being in favor of smaller boards 
which appear to relate to higher valuations (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998). Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2008) point to a U-shaped relation between firm value and board size 
advocating that either very small or very large boards are optimal in disciplining the CEO. 
Therefore, board characteristics that curb (or heighten) agency problems may act as important 
moderating attributes in the relation between CEO duality and the efficiency of internal capital 
allocation.  
To add to the debate on the role of the moderating effects of CEO duality, this thesis 
revisits equity-based compensation, due to its role in diminishing managerial entrenchment. 
CEO compensation constitutes a vital internal governance device to alleviate managerial slack 
                                                          
1 A staggered board is a board structure in which only a fraction of the directors is elected during a shareholder 
meeting, rather than all at once. 
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and align managerial incentives with shareholder concerns and its role should not be 
undermined (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hölmstrom, 1979). In the context of CEO duality, the 
main focus in past literature is only on examining compensation as a consequence of CEO 
duality (Westphal & Zajac, 1994) rather than utilising it as a moderating attribute. Equity-based 
compensation is known to attenuate agency costs by reducing the non-value-maximizing 
behaviour of managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), and to promote collaboration in large 
diversified firms (Oxley and Pandher, 2016). In the spirit of agency theory, Datta et al. (2009) 
document that stock grants play an important role in motivating CEOs to make more efficient 
internal capital allocation decisions. As it helps to align managerial interests with those of 
shareholders, equity-based compensation may play an important role in curbing the negative 
effect of CEO duality on internal investment allocation. 
Taken collectively, all these arguments lead to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The negative effect of CEO duality on internal capital allocation 
efficiency prevails only in diversified firms that are exposed to high agency problems. 
 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
3.1. Sample and data sources 
 
Four data sets serve to construct the sample with the required data: CEOs’ equity-based 
compensation and characteristics from Execucomp, firm-level financial data from Compustat, 
segment-level financial data from the Compustat Industrial Segment (CIS) database, and 
corporate governance data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Since the focuses on 
a contingency approach on an intra-firm examination of investments to business segments, the 
sample is restricted to diversified firms that report at least two segments, operating in different 
three-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) codes.  
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The primary sample for the time frame of 1992-2013 from Compustat consists of 
504226 firm year observations.  Similarly to Chapter 2, to attenuate distortions caused by small 
firms, which may have negligible sales or assets, the selection criteria require total sales of at 
least $20 million. Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), as well as firms with any divisions 
that operate in these sectors, are excluded, because they are subject to specific regulations. 
Further, taking into consideration certain WRDS recommendations for the elimination of non-
accurate observations, the sample is reduced to 43460 multi-segment firm years. Sales generally 
are allocated across the reported segments of a diversified firm, so the sum of all segment sales 
must be within 1% of the total firm sales (Berger and Ofek, 1995). For the purpose of industry 
benchmarking (defined by the median peer-focused firm), another requirement is the existence 
of at least five peer-focused firms in the same three-digit SIC for each segment of the sample 
of diversified firms. The final sample covers the period 1992-2013 and is made up of 4,168 
firm-years and 10,740 segment-year observations, after accounting for missing observations on 
the two variables, and control variables. 
3.2. Model specification and variable definitions 
 
3.2.1. Baseline specification 
To measure the effect of CEO duality on internal capital allocation efficiency, the 
segment-level regression equation adopted is the following: 
 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽2 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ-𝑞 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽3 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1   𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ-𝑞 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑖,𝑡,     (1) 
where the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted investment of segment j at time t, defined 
as segment j’s capital expenditure-to-sales ratio minus the capital expenditure-to-sales ratio of 
the median peer-focused firm operating in the same three-digit SIC industry as segment j. 
Subscript i denotes the firm, and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼𝑡 are firm and year fixed-effects, respectively. Year 
fixed-effects control for changing economic and financing conditions through time. Firm fixed-
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effects help isolate intra-firm changes and allow us to better capture the sensitivity of segment 
investment to changes in the independent variable of interest. Firm fixed-effects also mitigate 
concerns about omitted variable biases due to time-invariant firm-level unobservable factors. It 
is also important to note that industry fixed-effects are indirectly controlled for using industry-
adjusted segment variables.  
The two independent variables of interest in Eq. (1) are CEO Duality and High-q 
Segment. CEO Duality is a dummy variable set equal to one for firm-years during which the 
CEO served also as the board chair, and zero otherwise. High-q Segment is a dummy variable 
set equal to one if the corresponding segment belongs to a high growth industry (high-q), and 
zero otherwise (low-q). Following Ahn et al. (2006) and Datta et al. (2009), a segment is classed 
as high-q if the Tobin’s q of the median peer-focused firm in the corresponding three-digit SIC 
industry is greater than the sales-weighted average Tobin’s q for the firm as a whole. To 
empirically investigate Hypothesis 1, an interaction term of these two independent variables of 
interest is used (i.e., CEO Duality   High-q Segment). A negative 𝛽3 coefficient indicates that 
the capital allocation process in firms with CEO duality favors low-q over high-q segments, 
indicating the existence of inefficiencies in the capital allocation policy of the firm. In the 
current empirical framework, underinvestment in high-q segments is a measure of agency cost 
due to having CEO duality. This is captured by a negative 3 coefficient in Eq. (1). The more 
negative 3, the higher the agency cost associated with CEO duality. The study by Ang et al. 
(2000) also relies on efficiency ratios as a measure for agency costs, but its focus is on operating 
expenses and efficient use of assets, while this thesis focuses on the efficiency of cross-segment 
capital allocation. 
The specification in Eq. (1) also controls for a large set of time-varying segment, firm, 
and CEO characteristics: Segment Size, the natural logarithm of the sales of the corresponding 
segment; Relative Segment Size, the segment’s sales divided by the sum of sales across all 
segments of the firm; Segment CF, the industry-adjusted operating cash flow to sales ratio for 
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the corresponding segment; Other Segment CF, the industry-adjusted operating cash flow to 
sales ratio for the firm’s remaining segments; Industry Tobin’s q, the Tobin’s q ratio of the 
median peer-focused firm in the three-digit SIC code industry for the corresponding segment; 
Institutional Own, the proportion of institutional ownership in the firm’s ownership structure; 
Firm risk, the variance of the firm’s monthly excess stock returns during the fiscal year; CEO 
Tenure, the natural logarithm of one plus the length of time between the date when the person 
became the CEO and the current fiscal year end; and CEO Own, the proportion of CEO 
ownership in the firm. Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. To avoid 
potential problems with outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles of their distributions. Robust standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent 
are clustered at the firm level. Firm- and CEO-level right-hand side variables are lagged by one-
period, to alleviate the concern that CEO duality and the firm’s investment policy may be 
simultaneously determined in equilibrium. 
 
3.2.2. Moderating attributes 
 
The chapter aims to shed light on whether the internal capital allocation policy is 
inefficient in firms characterized as facing potentially high agency problems. Empirically this 
is done by conditioning the regression coefficient of interest, 𝛽3, in Eq. (1), on prominent firm-
specific and CEO-specific variables known to be correlated with agency issues, and therefore 
by capturing the potential misalignment of interests between the CEO and the shareholders. 
Such investigation is also in the spirit of recent studies probing for more research that considers 
moderating attributes that might alter the strength or direction of the relationship (see, for 
example, Krause et al., 2014).  
The first set of moderating attributes considered is related to firm characteristics, in 
particular the firm’s free cash flow (Free Cash Flow) and firm complexity (Complex Firm). 
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Complex firms and firms with high free cash flow are associated with potentially severe agency 
problems, particularly in the presence of a powerful CEO (Jensen, 1986). Free cash flow is 
calculated as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation expense scaled by total 
assets. The second firm- level moderating variable relates to whether the firm is complex or 
simple. Following Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2009), complexity is proxied with the sales 
concentration ratio, which declines with the number and variety of firm activities, and it is 
therefore considered as a  negative determinant of complexity. 
Next, three important board characteristics are considered which are known to be 
correlated with weak board monitoring and CEO entrenchment: board independence ,staggered 
board, and board size (see, for example, Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Bebchuk et 
al., 2002). Board independence (Board Independence) is measured using the proportion of 
outside directors in a firm’s board of directors. Staggered board (Staggered Board) is a dummy 
variable set equal to one in cases where not all members of the board are elected at the same 
time, and zero otherwise. Board size (Board Size) reflects the total number of directors in a 
firm’s board. 
Following Jensen and Murphy (1990), equity-based compensation is also adopted as 
another moderating attribute, since its use can be an effective tool for aligning the interests of 
managers and shareholders by exposing managers’ wealth to their firms’ stock prices. To 
capture this, the CEO’s Incentive Ratio as in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), and the Delta 
as in Core and Guay (2002) are used. The Incentive Ratio is calculated such that it captures the 
share of a hypothetical CEO’s total compensation that would come from a 1% increase in the 
value of the equity of their company. The Delta gives the CEO’s option portfolio price 
sensitivity estimated as the change in the risk-neutral value of the executive’s portfolio for a 
1% change in the price of the underlying stock. As such, the higher (lower) the Incentive Ratio 
or Delta, the more (less) sensitive the CEO’s compensation to a change in the firm’s stock price, 
implying potentially lower (higher) agency costs.  
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All the moderating attributes are measured with a one-year lag relative to the internal 
capital allocation policy, to ensure that the attributes are not affected by the investment decision. 
Detailed definitions of all the moderating variables appear in the Appendix. 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on CEO and firm characteristics in Panel A, and on 
segment characteristics in Panel B. The proportion of firm-year observations with CEO duality 
is 67% in the sample, a proportion similar to that reported by Yang and Zhao (2014). The 
average tenure of the CEOs is 7.6 years and the average CEO is about 57 years old, figures 
similar to those reported in Andreou et al. (2017b). Institutional investors own on average 37% 
of the firm’s equity capital, while the CEO owns slightly less than 3%. 
At the segment-level, the average industry-adjusted investment is 0.5%, close to the 
magnitude reported by Rajan et al. (2000) and Ahn et al. (2006). The mean size of the segment 
is about 456 million USD, the average segment generates about 34% of the firm’s sales, and 
the industry-adjusted ratio of cash flows to sales exhibits a mean of 15.4%, while the same ratio 
for the firm’s remaining segments is 16.2%. Finally, the industry Tobin’s q displays a mean of 
1.54, and about 49% of a firm’s segments are classified as having high-q growth opportunities.  
[Table 1 here] 
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix for the variables considered. Most variables 
correlate with CEO duality and exhibit the expected sign. For example, under the agency view, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Jensen (1986) imply that CEO duality should be pronounced 
for bigger firms (correlation with Segment Size is 0.177, p-value<0.01), Amihud and Lev (1981) 
suggest that CEO duality firms show a tendency to reduce their own risk (correlation with Firm 
Risk is -0.083, p-value<0.01, and CEO Own is -0.011, p-value<0.10), and as suggested by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), such firms engage in self-interested actions at the expense of 
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shareholders to reap private benefits and thus destruct value (correlation with Industry Tobin’s 
q is -0.019, p-value<0.01). It is evident that none of the correlations is high enough to raise 
concerns over multicollinearity. Still to eliminate any possibility, the study relies on the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) to identify the presence of multicollinearity among the predictors 
of all the regression models. As recorded in Table 3, all the predictors in Eq. (1) have a VIF 
that is in principle lower than 3.9, which indicates the absence of severe multicollinearity issues 
in the models.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
[Table 3 here] 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1. Baseline specification 
 
In the context of diversified firms, an efficient internal capital allocation policy 
prioritizes business segments with high growth opportunities (high-q segments) in directing its 
resources (Rajan et al., 2000). To examine the relation between CEO duality and internal capital 
allocation efficiency, Table 4 reports the estimation results of Eq. (1).  
Model (1) investigates a specification without the interaction term (CEO Duality  
High-q Segment), whereby the coefficient estimate of CEO Duality is equal to 0.005 (p-
value<0.05). This indicates that firms following a CEO-Chair leadership structure in year t-1 
on average increase their industry-adjusted segment investment by 0.5% over the next year. 
Overall, model (1) suggests that firms with CEO duality overinvest, relative to firms in which 
these roles are held by different individuals. This result alone squares with agency theory, 
supporting the view that diversified firms appear to incubate entrenched managers who engage 
in self-interested investments at the expense of shareholders to reap private benefits by 
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overinvesting and growing their firms beyond their optimal size (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). 
In model (2), the coefficient estimate of CEO Duality measures the effect of CEO 
duality on investment in low-q segments, while the interaction term measures the differential 
impact of CEO duality on investment in high-q segments. The coefficient estimate of CEO 
Duality is equal to 0.01 (p-value<0.01) and shows that the overinvestment pattern identified in 
model (1) is mainly concentrated in low-q segments. The coefficient of the CEO Duality  
High-q Segment (i.e., coefficient 𝛽3 in Eq. (1)), which is equal to -0.009 (p-value<0.05), shows 
that firms with CEO duality fail to give priority to high-q segments in their capital allocation 
policy, a result emphasizing a strong contradiction of the efficient internal capital markets 
paradigm (see, for example, Stein, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998), according to which diversified 
firms should channel corporate resources first to divisions with high growth opportunities, 
which can add value. The findings also suggest that part of the observed investment inefficiency 
documented in prior studies (for example, Rajan et al., 2000; Ahn et al., 2006; Datta et al., 
2009; Hovakimian, 2011; Duchin and Sosyura, 2013) stems from the increased power and the 
self-interested internal investment behaviour associated with CEO duality. 
To assess the robustness of the baseline findings, in model (3) firm fixed-effects are 
replaced with random-effects that allow for random differences in segment investment across 
firms. This specification makes use of both time-series and cross-sectional variations, and 
controls for the effect of unobservable firm heterogeneity on segment investment. Importantly, 
model (3) shows that the main findings are insensitive to the way unobservable firm 
heterogeneity is controlled.  
[Table 4 here] 
 
The main analysis of this study relates to the impact of CEO duality on investment 
allocation, therefore an empirical issue tackled is the potential endogeneity in the relation 
 66 
 
between CEO duality and internal capital allocation policy (Yang and Zhao, 2014). The firm’s 
internal capital allocation policy may be both a result of CEO duality and itself a determinant 
of the firm’s decision to adopt CEO duality. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that the 
decision about the structure and composition of a board of directors represents the firm’s answer 
to organizational design issues or problems. For Kang and Zardkoohi (2005), CEO duality can 
have various institutional, power, social reciprocity, reward, and organizational antecedents, so 
a firm’s choice of leadership structure is not random but rather represents a response to a 
constrained optimization process. Yet, Iyengar and Zampelli (2009) find no evidence that CEO 
duality is a structure intentionally chosen to optimize performance; if the firm is choosing a 
dual leadership regime, the reason for this choice is not performance. Still, to account for the 
possibility of endogenous CEO duality and its effects, chapter 3 accounts for the possibility of 
an endogenous relationship with the use of instrumental variables and endogeneity checks to 
ensure further validity of the main analysis’ results. More specifically, Elsayed (2010) suggests 
that corporate leadership structure must be viewed as a dynamic process, contingent on the 
context, actors and time. Elsayed (2010) documents that corporate leadership structure varies 
with firm size, firm age and ownership structure. Considering Elsayed’s findings, 2SLS tests 
are performed by simultaneously employing as instruments firm size and firm age. The test 
results are reported in Table 5, whereby models (1) and (2) present the results from the second-
stage estimation, investigating the impact of CEO duality on industry-adjusted segment 
investment. The analysis in model (1) uses two variables to instrument CEO duality: firm age, 
which is the number of years elapsed since the year of the firm’s Compustat of the firm listing, 
and firm size, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of the firm’s assets. The analysis in 
model (2) uses two other variables to instrument CEO duality: a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the age of the firm is higher than the industry median age in each year, and a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the size of the firm is higher than industry median 
size in each year. Both models (1) and (2) of Table 5 fully support the findings of the main 
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analysis; in both models the interaction term (CEO Duality  High-q Segment) remains negative 
and highly significant (p-value<0.10 and p-value<0.05, respectively).  
To address the endogeneity issue in another way, the study follows Abdallah, Goergen 
and O’Sullivan (2015) to perform the system generalized method of moments (GMM). In 
contrast to 2SLS and 3SLS endogeneity tests, system GMM does not rely on exogenous 
variables used as instruments; rather, it employs a system of two sets of equations with their 
own internal instruments. The analysis is implemented in the spirit of the estimation approach 
in Abdallah et al. (2015). Accordingly, the lagged dependent variable, i.e., industry adjusted 
segment investment (Segment Investment), is now included on the right-hand side of the main 
equation transforming the analysis into a dynamic panel regression. To account for first-order 
correlation and second order correlation in the residuals, the Arellano−Bond test for 
autocorrelation is utilized. GMM test results are reported in model (3) of Table 5. Consistent 
with the main findings, the interaction term (CEO Duality  High-q Segment) remains negative 
and highly significant (p-value<0.05), lending further support to the view that CEO duality 
adversely affects the internal capital allocation efficiency in diversified firms. Overall, it is 
observed that the endogeneity tests confirm the robustness and validity of the main findings. 
[Table 5 here] 
 
4.2. Moderating effects  
 
This subsection examines three main hypothesis which relate to the moderating role of 
firm-specific and CEO-specific variables known to be correlated with the severity of agency 
problems within the firm.  
This section first considers a firm’s Free Cash Flow, Firm Complexity, and three 
important board characteristics, namely, Staggered Board, Board Independence, and Board 
Size as moderating variables for the relation between CEO duality and the efficiency of internal 
capital allocation. Next, it adopts the Incentive Ratio and Delta of the CEO’s compensation 
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package as proxies for the importance of equity-based compensation as an incentive 
mechanism. With the help of each of these variables as measured in year t-1, the sample is split 
into two subsamples that characterize firm context with potentially high and low agency 
problems, respectively. Then for each of these subsamples, the specification in Eq. (1) is 
estimated and results are reported in Tables 6 to 9.  
Models (1) and (2) in Table 6 report on the subsample of firms with high (above the 
yearly median value) and low (below the yearly median value) free cash flows, respectively. 
Models (3) and (4) report the results for the subsamples of firms classified as being “Simple” 
(“Complex”) in fiscal year t-1, which are firms below (above) the yearly median values of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index of the firm’s sales (calculated as the sum of squares 
of sales shares by business and geographic segments), respectively. High free cash flow, and 
complex firms denote firm contexts with potentially high agency problems, and it is in these 
firms that the adverse effect of CEO duality on investment efficiency is expected to be more 
substantial. As depicted in model (1), firms with high free cash flows that feature CEO duality 
in year t-1 decrease their industry-adjusted investment in high-q segments by 1.0% over the 
next year, relative to their industry-adjusted investment in low-q segments. Similarly, Model 
(4) shows that the adverse effect of CEO Duality on investment efficiency prevails only in the 
case of complex firms proving that differences in the level of firm complexity matter in 
attenuating agency costs. Both CEO Duality and CEO Duality × High-q Segment are not 
statistically significant in models (2) and (3), which are the subsamples of firms with potentially 
low agency problems, demonstrating that the negative consequences of duality on investment 
allocation and efficiency vanish in simple firm settings and in firms with low free cash flows.  
[Table 6 here] 
 
In Table 7, Models (1) and (2) report on the subsample of firms with and without a 
staggered board structure, respectively. Models (3) and (4) report on the subsample of firms 
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with a low (below the yearly median value) and high (above the yearly median value) 
percentage of independent board members, respectively. The existence of staggered board, and 
low board independence represent firm contexts prone to severe agency problems, and it is 
expected that under these regimes the adverse effect of CEO duality on investment efficiency 
will manifest. Table 7 shows that the positive effect of CEO duality on segment overinvestment 
tendency prevails only in models (1) and (3). These are the subsamples of observations with 
potentially high agency problems. Likewise, the coefficient of CEO Duality × High-q Segment 
is negative and statistically significant (p-values<0.05) only in these models. Likewise, as 
shown in model (1), firms with staggered board structure reduce their investment in high-q 
segments by 2.1%, whereas as per model (3) the reduction in high-q is 1.2% in the case of firms 
with low board independence. Both CEO Duality and CEO Duality × High-q Segment are not 
statistically significant in models (2) and (4), which are the subsamples of firms with potentially 
low agency problems. These results emphasize that the absence of staggered board structure, 
and high board independence are firm contexts that are beneficial to the balance between strong 
leadership and better board monitoring. As such, they help to avoid situations according to 
which powerful CEOs can extract private benefits through misallocating corporate resources.  
[Table 7 here] 
 
The chapter also investigates the results separately for small-, medium- and large-sized 
boards in Table 8 Models (1), (2), and (3) respectively, using three tercile ranks of firms split 
according to board size in fiscal year t-1. The expectation is that larger boards would associate 
with poorer monitoring and thus weaker corporate governance structures that accentuate agency 
problems. Results in table 8 reveal a negative relation between CEO duality and investment 
efficiency for the subsample of firms with a large board; however, this relation is not 
statistically significant. A finer slicing of the data between small-, medium- and large-sized 
boards reveals a negative relation between CEO duality and investment efficiency only for 
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firms with medium-sized boards. A negative and significant coefficient (p-values<0.05) for 
CEO Duality × High-q Segment is obtained only in this model. This result is in line with the U-
shaped evidence documented by previous studies, where smaller as well as larger board sizes 
are optimal in various firm settings (Coles, et al., 2008). 
[Table 8 here] 
 
The low or high agency problems subsamples in Table 9 include observations below or 
above the yearly median values of, respectively, the Incentive Ratio in models (1) and (2), and 
Delta in models (3) and (4), as measured in year t-1. The results show that the negative impact 
of CEO duality on investment efficiency concentrates only in firms with potentially high agency 
problems, due to the absence of enough incentives (models (1) and (3) featuring low Incentive 
Ratio and low Delta, respectively), while the adverse impact of CEO duality on investment 
efficiency disappears in the subsample of firms with potentially low agency problems (models 
(2) and (4) featuring high Incentive Ratio and high Delta, respectively). In general, these 
findings follow in spirit those of Table 6 to 9, whereby the positive coefficients of CEO Duality 
reveal a clear tendency of over-investments in low-q segments, while the negative coefficients 
of CEO Duality  High-q Segment offer strong evidence of under-investments in high-q 
segments. Overall, there is compelling evidence that the existence of agency problems allows 
CEO duality to manifest rent-seeking behaviours that erode a firm’s internal investment 
efficiency, even though equity-based compensation can be effective in mitigating such 
inefficiencies.   
[Table 9 here] 
 
Collectively, the results of Tables 6 to 9 highlight the importance of firm contexts 
associated with high agency problems in moderating the negative effect of CEO duality on the 
internal capital allocation efficiency and provide strong support for the main hypothesis of this 
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chapter. These findings also complement prior literature (see, for example, Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni, 1994; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Davidson et al., 2004; Aguilera et al., 2008; Duru et 
al., 2016), because they offer additional evidence in support of the substitution hypothesis of 
internal corporate governance devices.  
   
4.3. Additional moderating attributes  
 
This subsection investigates additional attributes that might potentially moderate the 
relation between CEO duality and internal investment efficiency. The considered attributes are 
(i) CEO ability, (ii) CEO succession origin, and (iii) segment longevity, all measured in year t-
1. Table 10 reports the results.  
The chapter uses a managerial ability index developed by Demerjian et al. (2012), which 
relies on data envelopment analysis and measures managers’ efficiency in generating revenues 
(see the Appendix for a description of the index construction). Although the managerial ability 
index measures the ability of the whole management team, Demerjian et al. (2012) document 
that a substantial portion of the index variance is explained by CEO fixed-effects and as such 
can be used to quantify CEO managerial ability. In this regard, many subsequent studies have 
used this measure to investigate the effects of CEO managerial ability on different firm policies 
and outcomes (for example, Andreou et al., 2017a).  
Intuitively, CEO duality is expected to promote strong leadership and to be more 
beneficial to firm value when the CEO also has high ability, because this is a situation where 
the manager has the least need to opt for rent-seeking behaviour. This expectation is founded 
on two reasons. First, Demerjian et al. (2012) find that replacing CEOs with more able CEOs 
is associated with improvements in subsequent firm performance, whereas the reverse is true 
for less able CEOs. Second, Andreou et al. (2017a) find a strong positive relation between CEO 
ability and capital expenditures during the crisis period, which remains robust in the presence 
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of a large array of control variables capturing corporate governance attributes, executive 
compensation incentives and CEO characteristics. Taken together, their results are consistent 
with the view that high CEO ability helps to mitigate under-investment problems, which in turn 
increases firm value. To test this premise, models (1) and (2) of Table 10 report the results for 
the subsample of firms with low and high CEO ability, respectively. The low and high 
subsamples include observations below or above the yearly median values of the managerial 
ability index. Evidently, the negative effect of CEO duality on investment efficiency prevails 
only in model (1), indicating that powerful CEOs with low managerial ability are more inclined 
to develop entrenchment strategies, perhaps to hedge their employment risk and extract private 
benefits which they cannot otherwise achieve due to incompetency and mediocre talent.  
Next the study assesses whether the impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency 
relates to the CEO succession origin. Karaevli (2007) argues that externally hired CEOs are 
more likely to be performance- and change-oriented in comparison to internally promoted 
CEOs. In addition, internally hired CEOs, having strong ties within the firm and its business 
segments, might be more tempted to deviate from an efficiency-driven capital allocation 
process. This reasoning also resonates with the internal capital market efficiency literature, 
which aims to explain misallocation of resources and rent-payment by the CEO to the divisional 
managers, who receive unjustifiably more resource allocation for their divisions (Scharfstein 
and Stein, 2000; Rajan et al., 2000; Duchin and Sosyura, 2013). Therefore, the adverse effect 
of CEO duality is expected to be prevalent particularly in the subsample of internally hired 
CEOs. In general, a CEO is classified as externally hired if the appointed CEO has tenure of 
fewer than 365 days in the firm (more details on the classification definition are provided in the 
Appendix.) Models (3) and (4) in Table 10 report respectively on internally and externally hired 
CEOs, where the interaction term (CEO Duality  High-q Segment) in model (3) is negative 
and statistically significant (p-value<0.01). As expected, the results indicate that the inefficient 
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internal capital allocation of powerful CEOs is due to the investment behaviour of internally 
hired CEOs.  
Finally, the longevity of the respective segment is examined. It could be argued that 
powerful CEOs may find it more convenient for their own personal motives and risk reduction 
tendencies to invest in a long-lived segment, which has proved to survive through the years, 
rather than bearing the uncertainty related to younger segments, still unknown as to whether 
they will be able to survive and succeed in the long-run. It is also plausible that older divisions 
and their divisional managers may have more power and more say over the allocation process of 
the firm or could be better connected to the CEO (see Duchin and Sosyura, 2013, for similar 
arguments). Therefore, it is expected to find more investment inefficiency in the allocation 
process in long-lived business segments. The results in models (5) and (6) offer support for 
these conjectures. 
[Table 10 here] 
 
Overall, the results of Table 10 provide additional evidence that is broadly consistent 
with the agency view of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1989; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). CEOs’ risk reduction, 
rent extraction, and entrenchment tendencies potentially explain the existence of inefficient 
allocation of internal capital in firms with CEO duality. 
5. Conclusion 
As has been demonstrated, the vast majority of CEO duality research has utilized a 
variant of agency theory or stewardship theory to develop and test hypotheses. While these two 
prevailing models have permitted pertinent research to produce substantial insights about board 
leadership, the applicability of these studies given the recent economic turmoil is gradually 
waning. This chapter builds on this argument and contributes to the literature by drawing on 
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alternative theoretical paradigms, focusing on firm level and board governance moderators that 
moderate the (negative) effect of CEO duality on investment efficiency. Additionally, the 
findings of this chapter emphasize the importance of CEOs’ equity-based compensation as an 
important internal governance mechanism that provides incentives for CEOs to institute their 
acts and decisions in accord with shareholder interests, and as such to curb the negative effect 
of CEO duality on investment efficiency. 
Although the chapter provides an agency perspective on CEO duality, an important 
inference is that investment inefficiencies (and as a result firm performance) will not necessarily 
improve by splitting the CEO and board chair positions. Rather, performance implications of 
CEO duality must be viewed in a contingent lens in which an array of factors determines the 
structure that is deemed to be strategically beneficial for their firms. As such, the chapter 
informs strategic literature that the prospect that CEO duality begets self-interested behavior at 
the expense of shareholder depends on firm and compensation structure, as well as board and 
CEO characteristics. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Median Maximum St. Deviation 
 
Panel A. CEO and Firm Characteristics      
 
CEO Duality 
 
0.673 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
 
0.469 
CEO Tenure 7.598 0.496 5.332 37.996 7.344 
CEO Age 56.90 41.00 57.00 77.00 6.622 
CEO Own 0.028 0.000 0.013 0.276 0.046 
Institutional Own 0.368 0.000 0.353 1.000 0.183 
Firm Risk 0.014 0.001 0.008 0.311 0.023 
Panel B. Segment Characteristics 
    
Segment Investment 0.005 -0.402 -0.001 0.495 0.091 
Segment Size 6.122 -1.269 6.177 9.707 1.731 
Relative Segment Size 0.341 0.000 0.274 0.998 0.257 
Segment CF  0.154 -1.185 0.145 0.836 0.194 
Other Segment CF 0.162 -0.975 0.151 0.673 0.131 
Industry Tobin’s q 1.539 0.851 1.386 4.860 0.560 
High-q Segment 0.489 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 
Notes. This table reports the summary statistics on the CEO, firm, and segment variables used in the analyses. The 
sample covers the period 1992-2013 and is made up of 10,740 segment-year observations. Segment-level variables 
are measured in year t, and CEO- and firm-level variables in year t-1. The definitions of all the variables are 
provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.    CEO Duality            
2.    Segment Investment -0.004           
3.    Segment Size 0.177*** -0.013***          
4.    Relative Segment Size 0.005 -0.048*** 0.220***         
5.    Segment CF 0.021*** -0.012** 0.252*** 0.047***        
6.    Other Segment CF 0.016** 0.013*** 0.195*** -0.145*** 0.265***       
7.    Industry Tobin’s q -0.019*** -0.002 -0.132*** -0.013*** -0.043*** -0.026***      
8.    High-q Segment -0.008 -0.017*** -0.051*** -0.042*** -0.015*** 0.001 0.431***     
9.    Institutional Own 0.023*** 0.016*** -0.119*** 0.020*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.028*** 0.003    
10.  Firm Risk -0.083*** -0.014*** -0.320*** 0.053*** -0.175*** -0.209*** 0.063*** 0.005 0.011*   
11.  CEO Tenure 0.210*** 0.004 -0.083*** -0.001 -0.036*** -0.024*** 0.041*** 0.009 0.001 0.145***  
12.  CEO Own -0.011* -0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.01 0.015** -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 
Notes. All the variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 3. CEO duality and internal capital allocation efficiency: Multicollinearity Test 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. CEO duality and internal capital allocation efficiency  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
                  Fixed  Effects Random Effects 
    Segment Size -0.017***  
(0.004) 
-0.017***  
(0.004) 
-0.007***     
(0.001) 
Relative Segment Size 0.045***   
(0.013) 
0.045***   
(0.013) 
0.011**      
(0.005) 
Segment CF  -0.025         
(0.019) 
-0.025      
(0.012) 
-0.025***     
(0.005) 
Other Segment CF -0.001          
(0.022) 
-0.001      
(0.022) 
0.008           
(0.008) 
Industry Tobin’s q 0.001         
(0.002) 
0.001         
(0.002) 
0.003         
(0.002) 
High-q Segment -0.003        
(0.003) 
0.003       
(0.004) 
0.002         
(0.003) 
Institutional Own 0.002        
(0.008) 
0.002       
(0.008) 
-0.009       
(0.008) 
Firm Risk -0.053       
(0.042) 
-0.053         
(0.042) 
-0.067         
(0.053) 
CEO Tenure 0.001           
(0.001) 
0.001       
(0.002) 
0.001         
(0.001) 
CEO Own 0.026       
(0.040) 
0.027        
(0.041) 
-0.020           
(0.027) 
CEO Duality 0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.010***   
(0.003) 
0.008**      
(0.003) 
CEO Duality  High-q Segment  -0.009**   
(0.005) 
-0.009***            
(0.004) 
    N 10,740 10,740 10,740 
R2 0.239 0.239 0.213 
    
Notes. This table reports segment investment regression results for the years 1992-2013. Models (1) and (2) present 
the results with firm and year fixed-effects, while model (3) presents the results with random effects. Models (4) 
and (5) present the results from the second-stage estimation of the instrument variable (IV) approach. In model (4) 
the IV analysis instruments CEO duality using the natural logarithm of CEO age, while a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if the age of the CEO is higher that industry mean age in a given year, and zero otherwise is 
utilized as the instrument in model (5). In all specifications, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted segment 
investment in fiscal year t. Segment-level variables are measured in year t, and CEO- and firm-level variables in 
fiscal year t-1. All variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Regression models are estimated with year 
fixed-effects. Robust standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level are 
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
  
 
           Model 
          (VIF) 
Intercept 0 
CEO Dualityt-1 2.107 
Segment Size 1.432 
Relative Segment Size 1.305 
Segment CF/Sales  1.056 
Other Segment CF/Sales 1.057 
Median Tobin’s q 1.233 
Qdum 3.221 
CEO Tenuret-1 1.082 
Institutional Own t-1  1.067 
CEO Dualityt-1* Qdum 3.939 
CEO Own t-1 1.002 
Firm Risk t-1 1.088 
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Table 5. CEO duality and segment investment: 2SLS-IV and GMM  
 (1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
GMM 
    
Segment Size 
-0.021***  
(0.005) 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.031 
(0.075) 
Relative Segment Size 
0.054*** 
(0.014) 
0.060*** 
(0.015) 
-0.440 
(0.515) 
Segment CF  
-0.025 
(0.019) 
-0.025 
(0.019) 
0.072 
(0.111) 
Other Segment CF 
0.006 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.023) 
-0.507 
(0.351) 
Industry Tobin’s q 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.071 
(0.072) 
High-q Segment 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.159*    
(0.096) 
Institutional Own 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.425*    
(0.256) 
Firm Risk 
0.027 
(0.045) 
0.006 
(0.047) 
2.181 
(2.661) 
CEO Tenure 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.067**    
(0.033) 
CEO Own 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-2.507 
(2.921) 
CEO Duality 
0.130*** 
(0.031) 
0.086** 
(0.035) 
0.095 
(0.119) 
CEO Duality  High-q Segment 
-0.020*  
(0.012) 
-0.0258**    
(0.012) 
-0.220**    
(0.108) 
Segment Investment (t-1) 
  
0.220*** 
(0.082) 
    Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 10,392 10,392 9,659 
    
Notes. This table reports segment investment regression results for the years 1992-2013. Models 
(1) and (2) present the results from the second-stage estimation of the instrument variable (IV) 
approach, while model (3) reports the results of system GMM regression. The analysis in model 
(1) instruments CEO duality using two variables: firm age is the number of years elapsed since the 
year of the firm’s Compustat of the firm listing, and firm size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
assets. The analysis in model (2) instruments CEO duality using two dummy variables, a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the age of the firm is higher than the industry median age in a 
given year, and a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the size of the firm is higher than the 
industry median size in a given year. The analysis in model (3) is a system GMM estimation. All 
remaining variable definitions are given in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level, and are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of 
significance, respectively. 
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Table 6. CEO duality and internal capital allocation efficiency: The moderating role of free cash 
flow, and firm complexity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Free Cash Flow Firm Complexity  
 High  Low No Yes 
     Segment size  -0.021***         
(0.006) 
-0.014**         
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
Relative Segment Size 0.072***         
(0.017) 
0.022       
(0.022) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
0.069*** 
(0.021) 
Segment CF -0.034        
(0.023) 
-0.014       
(0.029) 
0.073*** 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.028) 
Other Segment CF 0.019       
(0.038) 
-0.036 *         
(0.021) 
0.004 
(0.032) 
-0.024 
(0.027) 
Industry Tobin's q -0.001          
(0.003) 
0.001       
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
High-q Segment 0.004        
(0.005) 
0.005        
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
Institutional Own 0.004          
(0.009) 
0.012                 
(0.018) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
Firm Risk -0.100**         
(0.049) 
-0.007           
(0.069) 
-0.037 
(0.050) 
-0.032 
(0.068) 
CEO Tenure -0.001         
(0.002) 
-0.002          
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
CEO Own -0.024         
(0.043) 
-0.014           
(0.063) 
0.072** 
(0.037) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
CEO Duality 0.017***         
(0.005) 
0.004       
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
CEO Duality  High-q 
Segment 
-0.010**         
(0.005) 
-0.010            
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
     N 6,774 3,966 4641 6099 
R² 0.295 0.263 0.344 0.223 
     
Notes. This table reports segment investment regression results for the years 1992-2013. Models (1) and (2) report 
the results for the subsamples of firms that have high and low free cash flows, respectively. These high and low 
subsamples are formed based on the yearly median values of the Free Cash Flow variable in fiscal year t-1. Models 
(3) and (4) report the results for the subsamples of firms classified as Simple (Complex) in fiscal year t-1, which 
are firms below (above) the yearly median values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index of the firm’s 
sales (calculated as the sum of squares of sales shares by business and geographic segments), respectively.The 
high and low subsamples are formed based on the yearly median values of the percentage of independent board 
members in fiscal year t-1. In all the model specifications, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted segment 
investment in fiscal year t. Segment-level variables are measured in fiscal year t, and CEO- and firm-level variables 
in fiscal year t-1. All variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Regression models are estimated with year 
and firm fixed-effects. Robust standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level 
are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 7. CEO duality and internal capital allocation efficiency: The moderating role of 
staggered board and board independence 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Staggered Board Board Independence 
 Yes No Low  High 
     Segment size  -0.018***         
(0.003) 
-0.022***         
(0.003) 
-0.023***         
(0.003) 
-0.018***         
(0.003) 
Relative Segment Size 0.054***         
(0.013) 
0.079***         
(0.014) 
0.078***         
(0.012) 
0.035***         
(0.012) 
Segment CF 0.020**         
(0.010) 
0.003         
(0.011) 
-0.063***         
(0.009) 
-0.002      
(0.009) 
Other Segment CF 0.047**         
(0.019) 
-0.037**       
(0.018) 
-0.031*         
(0.016) 
0.019        
(0.018) 
Industry Tobin's q -0.003        
(0.004) 
-0.001   
(0.005) 
-0.009**         
(0.004) 
0.008**         
(0.004) 
High-q Segment 0.012**         
(0.006) 
0.005     
(0.007) 
0.010*       
(0.005) 
-0.006      
(0.006) 
Institutional Own 0.017         
(0.018) 
0.015     
(0.024) 
0.030*   
(0.018) 
-0.027            
(0.018) 
Firm Risk -0.170      
(0.126) 
0.014     
(0.147) 
-0.154    
(0.118) 
0.063            
(0.097) 
CEO Tenure 0.002               
(0.002) 
0.001          
(0.003) 
-0.002      
(0.003) 
-0.003       
(0.002) 
CEO Own -0.008       
(0.085) 
-0.088     
(0.118 ) 
-0.021    
(0.069) 
0.123         
(0.104) 
CEO Duality 0.011*       
(0.007) 
0.011        
(0.008) 
0.019***         
(0.007) 
0.006          
(0.007) 
CEO Duality  High-q 
Segment 
-0.021***         
(0.006) 
-0.004                       
(0.008) 
-0.012**         
(0.006) 
-0.001         
(0.007) 
     N 3,068 2,109 2,911 3,093 
R² 0.305 0.314 0.350 0.330 
     
Notes. This table reports segment investment regression results for the years 1992-2013. Models (1) and (2) report 
the results for the subsamples of firms based on whether or not the firm has a staggered board in fiscal year t-1. 
Models (3) and (4) report the results for the subsamples of firms based on whether the firm has a low or high 
percentage of independent board members, respectively. The high and low subsamples are formed based on the 
yearly median values of the percentage of independent board members in fiscal year t-1. In all the model 
specifications, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted segment investment in fiscal year t. Segment-level 
variables are measured in fiscal year t, and CEO- and firm-level variables in fiscal year t-1. All variable definitions 
are provided in the Appendix. Regression models are estimated with year and firm fixed-effects. Robust standard 
errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 8. CEO duality and segment investment: The moderating role with board size  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Small  
Board  
Medium 
Board 
Large  
Board 
    
Segment Size 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
-0.041*** 
(0.008) 
Relative Segment Size 
0.047 
(0.034) 
0.088*** 
(0.034) 
0.116*** 
(0.037) 
Segment CF  
-0.069** 
(0.027) 
-0.001 
(0.038) 
0.104** 
(0.046) 
Other Segment CF 
0.015 
(0.037) 
-0.031 
(0.055) 
0.064 
(0.064) 
Industry Tobin’s q 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
High-q Segment 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
Institutional Own 
-0.024 
(0.029) 
0.073** 
(0.030) 
-0.004 
(0.041) 
Firm Risk 
-0.055 
(0.17) 
-0.129 
(0.118) 
0.260* 
(0.143) 
CEO Tenure 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
CEO Own 
0.022 
(0.088) 
0.009 
(0.131) 
0.082 
(0.075) 
CEO Duality 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
CEO Duality  High-q Segment 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.035** 
(0.015) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
    Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 1330 1574 1354 
R2 0.272 0.305 0.370 
Notes. This table reports segment investment regression results for the years 2001-2013. Models 
(1), (2) and (3) report the results for the three tercile ranks of firms – small, medium and large – 
split according to board size in fiscal year t-1. All remaining variable definitions are given in the 
Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and are reported in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 9. CEO duality and internal capital allocation efficiency: The moderating role of CEO 
equity-based compensation 
 
       (1)     (2)    (3)   (4) 
 
             Incentive Ratio 
     Low                        High 
                    Delta 
    Low                          High 
          
Segment size  -0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
-0.022*** 
(0.006) 
-0.012*** 
(0.005) 
Relative Segment Size 0.049** 
(0.020) 
0.047** 
(0.019) 
0.057*** 
(0.020) 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
Segment CF -0.018 
(0.030) 
-0.033 
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.030) 
-0.056*** 
(0.018) 
Other Segment CF 0.019 
(0.022) 
-0.021 
(0.041) 
-0.019 
(0.024) 
0.003 
(0.036) 
Industry Tobin's q 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
High-q Segment 0.007 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Institutional Own 0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
Firm Risk -0.093 
(0.070) 
-0.017 
(0.056) 
-0.080 
(0.060) 
0.002 
(0.077) 
CEO Tenure -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
CEO Own -0.041 
(0.053) 
0.064 
(0.077) 
0.061 
(0.093) 
0.035 
(0.043) 
CEO Duality 0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
     
CEO Duality  High-q 
Segment 
-0.017*** 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
     N 5,389 5,351 5,229 5,511 
R² 0.242 0.298 0.255 0.285 
     
Notes. This table reports segment investment regression results for the years 1992-2013. Models (1) and (2) use 
the Incentive Ratio variable, which captures the share of the CEO’s total compensation that comes from a 1% 
increase in the firm stock price, while models (3) and (4) use the CEO’s equity portfolio price sensitivity, denoted 
Delta, which is estimated as the change in the risk-neutral value of the executive’s equity portfolio for a 1% change 
in the price of the underlying stock. The low and high subsamples include firms below and above the yearly median 
values of the corresponding variable, respectively, as measured in fiscal year t-1. In all model specifications, the 
dependent variable is the industry-adjusted segment investment in fiscal year t. Segment-level variables are 
measure in fiscal year t whereas CEO- and firm-level variables in fiscal year t-1. All variable definitions are given 
in the Appendix. Regression models are estimated with year and firm fixed-effects. Robust standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
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Table 10. CEO duality and internal capital allocation efficiency: Additional results with 
moderating attributes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Low  
Managerial 
Ability 
High  
Managerial 
Ability 
Internally  
Promoted 
CEO 
Externally  
Promoted 
CEO 
Long-lived 
Business 
Segment 
Short-lived 
Business 
Segment 
              
Segment size  -0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.021***        
(0.005) 
-0.020*                    
(0.011) 
-0.021**     
(0.009) 
-0.012**     
(0.006) 
Relative Segment Size 0.036*** 
(0.009) 
0.048*** 
(0.008) 
0.067***       
(0.017) 
0.065**                 
(0.031) 
0.067***       
(0.025) 
0.035*       
(0.019) 
Segment CF -0.076*** 
(0.007) 
-0.058*** 
(0.007) 
-0.016        
(0.024) 
-0.021       
(0.041) 
0.028            
(0.035) 
-0.068***   
(0.023) 
Other Segment CF 0.025** 
(0.012) 
-0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.022         
(0.028) 
-0.016       
(0.033) 
0.019            
(0.039) 
-0.024          
(0.027) 
Industry Tobin’s q -0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001        
(0.003) 
0.010         
(0.006) 
-0.006       
(0.004) 
0.001          
(0.003) 
High-q Segment 0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.009         
(0.006) 
-0.003       
(0.009) 
0.008          
(0.007) 
-0.002           
(0.004) 
Institutional Own 0.018 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
0.010                
(0.012) 
-0.006        
(0.021) 
-0.011         
(0.018) 
-0.003               
(0.012) 
Firm Risk -0.108 
(0.071) 
-0.029 
(0.070) 
-0.082         
(0.067) 
0.018         
(0.065) 
0.026           
(0.060) 
-0.014               
(0.059) 
CEO Tenure 0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001          
(0.002) 
0.004              
(0.004) 
0.001         
(0.002) 
-0.002        
(0.003) 
CEO Own -0.026 
(0.043) 
0.060 
(0.053) 
-0.027        
(0.062) 
-0.035       
(0.106) 
-0.097         
(0.086) 
0.083**      
(0.038) 
CEO Duality 0.007** 
(0.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
0.012***        
(0.004) 
0.024*       
(0.013) 
0.008         
(0.005) 
0.009*        
(0.006) 
       
CEO Duality  High-q 
Segment 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.016***            
(0.006) 
-0.008            
(0.010) 
-0.015**             
(0.007) 
-0.003        
(0.005) 
       N 4,149 5,253 6,804 2,269 3,845 4,900 
R² 0.316 0.318 0.279 0.295 0.271 0.263 
       
Notes. This table reports segment investment regression results for the years 1992-2013. Models (1) and (2) report 
the results for the subsamples of firms with low and high managerial ability in fiscal year t-1, which are firms 
below and above the yearly median values of the managerial ability index of Demerjian et al. (2012), respectively. 
Models (3) and (4) report the results for the subsamples of firms with CEOs that are internally promoted and 
CEOs that are externally promoted, respectively. Models (5) and (6) report the results for the subsamples of firms 
with segments that are newer to the firm (age of five years or younger) and segments that are older to the firm 
(five years and older), respectively. In all the model specifications, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted 
segment investment in fiscal year t. Segment-level variables are measured in fiscal year t, and CEO- and firm-
level variables in fiscal year t-1.  All variable definitions are given in the Appendix. Regression models are 
estimated with year and firm fixed-effects. Robust standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and 
clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, 
respective  
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The Impact of Managerial Ability on Crisis 
Period Corporate Investment 
 
1.  Introduction 
The impact of managerial ability on firm policies has for a long time been ignored under 
the assumption that managers are largely homogeneous entities, which implies a limited role 
for manager-specific influences on economic outcomes. Only very recently a handful of studies 
has challenged this view by recognizing that managers play an economically significant role 
on their firms’ choices and performance (Bamber et al. 2010; Chemmanur et al., 2010; 
Demerjian et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2015; Andreou et al., 2016; Francis et al., 2016). Given the 
intriguing results in Chapter 3 on the moderating role of managerial ability and other CEO 
characteristics on the relation between CEO duality and investment efficiency, Chapter 4 
extends this literature by using the recent financial crisis as a natural experiment setting to 
investigate the impact of managerial ability on corporate investment. In addition, the nature of 
managerial ability is scrutinized to get insights about the type of ability that has the greatest 
effect on investments. Finally, the relationships of managerial ability with corporate financing 
and firm value are explored.   
Although it could be argued that the relationship between firms’ managerial ability and 
corporate policies is straightforward, prior findings are often contradictory. For instance, a 
stream of literature suggests that more able managers with great reputation at stake are expected 
to avert opportunistic rent-seeking actions that harm firm value, since such behaviour could 
tarnish their ability and fame as perceived by shareholders and investors (e.g., Fama, 1980; 
Kreps et al., 1982; Graham et al., 2013; Falato et al., 2015). A different stream of literature, 
however, argues that more able managers may decide upon specific conducts such as ill-based 
investments or earnings management to preserve their human capital and reputation, albeit 
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these actions usually reduce firm value (Malmendier & Tate, 2007; Francis 2008; Petrou & 
Procopiou, 2016). Such mixed evidence indicates that the relationship of managerial ability 
with firm policies and outcomes has not yet reached a consensus. Perhaps, this controversy is 
due to confounding effects arising from endogeneity problems whereby contemporaneous 
realizations of both the dependent variable and the explanatory variables in question affect each 
other (Abdallah et al., 2015). 
Such endogeneity concerns are circumvented by focusing on the relationship between 
firms’ managerial ability and corporate policies during the financial crisis period. This period 
is an ideal setting for such investigation, not only for its recentness and severity, but primarily 
because of the adverse impact it largely had on consumers and the availability of corporate 
finance (Duchin et al., 2010). More specifically, the extreme market conditions characterized 
by liquidity shortfalls (Ivashina and Sharfstein, 2010) along with the uncertain nature and the 
conservative approach of financial institutions dictating for more internal control, made it very 
difficult for corporations to obtain credit lines and access external capital. At the same time, 
firms faced various exogenously driven bottlenecks such as low demand for their products, 
resulting in losses that harmed their capacity to internally generate enough resources to finance 
attractive investments. Such weakened funding capacity creates the conditions for firms to 
suffer from underinvestment problems (Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010; 
Balakrishnan et al., 2015), which can be detrimental to firm value. Overall, the recent financial 
crisis abruptly changed the firms’ environment by causing an exogenous shock on their 
policies. Therefore, it provides a natural experiment setting suitable to alleviate endogeneity 
caveats that usually handicap empirical analyses in the corporate finance research.  
In this chapter, it is hypothesized that the impact of managerial ability on firms’ 
corporate investment should not only be more easily identified during the crisis period, but it 
should also be more profound in the presence of an exogenous negative shock to the availability 
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of financing resources that potentially undermines investments. Accordingly, it is expected that 
firms with higher pre-crisis managerial ability to invest more during the crisis period because 
their managers’ ability facilitates greater access to financing resources. In addition, such 
investments should also be more highly valued by the market because they mitigate severe 
underinvestment problems that emerged during the crisis period.   
To investigate these hypotheses, the study utilizes a measure of managerial ability 
proposed by Demerjian et al. (2012). The measure is based on a comparison of managers' 
efficiency in transforming corporate resources to revenues relative to their industry peers. 
Managerial ability increases when managers generate higher revenues for a given level of 
resources or, conversely, when they minimize the resources used for a given level of revenues. 
Using this measure, it is found that firms with higher pre-crisis managerial ability carry more 
crisis period investments in the form of capital expenditures. The results are robust to the 
inclusion of additional control variables relating to corporate governance attributes, as well as 
to the inclusion of executive compensation incentives and CEO-level characteristics.  
Despite the financial crisis is an exogenous capable to mitigate endogeneity, for 
robustness purposes a propensity score matching approach is also employed to ensure that the 
results are not driven by different characteristics between firms with high or low managerial 
ability. This treatment controls for the possibility that certain firm attributes simultaneously 
affect managerial ability and crisis period investments. The results of the propensity score 
matching approach lend credence to the main finding regarding the positive relationship 
between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis period corporate investment. 
Further, the types of managerial ability that seem to withstand distressed times are 
examined, shedding light on the growing importance of general versus firm-specific 
managerial skills (Custodio et al., 2013; Brockman et al., 2016). The findings point to find a 
positive relationship between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis period investments is 
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concentrated among firms with CEOs who have general managerial skills (coined as 
generalists) rather than firm-specific skills (coined as specialists). Additionally, a positive 
relationship between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis period financing resources is 
revealed. Thus, an important channel through which managerial ability affects investments is 
by facilitating financing. Finally, the chapter documents that the stock market highly values 
crisis period investments only when these are made by firms with high pre-crisis managerial 
ability. This finding is consistent with the view that managerial ability alleviates 
underinvestment problems during the crisis period that enhance firm value. 
This chapter contributes to the literature as follows. First, the results show positive 
(negative) valuation of investments during the crisis period for firms with high (low) pre-crisis 
managerial ability. This finding contributes to the extant literature (e.g., Graham et al., 2013; 
Falato et al., 2015; Malmendier and Tate, 2007; Francis, 2008) by shedding light on the 
differential way that managerial ability impacts firm value and helps to settle the conflicting 
conjectures as debated by prior studies. Second, the chapter contributes to recent studies that 
investigate how firms managed liquidity shortfalls in their effort to mitigate underinvestment 
problems following the onset of the crisis (e.g., Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010; 
Campello et al., 2011). Findings suggest that higher managerial ability contributed to the 
capacity of firms to secure more financing during the crisis that enabled them to pursue more 
investment opportunities. In this respect, high managerial ability appears to offset crisis period 
underinvestment problems that enhanced firms’ value. Finally, the chapter contributes to the 
burgeoning literature that highlights the importance of general versus firm-specific skills with 
respect to CEO pay (e.g., Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004; Custodio et al., 2013; Brockman et al., 
2016). Results reveal that generalist, not specialist, CEOs mitigate underinvestment at times of 
constraining economic conditions. In this vein, findings provide an economic explanation of 
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why generalist CEOs earn significantly higher annual pay premiums compared to their 
specialist peers.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the literature 
review and the arguments of the study. Section 3 includes the sample and data measurement, 
Section 4 the statistical methodology and the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background on managerial ability, corporate policies and outcomes 
Recent literature investigates whether managerial characteristics and competencies 
such as ability, talent, quality or reputation influence corporate decision-making. Starting with 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), a significant extent of the heterogeneity in investment, financial, 
and organizational practices of firms is shown to be explained by managers’ fixed effects. 
Chang et al. (2010) links variations in management actions and styles to variations in firm 
performance, consistent with the view that differences in firm performance may also stem from 
managers’ traits or experiences. This view is also supported by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), 
Chemmanur et al. (2009) and Switzer and Bourdon (2011) who document positive relations 
between firms’ management quality and IPOs/SEOs performance. In addition, Chemmanur et 
al. (2010) find value enhancing anti-takeover provisions in the presence of higher quality firm 
management. In the banking industry, Andreou et al. (2016) demonstrate that higher ability 
managers have the capacity to handle higher risks and to facilitate greater intermediation for 
their banks. Finally, Francis et al. (2016) show that firms with higher ability managers obtain 
more favourable loan contract terms, such as lower loan spreads, less stringent covenants, and 
longer term maturity. Overall, this literature demonstrates the importance of managerial ability 
on firm policies and outcomes.   
More able managers, inter alia, are more knowledgeable of their business leading to 
better judgments and estimates about product demand, better understand technology and 
industry trends and manage their employees more efficiently than less able managers 
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(Demerjian et al., 2012, 2013). Therefore, firms with higher managerial ability are expected to 
better align resources with the environment in which they operate resulting in greater internal 
profitability that is particularly important in the presence of growth opportunities, since it can 
facilitate undisruptive investments especially if these firms face difficulties in raising external 
finance.2  
Perhaps the most prominent channel through which managerial ability affects the firms’ 
policies is through the reputational capital that managers accumulate over their career. When 
financing investment opportunities through internal profitability is not adequate, the 
reputational capital of more able managers is expected to enable their firms’ to access external 
financing; for instance, through repeated negotiations and dealings with market participants 
(Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005; Chemmanur et al., 2009) in a credible and transparent way 
that help them stand out. Higher managerial ability can therefore act as a guarantee since it 
certifies their firms’ quality to outside markets, achieving in that way a decrease to the cost of 
capital because of a reduction in information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside 
markets about firm value (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). A reduction in information 
asymmetry allows creditors to anticipate future performance and more accurately evaluate the 
probability of default states, which translates into a lower price of debt and more flexible 
contract terms such as maturity, limitations on covenants, or collateral requirements (Aivazian, 
et al., 2010; Francis, et al., 2016). Together with their perceived ability to better resolve agency 
issues (Chemmanur, et al., 2009), more able managers raise their credibility in the eyes of 
creditors and other stakeholders in general. Credibility is important especially during financial 
                                                          
2 Campello et al. (2010) report that during the financial crisis, 86% of U.S. firms facing financial constraints 
bypassed attractive investments due to difficulties in raising external finance, compared to 44% of financially 
unconstraint firms that did the same. Also, they report that more than half of U.S. firms rely on internally generated 
cash flows to fund investment under financially constraint circumstances, and 56% of constrained firms are found 
to cancel investment projects when they are unable to obtain external funds compared to 31% of unconstrained 
firms that may cancel investment. 
. 
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crises because such periods intensify the frictions in external capital markets. The latter hinders 
firms’ capacity to acquire capital to pursue their investment projects (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1989; Bernanke et al., 1999), resulting in underinvestment; but not so for firms with more able 
managers because they could overcome such frictions. Therefore, firms with higher managerial 
ability should have better chances to access external financing such as loans and achieve lower 
loan rates or less stringent non-price contract terms, lowering in this way their investments’ 
financing cost. 
Overall, it is hypothesized that firms with higher managerial ability are likely to have 
a larger scale of corporate investment during the crisis period due to greater access to 
financing resources, mitigating in this respect underinvestment problems that enhance firm 
value. Thus,  
Hypothesis 1: High pre- crisis managerial ability will be positively related to the level 
of crisis period investments.    
Hypothesis 2: High pre- crisis managerial ability will be positively related to crisis 
period financing resources. 
Hypothesis 3: Crisis period investments executed by high pre- crisis managerial 
ability, will be positively related to firm value.     
3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Data  
 
To construct this chapter’s dependent variables, data is obtained from the 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP merged database for the fiscal year 2008. According to Duchin et al., 
(2010) and Balakrishnan et al., (2015), the crisis period lasted from August 1, 2007 to August 
31, 2009. During that period, there was an abnormally high LIBOR-OIS spread, which 
skyrocketed loan spreads, consistent with the view that the financial crisis exogenously 
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tightened firms’ access to finance. Therefore, the fiscal year 2008 is used to represent the crisis 
period since this year resides somewhere in the middle of the abovementioned dates. 
Compustat contains 7216 firm observations for 2008. Out of these 7216 firm observations, 
available information on the main dependent variables for 2006-2008 and on listed firms for 
which available information enables a calculation of stock returns, leaves the sample with 3936 
observations. Crisis period dependent variables are then linked with two measures of 
managerial ability estimated before the onset of the crisis (i.e., at the end of fiscal year 2006 or 
before); estimating ability during the pre-crisis period ensures that the measure is not affected 
by consequences arising from the crisis. The sample on which an estimate of the measures of 
managerial ability is obtained features 2,748 firms; however, depending on the regression 
model, the analysis results in fewer data due to missing observations of the control variables, 
which account for firm characteristics, corporate governance attributes and CEO 
characteristics/executive compensation incentives. Corporate governance attributes and CEO 
education information are collected from BoardEx, while executive compensation and other 
CEO characteristics data are collected from Execucomp. To lessen the influence of outliers, all 
continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.   
3.2. Model specification and variable definitions 
 
In this section, the baseline specification is provided along with the measurement of the 
three sets of variables used to empirically test the baseline models is described, in particular: 
(i) dependent variables, i.e., investments, financing and firm value (ii) independent variables, 
i.e., managerial ability, and (iii) main control variables relating to firm-level characteristics. 
Detailed variable definitions can be found in the Appendix. 
3.2.1. Baseline specification 
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𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,2008(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑄)(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐶𝐹)(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠)(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛) =
𝛼𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,2006  + 𝛽2  𝑀𝐴 (𝑀𝐴 𝐴𝑉)𝑠𝑖,2006 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                      (1) 
where the dependent variables are crisis investment, crisis Tobin’s, crisis cash flows, crisis 
resources and crisis financial constraints. 𝛼𝑓𝑓 are industry fixed-effectx. Industry fixed-effects 
account for disciplining effects on managerial opportunism which correlates with severe 
agency problems that constitute significant caveats for firms in noncompetitive industries.  To 
ensure that results are not driven by outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
values. It is noteworthy to remark that both managerial ability measures utilize information 
from fiscal year 2006 or before that is at least two years away from the time-point the dependent 
variables are measured. This is a crucial treatment ensuring that the measurement of the 
managerial ability is less likely to be spuriously related to unobserved within-firm changes in 
financing and investment policies following the onset of the crisis. The latter advantage should 
be stronger for MA_AV that aggregates (per-firm) information from 2002 to 2006, and therefore 
it is even less likely to be confounded from effects related to a potential anticipation of the 
crisis. 
3.2.2. Dependent variables 
 
Different dependent variables are utilized to cover the three main areas examined in the 
study: investments, financing and firm value. Crisis period corporate investment 
(CRISIS_INVESTMENT) is measured with capital expenditures divided by lagged net assets, 
while crisis period firm value is measured using Tobin’s Q (CRISIS_Q) defined as market value 
of equity  plus total debt plus preferred stock liquidating value minus deferred taxes and 
investment tax credits all deflated by the book value of assets. For financing resources three 
measures are employed. First, crisis period cash flow (CRISIS_CF) is defined as operating 
income before depreciation deflated by beginning of the year stockholders’ equity. Second, 
crisis period total resources (CRISIS_RESOURCES) is defined as the difference between 
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issuance of long-term debt and long term debt reduction plus operating activities all deflated 
by the total value of net assets. Third, a crisis period financial constraints’ index 
(CRISIS_FINCON) is defined as in the Whited and Wu (2006) study, which is based on firm 
characteristics associated with external finance constraints and as such it reflects the severity 
of liquidity constraints faced by each firm in the sample during the crisis period.  
3.2.3 Independent variable: Managerial ability  
 
The managerial ability measures are derived from the method proposed in Demerjian 
et al. (2012). This measurement of managerial ability captures the ability of a firm’s managers 
to produce more revenue while using either the same or even fewer resources than their peers 
in the same industry. Demerjian et al. (2012) use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to model 
firm efficiency and they follow a two-step procedure to quantify managerial ability. The first 
step requires the estimation of firm efficiency scores defined as the ratio of outputs over inputs 
using the following DEA optimization problem: 
𝐷𝐸𝐴 − 𝐸𝑓𝑓:   𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑣𝜃 =  
∑ 𝑢𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1 𝑦𝑖𝑘
∑ 𝑣𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑘
𝑚
𝑗=1
, 𝑘 = 1, … 𝑛                           (2) 
In Eq. (2), s are the outputs, m are the inputs, n is the number of firms, while u and v 
represent the weights for the outputs and inputs, respectively, which are necessary to calculate 
the firm efficiency score. Following the rationale in Demerjian et al. (2012), the output variable 
used in Eq. (2) is sales whereas the input variables are: net property, plant and equipment, net 
operating leases, net research and development, purchased goodwill, other intangible assets, 
cost of inventory, and selling, general and administrative expenses. All these inputs contribute 
to the generation of revenues and are affected by managerial ability, as each input is subject to 
managerial discretion. The solution to the above optimization problem results to an efficient 
frontier that measures the amount and mix of resources used to generate revenues by the firms 
within each industry. Firms operating on the frontier are assigned a score of one and the least 
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efficient firms are assigned a score of zero; the lower the firm’s score, the further away it is 
from the frontier. 
As theorized by Demerjian et al. (2012), firm efficiency scores are affected by both 
firm-specific factors and management ability. Therefore, the second step purges out the effect 
of key firm-specific characteristics, which may aid or hinder managers’ ability, by regressing 
the DEA efficiency scores (DEA-Eff) on firm size, market share, positive free cash flows, firm 
age, number of segments and a foreign currency indicator. Demerjian et al. (2012) estimate the 
following Tobit regression model per industry: 
𝐷𝐸𝐴 − 𝐸𝑓𝑓 =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑎2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝑎3𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 
 𝑎4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝑎5𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟_𝑜𝑓_𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝑎6𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛_𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 
                 𝑎7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑_𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝐸𝐹𝐹.                                                                                     (3) 
In regression Eq. (3), the residual term (RES_EFF) captures the effect of firm efficiency 
attributed to managerial ability. Hence, the first measure of managerial ability, denoted as 
RES_EFF_2006, is the residual term of Eq. (3) using data only from the fiscal year 2006. An 
alternative managerial ability measure is also estimated, denoted as RES_EFF_AV, by using 
the per-firm average value of RES_EFF using data from the fiscal years 20022006. As shown 
in Table 1 that describes the summary statistics of the main variables, the mean (median) values 
of RES_EFF_2006 and RES_EFF_AV are -0.005 (-0.042) and -0.017 (-0.065) respectively, all 
close to the value of -0.004 (-0.013) reported by Demerjian et al. (2012). The standard 
deviations of RES_EFF_2006 and RES_EFF_AV are respectively 0.257 and 0.263, which are 
higher than the value of 0.149 reported by Demerjian et al. (2012). This discrepancy is 
attributed to the significant difference in the sample size between the two studies. Specifically, 
Demerjian et al. (2012) employ 177,134 observations sampled from 1980 to 2009, which is 
enormously a much bigger data set than the one employed in this chapter, and due to statistical 
reasons it is natural to observe a much lower standard deviation in their case. 
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This managerial ability measurement approach is deemed as appropriate for the 
particular investigation since it reflects the ability of managers to generate revenues through 
efficient exploration of resources pertaining to decisions and choices that regard capital, labour, 
investment, and other revenue generating practices. In this respect, higher ability firms are the 
ones with more able managers who are more knowledgeable of their business in terms of cost 
and revenue drivers and have better skill attributes and superior judgment to anticipate future 
changes than their less able peers. Therefore, the choice of the managerial ability measure for 
this study is directly linked to the main research questions under investigation that reflect 
access to resources and utilization of those in the form of investments to enhances firm value. 
Further, this approach lends credence to this analysis since it enables the computation of 
managerial ability measures for a broader set of firms, even small ones, offering more 
generalized inferences compared to studies that have focused exclusively on certain type of 
firms and specific events (e.g., Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005; Chemmanur et al., 2009).   
Because RES_EFF in Eq. (3) is calculated based on a two-step estimation approach, it 
is likely to suffer from random measurement errors that could harm the precision of the ability 
measure and consequently to distort statistical inferences. Therefore, to mitigate a potential 
bias in the managerial ability measures like in the case of Demerjian et al. (2013), 
RES_EFF_2006 and RES_EFF_AV are recoded into deciles by assigning the value of 0 to the 
decile with the 10% lowest values, the value of 9 to the decile with the 10% highest values, 
while in-between deciles are assigned accordingly the values from 1 to 8. The categorical 
definitions of managerial ability are correspondingly denoted as MA and MA_AV.3  
                                                          
3 The recoding of managerial ability from a continuous into a categorical variable leads to slightly stronger 
relations with the dependent variables. For example, the correlation coefficient between RES_EFF_AV and 
CRISIS_INVESTMENT is 0.069 (p-value<1%), whereas the correlation coefficient between MA_AV and 
CRISIS_INVESTMENT is 0.071 (p-value<1%). In general, a slightly higher power is obtaned in test statistics 
when using the categorical definition of managerial ability, albeit all of the statistical inferences and conclusions 
remain unaltered if instead RES_EFF_2006 and RES_EFF_AV are used.   
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3.2.4 Main control variables 
 
Following prior studies within the context of this investigation (see Chemmanur et al., 
2009; Duchin et al., 2010; Balakrishnan et al., 2015, Francis et al., 2016), the study controls 
for size, leverage, profitability, cash flow, and growth opportunities to account for firm-related 
heterogeneity that can influence corporate investment and financing opportunities, all of them 
measured at the pre-crisis period (i.e., fiscal year 2006). Specifically, size (SIZE) is defined as 
the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity. Size signals firm quality and power 
whereby larger firms may enjoy easier access and more favourable financing terms and hence 
they might have the capacity to carry out more investments. Leverage (LEV) is the book value 
of debt divided by book value of total assets and could account for potential investment 
distortions and impediments to financing in case of over-indebtedness; conversely, leverage 
may also signal a firm’s stronger corporate governance quality as higher levels of leverage 
discipline and incentivize managers in delivering strong operating performance and high 
growth in the net assets of the firm. Cash flow (CF) is calculated as operating income before 
depreciation deflated by beginning of the year stockholders’ equity and used to account for 
financial slack that could allow for more investments that remedy underinvestment problems. 
Return on equity (ROE) is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes deflated by 
beginning of the year net assets and used to account for profitability that enhance the firm’s 
internal sources of financing allowing for more investments. Further, growth opportunities are 
proxied with the use of the firm’s market-to-book ratio (MTB) and stock return performance 
(RET). MTB is calculated as the market value divided by book value of equity. Firms with 
higher MTB values feature richer growth opportunity sets implying higher market expectations 
for future profitability. Hence, such firms may have easier access to external financing for 
making investments. To capture growth opportunities and market expectations not reflected in 
ΜΤΒ, the firm’s stock return performance (RET) is also considered, calculated as the 12-month 
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compounded stock return (excluding dividends) spanning the fiscal year 2006. Complimentary, 
the study accounts for the firm’s asset growth rate (GROWTH) calculated as the difference 
between the beginning and ending of the year total assets deflated by beginning of the year 
total assets. A firm featuring greater past asset expansions might have exhausted its financial 
slackness and hence has less capacity to access additional financing to offset underinvestment. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables employed in the empirical 
analysis. These statistics are computed using a sample of 2,583 observations with full available 
information for all variables tabulated in this table.4 In terms of crisis period investments, 
CRISIS_INVESTMENT has a mean of 0.140 and a standard deviation of 0.258. In terms of the 
various financing resources, CRISIS_CF has a mean (standard deviation) of 0.209 (0.562), 
while these figures for CRISIS_RESOURCES and CRISIS_FINCON are 0.196 (0.510) and -
0.171 (0.187), respectively. In terms of firm value, CRISIS_Q has a mean of 2.617 and a 
standard deviation of 6.872. Finally, in terms of control variables, the mean values (standard 
deviations) for SIZE, MTB, and LEV are 6.435 (2.025), 3.289 (4.003) and 0.259 (0.285), 
respectively. Other mean values (standard deviations) are 0.190 (0.413) for GROWTH, 0.228 
(0.784) for RET, 0.128 (0.508) for ROE and 0.215 (0.598) for CF.  Additionally, to account for  
any possibility of the presence of multicollinearity among the predictors in the main regression 
models, the chapter examines the variance inflation factor (VIF). As recorded in Table 2, all 
the predictors in the main Eq. (1) have a VIF that is in principle lower than 1.143, which 
indicates the absence of severe multicollinearity issues in the models.  
 
                                                          
4 In the regression analysis that follows, simultaneous availability for MA and MA_AV is required, therefore certain 
regression models are estimated using a larger number of observations.  
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[Table 1] 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
 
In this section, the methodology of the multivariate regression tests is described and the 
results from investigating the relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis period 
investments, financing and firm value are discussed.5 If managerial ability matters, then it is 
expect to evince higher scales of crisis period investment and financing in the presence of 
higher pre-crisis managerial ability. This should consequently be echoed on the crisis period 
firm value.  
4.2.1 Pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis corporate investment   
 
Table 2 reports the results of the relation between pre-crisis managerial ability (MA, 
MA_AV) and capital expenditures during the crisis (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). The regression 
models include Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects under the assumption that such treatment 
largely captures product market competition which highly correlates with corporate 
governance mechanisms (Giroud and Mueller, 2011). Thus, the inclusion of the industry 
dummies is conceived to control for disciplining effects on managerial opportunism which 
correlates with severe agency problems that constitute significant caveats for firms in 
noncompetitive industries. The regression models also include the abovementioned set of 
control variables. Characteristics featuring larger firms, and firms with greater growth 
opportunity sets and higher liquidity supply/slackness should have a positive impact on the 
scale of corporate investment.   
                                                          
5 For the regression analysis, all continuous variables have been standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 1. Such standardization is useful to avoid potential influences attributed to scaling differences. 
Nevertheless, all results are robust in using instead the unstandardized variables. 
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The results in Table 2 show positive and significant relations between the pre-crisis 
managerial ability measures, namely MA (p-value<10%) and MA_AV (p-value<5%), and crisis 
period investments (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). These findings lend support to the notion that 
more ably managed firms invest more during the crisis and this could act as a remedy to 
underinvestment problems. With regards to the control variables, the coefficients of firm size 
(SIZE), market-to-book (MTB) and leverage (LEV) are positive and statistically significant (p-
values<5%). Past asset growth rate (GROWTH), stock return performance (RET) and cash 
flows (CF) carry the expected coefficients signs but are not statistically significant, mainly 
because their influence on CRISIS_INVESTMENT is subsumed by the other variables.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
4.2.2 Propensity score analysis 
 
If the baseline characteristics of firms managed by more able managers are fundamentally 
different than firms managed by less able managers, then the managerial ability impact on 
corporate investment might be a statistical artefact stemming from model misspecification. To 
mitigate any potential nonrandomized confounding biases relating to either measured or 
unmeasured baseline characteristics, the study follows in spirit Andreou et al. (2017) and create 
two data samples using a one-to-one propensity-score matching estimation method. Based on 
this method, the resulting firm-year observations in each sample are comparable across all the 
control variables, except managerial ability. Specifically, the method consists of a probit 
regression to estimate propensity scores, p(Y=1/X=x), based on the probability of receiving a 
binary treatment, Y, conditional on all the control variables, x. Thus, to operationalize the 
probit regression, firms’ having more able managers are considered as treatment. More able 
managers are defined using a binary variable based on the median value of pre-crisis 
managerial ability measures (e.g. MA, MA_AV). Then, for each managerial ability measure, 
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separately, the probability of firms’ having more able managers is estimated using as 
independent variables the controls included in the baseline models as per Table 2. Finally, for 
each firm where a firm has more able managers, the propensity scores are used to find 
comparable firm observations where a firm has less able managers. To do so, the nearest-
neighbour method is employed, requiring that the absolute difference of the propensity score 
among pairs does not exceed 0.01. Whenever there are more firms with a less able manager 
that meet this criterion, only the firm with the smallest difference in the propensity scores is 
kept. This method yields 1,244 and 1,364 unique pairs of matched firms when using MA and 
MA_AV, respectively. Panel A (Panel C) of Table 3 reports difference-in-means of the control 
variables for firms with more and less able managers for both the unmatched and matched 
samples when the treatment effect is based on MA (MA_AV).  As expected, the corresponding 
difference-in-means show that some control variables differ statistically for the unmatched 
sample. Nevertheless, the difference-in-means becomes statistically insignificant for the 
matched sample, consistent with the view that the propensity score matching approach 
successfully makes the sample of firms with more able managers comparable to the sample of 
firms with less able managers. Based on these matched samples,  the regression models of 
Table 2 are re-run using the MA and MA_AV, as main variables of interest, respectively. The 
results in Panels B and D of Table 3 show positive and significant relations between MA (p-
value<10%), MA_AV (p-value<1%) and crisis period investments (CRISIS_INVESTMENT).  
Overall, the propensity score matching results continue to demonstrate that pre-crisis 
managerial ability has a strong positive relation with crisis period corporate investments, 
lending further credence to the results as obtained in Table 2.  
 
[Table 3  here] 
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4.2.3 Additional controls 
 
Analyses in this subsection investigate the robustness of the main finding to the 
inclusion of a large array of corporate governance and CEO related controls. Such an 
investigation is motivated by previous literature that documents links between firms’ policies 
with corporate governance (e.g., Harford et al., 2012) and CEO characteristics (e.g., Bertrand 
and Schoar, 2003, Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). If the positive effect of pre-crisis managerial 
ability on the scale of corporate investment is because of stronger governance structures or due 
to managerial traits, then this effect is expected to considerably diminish (or vanish) when such 
controls are included in the regression analysis. 
The importance of corporate governance is scrutinized by augmenting the main 
regression models with corporate governance variables and retaining all of the other 
explanatory variables. Particularly, the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index (GIM) is 
incorporated, which proxies for the balance of power between shareholders and managers, 
board size (BOARD_SIZE) to control for the effects of larger boards on investment levels, 
board independence (BOARD_INDEP) as an indication of superior governance, as well as 
stock (INC_STOCKS) and option (INC_OPTIONS) compensation incentives to account for the 
degree of alignment of executive incentives with shareholder interests as a direct way to 
mitigate agency problems (all of these variables are defined in the Appendix of this paper). 
Firms with lower GIM indices, smaller board sizes, higher proportions of independent 
directors, as well as more incentivized CEOs in terms of compensation, are expected to 
maintain superior governance structures (Hoechle et al., 2012).  
Along with the corporate governance controls, the analysis also considers the effects of 
certain managerial characteristics. A proxy for a CEO’s formal power is included, defined as a 
dummy that equals one when the CEO also serves as chairman of the board (CEO_DUALITY). 
Also the natural logarithm of the CEO’s age (CEO_AGE) and the natural logarithm of the 
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CEO’s tenure (CEO_TENURE) are added in the model to proxy for the CEO's risk-taking and 
investment behaviour. Similarly to the inclusion of corporate governance variables, a 
decreasing impact of pre-crisis managerial ability is expected on crisis period investments in 
the presence of: powerful CEOs, since they have discretionary authority to opportunistically 
engage in additional investments for servicing their risk-preferences (e.g., Kim et al., 2009; 
Aktas et al., 2017), older CEOs consistent with the view that risk-taking behaviour pertaining 
to certain corporate policies decreases as CEOs become older (Serfling, 2013, Andreou et al., 
2017), and shorter tenures since CEOs become more conservative as their tenure increases 
which constitute important factor influencing CEOs to adapt less to the circumstances of 
external environment and may limit their appetite to take more investments (e.g., Miller, 1991; 
McClelland et al., 2012). 
Model (1) of Panels A and B in Table 4 shows the regression results after including the 
additional corporate governance variables. Results maintain the positive and significant 
coefficients (p-value<1%) for both measures of managerial ability (MA, MA_AV). A similar 
positive relation is shown in model (2) when the regression model controls for CEO 
characteristics. When all corporate governance and CEO characteristics controls are added in 
model (3), a strong positive and significant (p-value<1%) relation is still maintained between 
both measures of pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis period corporate investment.  
Overall, it can be concluded that impact of managerial ability on investments is distinct 
and remains robust in the inclusion of other variables that feature corporate governance and 
CEO characteristics.  
[Table 4 here] 
 
4.2.4 Types of managerial ability and crisis investments 
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Since the measure of managerial ability is generic capturing a broader notion of 
managers’ impact on firms’ operational effectiveness, it would be beneficial to delve into 
greater depth to understand the types of managerial ability that appear to be more influential 
within the setting of the analysis. Custodio et al. (2013) argue that general managerial skills 
have recently become more important than firm-specific skills. Firms and respective boards 
show an inclination to outside hiring reflecting a shift towards the relative importance of 
general versus specific human capital chosen for executive positions. These facts are 
substantiated by the premium paid particularly to “generalist” CEOs who have accumulated 
general managerial capital that is transferrable across firms and industries, rather than 
“specialist” CEOs whose human capital is firm specific (Custodio et al., 2013; Brockman et 
al., 2016). 
To investigate if the main inferences from Table 2 hold across the whole array of 
generalist-specialist skills, the general ability index is used as in Custodio et al. (2013). The  
general ability index classifies CEOs into either generalists or specialists to investigate the 
types of managerial skills that matter most in corporate investment during the financial crisis. 
It is important to note that, while Demerjian et al. (2012) ability score is attributed to the 
management team, the general ability measure by Custodio et al. (2013) is attributed to the 
CEO; since the CEO is the most influential personality in corporate decision-making, is 
considered as the one who, on average, most likely impacts corporate investment (Fee and 
Hadlock 2003; Demerjian et al. 2012). Demerjian,et al. (2012) find for the period 1992-2009 
that 60.5% of their CEO fixed-effects are statistically significant in explaining managerial 
ability after controlling for firm fixed effects. They argue that these results indicate that the 
managerial ability measure reflects, to a large extent, the CEOs impact on firm organizational 
output. Their approach is revisited to observe in this study’s sample a CEO fixed effects 
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explanatory power of about 67%. This evidence suggests that the managerial ability measures 
used reflects decision-making highly attributed to the CEO.  
The general ability index is constructed based on the lifetime work experience of CEOs 
in publicly traded firms prior to their present CEO position. The index encompasses the skills 
which are transferrable across firms and industries, rather than firm-specific. Custodio et al. 
(2013) consider five aspects of general managerial ability; past number of positions in CEO’s 
career to examine the exposure of the CEO to different organizational fields such as production, 
finance, sales, etc; past number of firms the CEO had been employed before; past number of 
industries, to identify the degree of the CEO’s exposure to different business environments; 
past CEO positions at different firms which could be viewed as a signal of skills to internally 
manage these firms and externally maintain the appropriate strategies for all involved 
stakeholders; past work experience in a conglomerate firm, which serves as an indication of 
generic skill enhancement of managing complex and multi-industry settings. The index of 
general managerial ability is derived as the first factor of principal components analysis of 
these five dimensions to derive a one-dimensional index of general managerial ability, with 
more weight attributed to those components that more precisely represent the general skills of 
a CEO; specifically, equal weights are assigned to the past number of positions, firms, and 
industries, and a lower weight is assigned to the past CEO positions and conglomerate 
experiences. The index is estimated by applying the scores of each proxy to the standardized 
general ability components, and it is standardized to have a mean equal to zero and a standard 
deviation equal to one. This construction of a composite measure from the five variables helps 
to steer clear of problems arising from multicollinearity and measurement errors. The five 
variables are positively correlated with the index indicating that higher values of the index 
reflect greater general human capital.  
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In Table 5, model (1) re-examines the relation between the two measures of managerial 
ability (Panel A for MA and Panel B for MA_AV) and crisis investments 
(CRISIS_INVESTMENT) for the sample in which the general ability index is available. In 
support of Table’s 2 findings, these results also show that pre-crisis managerial ability is in 
both measures significant (p-values<5%) and positively related to crisis period investments. 
Then the effect of the types of managerial ability on this relation is investigated, whereby the 
relation is re-examined based on whether the CEO is classified as a specialist (observations 
with values below the median general ability scores) in model (2) or as a generalist 
(observations with values above the median general ability scores) in model (3).6 Overall, the 
results show that the positive relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis 
investments is statistically significant only in model (3) of Panels A and B, which refers to 
firms run by generalist CEOs (p-value<1% for MA and p-value<5% for MA_AV). It appears 
that generalist CEOs, as opposed to specialist CEOs, may be the best match at distressed times 
as general knowledge and skills during such times is an important dimension of the CEO 
ability. This finding adds to Custodio et al. (2013) work by providing further evidence of the 
growing importance of general versus firm-specific skills in the market for CEOs, particularly 
at distressed times when firms face several challenges in terms of liquidity shortfalls and 
underinvestment problems. 
[Table 5 here] 
 
4.2.5 Additional analysis on the types of managerial ability 
 
Following a similar line of reasoning as for the analysis in Table 4, the chapter 
investigates whether the above positive relation between managerial ability and investment that 
                                                          
6 This classification follows Custodio et al. (2013). I am indebted to Claudia Custodio, Miguel Ferreira, and Pedro 
Matos for providing access to the database on the general ability index. 
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is prevalent only for generalist CEOs remains robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In 
Table 6, models (1) to (3) report the results for the sample of specialist CEOs, while models 
(4) to (6) report the results for the sample of generalist CEOs. Models (1) and (4) include 
corporate governance control variables, namely GIM index, board size (BOARD_SIZE), board 
independence (BOARD_INDEP), as well as executive stock (INC_STOCKS) and option 
(INC_OPTIONS) compensation incentives. For both managerial ability measures (Panels A 
and B), the results of model (1) show that the relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and 
crisis period investments is insignificant for the sample of specialist CEOs. On the contrary, 
the results in model (4) show that both measures are significant (p-value<1%) and positively 
related to the scale of corporate investment for the sample of generalist CEOs. Hence, 
generalist CEOs help to increase investments during distressed times even after taking into 
account corporate governance attributes, a tendency that is absent from their specialist 
counterparts. The same pattern appears in models (2) and (5) when CEO-level characteristics, 
namely CEO age (CEO_AGE), tenure (CEO_TENURE), duality (CEO_DUALITY) and 
education (CEO_EDU) are included as control variables in the models. CEOs’ education is 
included as an extra managerial characteristic for this analysis that conditions on a sample with 
available observations for the generalist-specialist skills. This additional control variable is 
deemed necessary since variation in the CEOs’ educational background might be driving the 
strong positive relationship that is observed for the sample of generalists. CEO_EDU takes the 
value of 0 when the CEO has no university education, the value of 1 when the CEO has a 
bachelor degree, the value of 2 when the CEO also holds a master degree and a value of 3 when 
the CEO holds a PhD degree. The ability of CEOs with more general managerial skills, as 
opposed to those with firm-specific managerial skills, to increase investments during crisis 
periods is again robust to the inclusion of CEO-level characteristics. The same conclusions can 
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be reached even when all corporate governance and CEO characteristics are combined together 
in models (3) and (6).  
Overall, after the inclusion of a large array of corporate governance and CEO related 
characteristics, the results in Table 6 continue to show a strong positive relationship between 
pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis period investments that is prevalent only among firms 
with CEOs that have general (rather than firm-specific) managerial skills. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Additional robustness checks of the abovementioned relations are also performed. In 
Table 7, alternative measures of the dichotomous definition of generalist vs. specialist CEOs 
are used. Using detailed data on the educational background of CEOs, CEOs are classified 
based on their field of study for their highest educational degree. First, the study conducts a 
test by dividing the data into the sample of CEOs who hold a PhD (i.e., specialists) and all 
others who do not hold a PhD (i.e., generalists). Second, an additional test is conducted on 
whether the CEO is holding some general postgraduate education degrees; thus, the data is 
divided into the sample of CEOs who have been awarded with an MBA and/or a CPA degree 
(i.e., generalists) and all others who have specific postgraduate education degrees (i.e., 
specialists). The reasoning in utilizing the educational background to characterize a CEO as a 
specialist or generalist emanates from the fact that education is considered to affect managerial 
decision-making (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). In this vein, for example, CEOs with PhD 
degrees can be conceived as individuals with rather firm-specific skills who can process 
specific information and make better decisions for specialized business/scientific-related 
issues. On the contrary, CEOs with MBA and/or CPA degrees can be conceived as individuals 
with rather generic skills that can process better information pertaining to factors such as 
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investing, financing, forecasting, etc., which allow them to make better and sharper decisions 
during highly evolving and turbulent market conditions. 
Table 7, models (1) to (6) report estimates for regression models of 
CRISIS_INVESTMENT when the CEO is classified as a specialist or a generalist based on 
whether (s)he holds a PhD. To maintain consistency with the previous analyses, the study also 
incorporates controls of corporate governance and CEO-level characteristics. Similarly to the 
findings in Table 6, regression coefficients for both managerial ability measures emerge as 
insignificant in models (1) to (3) for the sample in which the CEO is classified as a specialist 
(under the heading “CEO holds a PhD”). Conversely, for the sample in which the CEO is 
classified as a generalist (under the heading “CEO does not hold a PhD”), regression models 
(4) to (6) evince a positive and significant relation between the two measures and investments. 
The same patterns continue to hold true for the specific vs. general education subsample 
analysis in models (7) to (12), which ascertain the robustness of the findings. Overall, the 
results confirm that generalist CEOs are the types of managers whose ability is most influential 
for the scale of corporate investment during the financial crisis.  
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
4.2.6 Pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis period financing  
 
  Duchin et al. (2010) argue that corporate investment declines significantly following 
the onset of the crisis, and this decline appears to be greatest for firms with low cash reserves 
or high net short-term debt, with high financing frictions, or in industries which are heavily 
dependent on external finance. If higher ability managers are more capable to mitigate 
underinvestment during the crisis, then one important conjecture to be made is that more ably 
managed firms should also be able to mitigate the impact of negative shocks on the supply of 
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internal and external finance, thus preserving the firms’ capacity to carry out corporate 
investment. On one hand, more ably managed firms conveys trust and credibility to external 
markets and thus confronted with reduced financial constraints and greater supply of external 
funds; on the other hand, more ably managed firms might have less need to raise funds 
externally if they generate internally sufficient cash flows to undertake attractive investments 
during the crisis. 
To examine these arguments, the study investigates the relation between pre-crisis 
managerial ability and crisis period financing resources as captured by cash flows 
(CRISIS_CF), total financing resources (CRISIS_RESOURCES) and financial constraints 
(CRISIS_FINCON). Table 8 presents regression results of the relation between the pre-crisis 
managerial ability (MA, MA_AV) and these financing measures. As before, the regression 
models include the main control variables measured at the end of fiscal year 2006, as well as 
industry fixed effects. Moreover, it is reasonable to posit that more able managers are superior 
at anticipating future changes in their firms’ underlying economic conditions (Trueman 1986). 
This means that more able managers may foresee an upcoming financial crisis and build 
precautionary cash reserves or secure additional credit lines which can be used to fund 
investments during the crisis. To control for this possibility, which could otherwise create a 
mechanical relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis period financing, the pre-
crisis period value (measured in fiscal year 2006) of each of dependent variable under 
investigation is included, namely CF, RESOURCES and FINCON, respectively. Further, since 
information asymmetry between the firm and external capital markets may affect the relation 
between managerial ability and financing, the study reports regression results that control for 
the number of analysts following the firm (NUM_ANAL), calculated as the natural logarithm 
of one plus the number of analysts following the firm in fiscal year 2006, as well as the standard 
deviation of daily returns during the fiscal year 2006 (RET_STD). High information asymmetry 
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may impede the capacity of the firm to attract external financing, thus an inverse relation is 
expected between NUM_ANAL and RET_STD and total financing resources 
(CRISIS_RESOURCES), while a positive relation is anticipated between these variables and 
financial constraints (CRISIS_FINCON). 
Models (1) and (2) in Table 8 present the relation between managerial ability and 
CRISIS_CF. Findings for model (1) evince that both measures of pre-crisis managerial ability 
are positively related to crisis cash flows (p-values<1%), and the results maintain their 
statistical significance when controlling for information asymmetry in model (2). Is seems that 
in the presence of high pre-crisis managerial ability, firms manage to internally generate more 
cash flows during the crisis. With regards to the coefficient of the crisis period cash flow 
variable, CF, it emerges as positive and significant (p-value<5%) supporting that firms with 
strong internal financial positions prior the crisis continue to generate higher crisis period 
internal resources. The two measures of pre-crisis information asymmetry appear weakly 
related to crisis cash flows, a behavior that is expected since information asymmetry is a 
problem primarily affecting the credibility the firm signals to its external markets. 
In model (3) the relation between the two measures of pre-crisis managerial ability is 
again positive and significant (p-values<1%) with total financing resources 
(CRISIS_RESOURCES), and they remain significant after the inclusion of information 
asymmetry controls as shown in model (4). These results provide strong empirical evidence 
that firms with higher pre-crisis managerial ability have higher levels of financing resources 
during the crisis. Overall, these findings complement Chemmanur et al. (2009) who support 
that superior managerial quality tends to disclose accurately to the markets the true future cash 
flows and firm performance, thus attaining easier access to financing resources compared to 
inferior management quality. Higher managerial ability conveys the intrinsic value of the firm 
more credibly to outsiders and reduces information frictions, thus achieving higher levels of 
 112 
 
external fund raising even at times when this is hard to tap. The positive and significant 
coefficient of the pre-crisis total resources variable (RESOURCES) confirms that crisis total 
resources are significantly larger for firms with higher total resources before the onset of the 
crisis. Further, in model (4) and according to expectations, RET_STD is negative and 
significant to crisis period total resources.  
The chapter also looks at the relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and the 
severity of liquidity constraints during the financial crisis as proxied by the Whited and Wu 
(2006) financial constraints index (CRISIS_FINCON). Results in models (5) reveal a strong 
negative relation between managerial ability and financial constraints, which is also robust to 
additional information asymmetry controls as in model (6). The more able the firm’s managers 
are, the less the firm suffers from financial constraints, substantiating the results of the previous 
models. The positive and significant relation of pre-crisis financial constraints (FINCON) to 
crisis period financial constraints (CRISIS_FINCON) verify that a priori constrained firms will 
most likely be heavier constrained in the crisis. 
Overall, the results in Table 8 suggest that higher managerial ability immunizes firms 
against adverse negative liquidity shocks caused by the financial crisis, as the findings support 
that more able managers have greater availability of financing that is necessary to enable them 
support the increased investments they undertake during the crisis period. 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
4.2.7 Managerial ability and firm value 
 
As discussed so far, more ably managed firms undertake more investments as they 
appear to have greater access to financing resources during the crisis period. Yet, the act of 
increasing investments does not necessarily imply conducting more value-enhancing 
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investments. Therefore, to gain more insights the chapter examines the valuation effects of the 
increased investment activity initiated by high ability managers. 
The regression models in Table 9 are intended to capture the effects of crisis period 
investments (CRISIS_INVESTMENT) on firm value as measured by crisis period Tobin’s Q 
(CRISIS_Q). The following variables are additionally included in the models along with the 
main controls as used in previous regression models: (i) R&D (RD) defined as research and 
development expense in the fiscal year 2006 divided by lagged net assets to proxy for 
discretionary investments at the realm of the CEO power which might have value-relevance 
(Lev and Sougiannis, 1996), and (ii) capital expenditure investments made in the fiscal year 
2006 (INVEST) to capture potential crisis period valuation effects emanating from past 
investments. Under an agency view, more able managers with great reputation at stake are 
expected to avert opportunistic rent-seeking actions that harm firm value; therefore, 
discretionary investments conducted by low ability managers would destruct firm value, 
whereas such investments undertaken by high ability managers would enhance value. In 
models (2) to (4) further controls for corporate governance (GIM) and equity (INC_STOCKS) 
and option (INC_OPTIONS) related incentives are included. Stronger corporate governance 
and better compensation alignment to shareholders’ interest should be positively related to 
crisis firm value.  
[Table 9 here] 
 
In model (1) of Table 9, crisis investments (CRISIS_INVESTMENT) are found to have 
a significantly positive effect (p-value<1%) on crisis firm value (CRISIS_Q). There is evidence 
that on average the market highly values investments made during the financial crisis. Model 
(2), controls for corporate governance and executive compensation incentives and results still 
show a strong positive relation (p-value<1%) between crisis period investments and firm value.  
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In models (3) and (4) MA is used to divide the available sample to low versus high pre-
crisis managerial ability firms. This is done to examine the effect of crisis investments on firm 
value based on whether these investments are a result of inferior or superior managerial ability. 
Firms with pre-crisis managerial ability values below the median are classified as low ability 
(LOWMA) firms, whereas firms with pre-crisis managerial ability values above the median 
are classified as high ability (HIGHMA) firms. The results show that for the sample of 
LOWMA firms there is a strong negative relation (p-value<1%) between crisis investments 
(CRISIS_INVESTMENT) and firm value (CRISIS_Q); it seems that the market does not value 
the investments made by low ability firms during the crisis. This is perhaps the outcome of bad 
and/or unprofitable investments made by low ability managers, which in turn are not 
appreciated by the market. This finding is not surprising and squares with managers’ careers 
and reputation concerns in the labour market as in Scharfstein and Stein (1990), who posit that 
under distressed financial conditions, when managers cannot utilize their own private 
information they expose a type of herding behaviour choosing to mimic the investment 
decisions of other (more able) managers. Another explanation for this negative value effect is 
failure to optimally downsize when in fact the market expects low ability managers to have 
shrunk their existing operations by reducing crisis period investments. Such explanation gains 
more merit given that low managerial ability implies low capacity on behalf of the managers 
to accurately foresee and estimate economic conditions and market expectations (e.g., 
Trueman, 1986, Baik et al., 2011, Demerjian, et al., 2013).  
Conversely, for the sample of HIGHMA firms, CRISIS_INVESTMENT is positively 
and significantly related (p-value<1%) to CRISIS_Q. This finding reflects that more able 
managers do not bow to opportunistic rent-seeking actions and are prudent to pick high quality 
investments that eventually enhance firm value (e.g., Fama, 1980; Kreps et al., 1982, Graham 
et al., 2013; Falato et al., 2015). Such investment decision-making also reflects the intentions 
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and capacity of high ability managers to further strengthen their perceived reputation and 
human capital during highly distressed periods.  
Overall, these findings provide a scope on the role of managerial ability during the 
financial crisis, which complements the work of Campello et al. (2009) and Duchin et al. 
(2010), among others, who find that managers surpass profitable investment opportunities 
during the crisis as a result of external financing constraints. Managerial ability is an important 
driver of corporate investment activity and through this channel more able managers enhance 
firm value. Specifically, this finding allows an identification of a channel through which CEO 
ability explains cross-sectional variation in firms’ valuation during distressed and turbulent 
periods. 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
This chapter investigates the effect of pre-crisis managerial ability on corporate policies 
and value during the recent financial crisis. The chapter primarily documents positive and 
robust relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis period corporate investment. To 
gain more insight into the types of managerial ability appearing to be more effective during the 
crisis, evidence is provided that managers with general skills (versus managers with firm-
specific skills) are driving their firms’ scale of corporate investment. Additionally, evidence 
shows a positive relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis period financing. 
Finally, the increased crisis period investment activity is mediated on market valuation, 
evincing strong positive relations between the levels of investments undertaken by high 
managerial ability and firm value.   
Overall, the findings of this chapter suggest that managerial ability appears to be a 
crucial dimension of firm quality and performance during the crisis period. The chapter 
proposes that a firm’s managerial ability is useful to curtail underinvestment problems through 
gaining access to more resources that enhance firm value. Consequently, in light of these 
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results, assuming homogeneity in the managerial factor, as in the case of several past studies, 
can be proved problematic; rather, understanding the impact of managerial ability on firm 
policies and economic outcomes is fundamental, especially at times when the firm is financially 
distressed suffering from several liquidity shortages and harsh finance provisions. It is 
important to note that firms should acknowledge that there are aspects of managerial ability 
that seem to be more effective to hard economic times and as such general managerial skills 
should be seriously taken into consideration when CEOs are hired.  
In this chapter, the focus is on investigating the role of managerial ability in mitigating 
or worsening the impact of the crisis on the scale of corporate investment. The chosen setting 
recognizes that inferences may be confounded as variation in managerial ability and corporate 
decision-making are endogenous to unobserved variation in investment opportunities. To 
address this issue, the analysis employs data from the fiscal year 2008 to take advantage of the 
natural experiment conditions enabled by the negative liquidity shock and the deteriorating 
product demand observed during the recent financial crisis. However, the empirical findings 
and implications remain agnostic of whether the positive effect of managerial ability on 
corporate investment, financial policies and firm value is also present during normal times or 
when such negative shocks are temporary. Despite this limitation, it is remarked that these 
results are fully consistent with market-based theories which predict that differences in 
managerial ability should relate to corporate decision-making and lead to potentially large 
differences in firm valuation (e.g., Fama, 1980; Kreps et al., 1982; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004; 
Graham et al., 2013; Custodio et al., 2013, Falato et al., 2015). 
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 Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
     
CRISIS_INVESTMENT  0.140 0.063 0.258  
CRISIS_CF  0.209 0.206 0.562  
CRISIS_RESOURCES  0.196 0.158 0.510  
CRISIS_FINCON  -0.171 -0.197 0.187  
CRISIS_Q  2.617 2.355 6.872  
Main Independent  Variables    
RES_EFF_2006  -0.005 -0.042 0.257  
RES_EFF_AV  -0.017 -0.065 0.263  
Main Control  Variables    
SIZE  6.435 6.351 2.025  
MTB  3.289 2.429 4.003  
LEV  0.259 0.189 0.285  
GROWTH  0.190 0.092 0.413  
RET  0.228 0.092 0.784  
ROE  0.128 0.165 0.508  
CF  0.215 0.252 0.598  
Note. This table reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, managerial ability and main control 
variables using a sample of 2,583 observations with available information for all tabulated variables. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 2. Managerial ability and investments: Multicolinearity Test   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Managerial ability and investments    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on investments during 
the crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). Model (1) includes the managerial ability measure, MA, whereas 
model (2) includes the managerial ability measure MA_AV. CRISIS_INVESTMENT is measured during the fiscal 
year 2008 while the managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during the fiscal year 
2006. All regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is designated by ‘***’ 
at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10% 
 
 
 
 
  
 
           Model 
          (VIF) 
Model 
       (VIF) 
MA 1.023  
MA_AV  1.034 
SIZE 1.138 1.143 
MTB 1.056 1.056 
LEV 1.056 1.035 
GROWTH 1.050 1.050 
RET 1.060 1.060 
CF 1.097 1.105 
  CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
Main Independent  Variables (1)  (2) 
MA  0.010*                               
(0.006) 
  
 
MA_AV    0.012**                                        
(0.006) 
 
SIZE  0.041**                               
(0.018) 
0.042**                                                       
(0.018) 
 
MTB  0.115***                                
(0.017) 
0.116***                                             
(0.017) 
 
LEV  0.176***                                         
(0.018) 
0.176***                                            
(0.018) 
 
GROWTH  0.004                                 
(0.017) 
0.004                                            
(0.017) 
 
RET  0.021                                            
(0.017) 
0.022                                        
(0.017) 
 
CF  0.011                                
(0.018) 
0.011                                              
(0.018) 
 
No. of Firms  2,748  2,748  
R2  0.262  0.262  
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Table 4. Propensity score matching    
PANEL A: Difference-in-means of control variables between High Managerial Ability and Low Managerial 
Ability (based on the median value of MA) 
 Unmatched sample  Matched sample 
 Difference-in-means t-stat               Difference-in-means     t-stat 
SIZE 0.078** 2.04                -0.052 1.35 
MTB 0.008 0.22                -0.016 -0.53 
LEV 0.017 0.44 0.054 1.50 
GROWTH -0.030 -0.80 0.016 0.43 
RET -0.033 -0.86 0.016 0.47 
CF -0.188*** -4.94 -0.031 -1.38 
     
Observations     
Total sample 2,748  2,488  
High MA  1,374  1,244  
Low MA 1,374  1,244  
PANEL B: Managerial Ability (MA) and investments: Matched Sample 
MA 
 
 0.010*                                
(0.006) 
 
SIZE 
  
3.578**  
 (1.471) 
 
MTB 
  
0.575***                                                
(0.188) 
 
LEV 
  
0.718*** 
 (0.219)  
GROWTH 
  
-0.660** 
(0.277)  
RET 
  
-0.859**  
(0.367)  
CF 
  
-6.170**                            
(2.565)  
No of Firms   2,488  
R2   0.665  
PANEL C: Difference-in-means of control variables between High Managerial Ability and Low Managerial 
Ability (based on the median of MA_AV) 
 Unmatched sample Matched sample 
 Difference-in-means     t-stat Difference-in-means t-stat 
SIZE 0.058 1.53 -0.042 -1.12 
MTB 0.038 1.00 0.011 0.31 
LEV 0.020 0.52 0.004 0.11 
GROWTH -0.018 -0.47 0.018 0.46 
RET 0.012 0.31 0.036 0.97 
CF -0.160***    -4.21 -0.016 -0.44 
     
Observations     
Total sample 2,748  2,728  
High MA  1,374  1,364  
Low MA 1,374  1,364  
               PANEL D: Managerial Ability (MA_AV) and investments: Matched Sample 
MA_AV      
0.018***   
(0.006) 
 
SIZE   
0.137*** 
 (0.032) 
 
MTB   
0.095*** 
(0.027) 
 
LEV   
0.146*** 
 (0.026) 
 
GROWTH   
0.031 
 (0.025) 
 
RET   
0.041* 
(0.025) 
 
CF   
0.047 
(0.036) 
 
No of Firms   2,728  
R2   0.625  
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Note. This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on investments during 
the crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT) using propensity score matched samples. Panels A and C display for 
each control variable in Table 2 the difference-in-means between the high and low pre-crisis managerial ability 
subsamples (MA and MA_AV, respectively) together with the corresponding t-statistics. The unmatched sample 
corresponds to the original sample. The matched samples are the samples based on pre-crisis managerial ability 
propensity score matching. Panels B and D present coefficient estimates of specifications (1) and (2) of Table 2 
(for MA and MA_AV, respectively) using the matched samples. CRISIS_INVESTMENT is measured during the 
fiscal year 2008 while the managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during the fiscal 
year 2006. All regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is designated by 
‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%. 
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Table 5. Managerial ability and investments: Additional control variables 
    
 CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
PANEL A (1) (2)  (3) 
MA 0.027***         
(0.010) 
0.014*        
(0.009) 
0.028***     
(0.010) 
SIZE -0.035         
(0.056) 
0.008               
(0.035) 
-0.028              
(0.057) 
MTB 0.061*          
(0.036) 
0.051               
(0.031) 
0.051                     
(0.036) 
LEV 0.255***      
(0.035) 
0.219***           
(0.028) 
0.256***      
(0.035) 
GROWTH -0.031        
(0.040) 
0.009          
(0.033) 
-0.036        
(0.040) 
RET 0.181***        
(0.051) 
0.098***             
(0.036) 
0.184***         
(0.051) 
CF 0.030                 
(0.041) 
0.121***         
(0.034) 
0.034            
(0.040) 
GIM -0.014 
(0.012) 
 -0.011        
(0.012) 
BOARD_SIZE 0.0289 
(0.036) 
 0.045          
(0.036) 
BOARD_INDEP 0.007  
(0.030) 
 0.006              
(0.030) 
INC_STOCKS 0.075** 
(0.030) 
 0.079**       
(0.033) 
INC_OPTIONS 0.019  
(0.034) 
 0.016           
(0.035) 
CEO_AGE  -0.091***       
(0.028) 
-0.108***        
(0.033) 
CEO_TENURE  0.051*         
(0.028) 
0.047                
(0.036) 
CEO_DUALITY  0.0192            
(0.052) 
-0.060             
(0.062) 
No of Firms 844 1,090    844 
R2 0.317 0.292   0.329 
PANEL B (1) (2)  (3) 
MA_AV 0.026***       
(0.010) 
0.014*       (0.008) 0.027***    
(0.010) 
SIZE -0.036         
(0.056) 
0.007              
(0.035) 
-0.029       
(0.057) 
MTB 0.062*         
(0.036) 
0.051*            
(0.031) 
0.052      
(0.036) 
LEV 0.255          
(0.035) 
0.219***         
(0.028) 
0.256*** 
(0.035) 
GROWTH -0.029           
(0.040) 
0.009               
(0.033) 
-0.034      
(0.040) 
RET 0.184***         
(0.051) 
0.100***          
(0.036) 
0.187*** 
(0.051) 
CF 0.028          
(0.041) 
0.014          
(0.008) 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
GIM 0.013          
(0.012) 
 0.031               
(0.040) 
BOARD_SIZE 0.030     
(0.036) 
 -0.011              
(0.012) 
BOARD_INDEP 0.007         
(0.030) 
 0.045          
(0.036) 
INC_STOCKS 0.076** 
(0.030) 
 0.005          
(0.030) 
INC_OPTIONS 0.019     
(0.034) 
 0.080**          
(0.033) 
CEO_AGE  -0.091*** 
(0.028) 
0.017           
(0.035) 
CEO_TENURE  0.051*      
(0.028) 
-0.109*** 
(0.033) 
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CEO_DUALITY  0.021         
(0.052) 
0.047          
(0.036) 
No of Firms 844 1,090 844 
R2 0.317 0.292 0.328 
Note.This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on investments during the 
crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). CRISIS_INVESTMENT is measured during the fiscal year 2008 while the 
managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during the fiscal year 2006. Panel A displays 
results using the managerial ability measure MA. Model (1) includes corporate governance variables as additional 
controls. Model (2) includes CEO-level controls. Model (3) includes both corporate governance and CEO-level 
controls. Panel B displays similar estimations using the managerial ability measure MA_AV. All regressions 
include a constant and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is designated by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and 
‘*’ at 10%. 
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Table 6. Managerial ability and investments: Specialists versus generalists 
 CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
 ALL SPECIALISTS GENERALISTS 
PANEL A (1) (2) (3) 
    
MA 0.020**           
(0.009) 
0.001         
(0.012) 
0.035***        
(0.013) 
SIZE -0.006            
(0.035) 
-0.052       
(0.052) 
0.033         
(0.048) 
MTB 0.091***  
(0.033) 
0.358***          
(0.056) 
-0.040         
(0.041) 
LEV 0.228***  
(0.029) 
0.278***         
(0.045) 
0.169***        
(0.039) 
GROWTH -0.018      
(0.036) 
0.031        
(0.053) 
-0.051       
(0.048) 
RET 0.107***  
(0.037) 
0.050        
(0.054) 
0.173***           
(0.050) 
CF 0.129***  
(0.036) 
-0.071      
(0.063) 
0.152***         
(0.046) 
No of firms 1,029 511 518 
R² 0.279 0.433 0.254 
PANEL B (1) (2) (3) 
    
MA_AV 0.019**          
(0.009) 
-0.004      
(0.012) 
0.033**         
(0.013) 
SIZE -0.007       
(0.035) 
-0.054          
(0.052) 
0.031           
(0.048) 
MTB 0.091***  
(0.033) 
0.360***     
(0.056) 
-0.040       
(0.041) 
LEV 0.228***  
(0.029) 
0.276***     
(0.045) 
0.168***         
(0.039) 
GROWTH -0.017         
(0.036) 
0.032       
(0.053) 
-0.049          
(0.048) 
RET 0.109***  
(0.037) 
0.049           
(0.054) 
0.179***         
(0.050) 
CF 0.128***  
(0.036) 
-0.073           
(0.063) 
0.153***        
(0.046) 
No of firms 1,029 511 518 
R² 0.278 0.433 0.253 
Note.This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on investments during the 
crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). CRISIS_INVESTMENT is measured during the fiscal year 2008 while the 
managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during the fiscal year 2006. The sample 
consists of firms with available information for the general ability index developed by Custodio et al. (2013). 
Panels A and B display results using the managerial ability measures MA and MA_AV, respectively. All 
regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is designated by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ 
at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%.     
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Table 7.  Specialists versus generalists and investments: Additional controls    
 CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
 SPECIALISTS  GENERALISTS 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
        
MA 0.011                    
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
0.016  
(0.016) 
0.047*** 
(0.014) 
0.046*** 
(0.015) 
0.049*** 
(0.015) 
SIZE -0.012        
(0.082) 
0.017  
(0.061) 
0.028   
(0.093) 
-0.035    
(0.076) 
0.010     
(0.052) 
-0.047 
(0.082) 
MTB 0.350*** 
(0.067) 
0.283*** 
(0.062) 
0.367*** 
(0.071) 
-0.061   
(0.045) 
-0.089* 
(0.046) 
-0.071 
(0.047) 
LEV 0.377*** 
(0.055) 
0.318*** 
(0.051) 
0.395*** 
(0.060) 
0.168*** 
(0.048) 
0.212    
(0.044) 
0.171*** 
(0.051) 
GROWTH 0.077 
(0.073) 
0.052  
(0.061) 
0.105  
(0.087) 
-0.084*  
(0.049) 
-0.066             
(0.050) 
-0.090* 
(0.051) 
RET -0.009 
(0.069) 
-0.002 
(0.059) 
0.008  
(0.075) 
0.354*** 
(0.076) 
0.166*** 
(0.053) 
0.361*** 
(0.078) 
CF -0.289*** 
(0.078) 
-0.130* 
(0.070) 
-0.331*** 
(0.082) 
0.062    
(0.050) 
0.175*** 
(0.049) 
0.067  
(0.052) 
GIM -0.025 
(0.017) 
 -0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.000    
(0.017) 
 0.001  
(0.018) 
BOARD_SIZE 0.006 
(0.051) 
 0.040  
(0.059) 
0.030    
(0.050) 
 0.039  
(0.053) 
BOARD_INDEP 0.010 
(0.041) 
 0.026  
(0.047) 
0.030          
(0.044) 
 0.028  
(0.051) 
INC_STOCKS 0.149 
(0.186) 
 0.092  
(0.229) 
0.374        
(0.232) 
 0.466* 
(0.256) 
INC_OPTIONS -0.043 
(0.259) 
 -0.012 
(0.292) 
0.278             
(0.261) 
 0.321  
(0.278) 
CEO_AGE  -0.114** 
(0.045) 
-0.180*** 
(0.052) 
 -0.063   
(0.050) 
-0.051 
(0.054) 
CEO_TENURE  0.097** 
(0.044) 
0.159*** 
(0.058) 
 0.044     
(0.050) 
-
0.012 
(0.060) 
CEO_DUALITY  -0.084   
(0.089) 
-0.102 
(0.103) 
 0.033       
(0.085) 
-
0.056 
(0.091) 
CEO_EDU  -0.106** 
(0.051) 
-0.186*** 
(0.059) 
 0.061             
(0.051) 
0.071  
(0.054) 
No of firms 392 416 342 425 461 400 
R² 0.447 0.446 0.487 0.326 0.278 0.331 
        
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
        
MA_AV 0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
0.010     
(0.016) 
0.048*** 
(0.014) 
0.044*** 
(0.014) 
0.052*** 
(0.015) 
SIZE -0.011       
(0.083) 
0.016  
(0.062) 
0.030  
(0.093) 
-0.039   
(0.076) 
0.007           
(0.052) 
-0.052 
(0.082) 
MTB 0.353*** 
(0.067) 
0.284*** 
(0.062) 
0.369*** 
(0.071) 
-0.057   
(0.045) 
-0.086*  
(0.046) 
-0.067 
(0.047) 
LEV 0.376*** 
(0.055) 
0.317*** 
(0.051) 
0.395*** 
(0.060) 
0.166*** 
(0.048) 
0.210*** 
(0.044) 
0.167*** 
(0.051) 
GROWTH 0.079        
(0.073) 
0.052  
(0.061) 
0.108   
(0.087) 
-0.083*  
(0.049) 
-0.064           
(0.050) 
-0.089* 
(0.0505) 
RET -0.011           
(0.070) 
-0.003 
(0.059) 
0.005  
(0.076) 
0.362*** 
(0.076) 
0.174*** 
(0.053) 
0.369*** 
(0.078) 
CF -0.292*** 
(0.078) 
-0.130* 
(0.070) 
-0.335 
(0.082) 
0.060    
(0.050) 
0.175*** 
(0.049) 
0.063   
(0.052) 
GIM -0.024        
(0.017) 
 -0.020 
(0.018) 
0.001    
(0.017) 
 0.003  
(0.018) 
BOARD_SIZE 0.004           
(0.051) 
 0.039 
(0.059) 
0.036    
(0.050) 
 0.045  
(0.053) 
BOARD_INDEP 0.009            
(0.041) 
 0.025 
(0.048) 
0.029    
(0.044) 
 0.026  
(0.051) 
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INC_STOCKS 0.155           
(0.186) 
 0.096 
(0.229) 
0.374    
(0.231) 
 0.472* 
(0.255) 
INC_OPTIONS -0.055         
(0.259) 
 -0.029    
(0.291) 
0.300    
(0.261) 
 0.350     
(0.277) 
CEO_AGE  -0.115** 
(0.045) 
-0.180*** 
(0.053) 
 -0.060   
(0.050) 
-0.050 
(0.054) 
CEO_TENURE  0.097** 
(0.044) 
0.160*** 
(0.058) 
 0.042        
(0.050) 
-0.014        
(0.060) 
CEO_DUALITY  -0.084 
(0.089) 
-0.100  
(0.103) 
 0.040       
(0.085) 
-0.053    
(0.090) 
CEO_EDU  -0.106** 
(0.051) 
-0.185*** 
(0.059) 
 0.066       
(0.052) 
0.075        
(0.054) 
No of firms 392 416 342 425 461    400 
R² 0.447 0.446 0.485 0.329 0.278                                         0.335
Note.This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on investments during 
the crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). CRISIS_INVESTMENT is measured during the fiscal year 2008 
while the managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during the fiscal year 2006. 
Panel A display results using the managerial ability measure MA. Model (1) includes corporate governance 
variables as additional controls. Model (2) includes CEO-level controls. Model (3) includes both corporate 
governance and CEO-level controls. Panel B displays similar estimations using the managerial ability 
measure MA_AV. All regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is 
designated by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%.   
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Table 8. Specialist versus generalists and investments: Alternative measures 
    
 
CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
              SPECIALISTS 
                             (CEO holds a PhD) 
                GENERALISTS 
           (CEO does not hold a PhD) 
SPECIALISTS 
(CEO with  specific education) 
GENERALISTS 
(CEO with  MBA and/or CPA ) 
 Panel A                                 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
             
MA 
0.017              
(0.036) 
0.012  
(0.026) 
0.021  
(0.037) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.044** 
(0.019) 
0.038** 
(0.016) 
0.042** 
(0.019) 
SIZE 
-0.450*** 
(0.168) 
-0.080 
(0.096) 
-0.480*** 
(0.176) 
0.017        
(0.065) 
0.018  
(0.042) 
0.031  
(0.066) 
0.031 
(0.063) 
0.018 
(0.044) 
0.021 
(0.067) 
-0.102 
(0.107) 
-0.000 
(0.064) 
-0.070 
(0.111) 
MTB 
-0.020       
(0.146) 
-0.034 
(0.104) 
-0.035 
(0.152) 
0.064        
(0.040) 
0.045  
(0.036) 
0.053  
(0.040) 
-0.087** 
(0.043) 
-0.060 
(0.040) 
-0.080** 
(0.043) 
0.172*** 
(0.064) 
0.141** 
(0.056) 
0.165** 
(0.064) 
LEV 
0.312*** 
(0.117) 
0.333*** 
(0.090) 
0.319** 
(0.122) 
0.274*** 
(0.040) 
0.254*** 
(0.034) 
0.275  
(0.040) 
0.212 
(0.043) 
0.181 
(0.036) 
0.218*** 
(0.043) 
0.362 
(0.066) 
0.388 
(0.054) 
0.357 
(0.067) 
GROWTH 
0.029         
(0.089) 
0.009  
(0.077) 
0.024  
(0.091) 
-0.033      
(0.049) 
-0.036 
(0.040) 
-0.039 
(0.049) 
-0.032 
(0.047) 
-0.032 
(0.039) 
-0.040 
(0.047) 
-0.038 
(0.078) 
-0.014 
(0.067) 
-0.036 
(0.079) 
RET 
-0.072            
(0.214) 
-0.076 
(0.174) 
-0.108 
(0.225) 
0.169*** 
(0.057) 
0.096** 
(0.040) 
0.180*** 
(0.057) 
0.118 
(0.079) 
0.038 
(0.047) 
0.113 
(0.079) 
0.147* 
(0.080) 
0.126** 
(0.062) 
0.157* 
(0.081) 
CF 
0.192          
(0.224) 
0.129           
(0.115) 
0.246  
(0.239) 
0.012        
(0.044) 
0.119*** 
(0.040) 
0.014  
(0.044) 
0.107* 
(0.058) 
0.278*** 
(0.049) 
0.118** 
(0.058) 
-0.060 
(0.065) 
-0.052 
(0.058) 
-0.060 
(0.065) 
GIM 
0.055       
(0.034) 
 
0.062* 
(0.035) 
-0.013      
(0.014) 
 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
-0.022 
(0.014) 
 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.014 
(0.023) 
 
-0.007 
(0.023) 
BOARD_SIZE 
0.286*** 
(0.090) 
 
0.296*** 
(0.100) 
-0.026       
(0.043) 
 
-0.009 
(0.043) 
0.004 
(0.044) 
 
0.018 
(0.045) 
0.066 
(0.066) 
 
0.075 
(0.066) 
BOARD_INDEP 
-0.036       
(0.083) 
 
-0.017 
(0.088) 
0.021        
(0.036) 
 
0.027  
(0.037) 
0.041 
(0.036) 
 
0.048 
(0.037) 
-0.029 
(0.060) 
 
-0.021 
(0.062) 
INC_STOCKS 
0.393              
(0.367) 
 
0.469  
(0.437) 
0.357**     
(0.167) 
 
0.355** 
(0.180) 
0.259* 
(0.150) 
 
0.348** 
(0.168) 
0.382 
(0.309) 
 
0.309 
(0.329) 
INC_OPTIONS 
1.294*** 
(0.475) 
 
1.341*** 
(0.488) 
0.034        
(0.213) 
 
0.026  
(0.215) 
0.249 
(0.198) 
 
0.280 
(0.199) 
0.018 
(0.366) 
 
-0.096 
(0.373) 
CEO_AGE  
-0.043 
(0.084) 
0.008                        
(0.106) 
 
-0.098*** 
(0.035) 
-0.103*** 
(0.039) 
 
-0.069* 
(0.037) 
-0.069* 
(0.040) 
 
-0.073 
(0.053) 
-0.100 
(0.064) 
CEO_TENURE  
0.024  
(0.066) 
-0.006 
(0.096) 
 
0.073** 
(0.034) 
0.063  
(0.043) 
 
0.026 
(0.034) 
0.000 
(0.040) 
 
0.125** 
(0.055) 
0.117 
(0.074) 
CEO_DUALITY  
0.122  
(0.151) 
-0.167 
(0.189) 
 
-0.024 
(0.062) 
-0.092 
(0.071) 
 
0.008 
(0.067) 
-0.094 
(0.070) 
 
-0.039 
(0.096) 
-0.047 
(0.122) 
No of firms                           97  125 97 672 826 672 398 505 398 371 446 371 
R²                                         0.627  0.500 0.632 0.311 0.285 0.322 0.410 0.346 0.422 0.333 0.340 0.341 
Panel B                           (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
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MA_AV 
0.016       
(0.035) 
0.007  
(0.026) 
0.017  
(0.036) 
0.030***      
(0.011) 
0.025** 
(0.010) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.037** 
(0.019) 
0.030** 
(0.015) 
0.035* 
(0.019) 
SIZE 
-0.447**  
(0.171) 
-0.085 
(0.096) 
-0.480*** 
(0.179) 
0.015             
(0.065) 
0.018  
(0.042) 
0.030  
(0.066) 
0.032 
(0.062) 
0.020 
(0.044) 
0.022 
(0.064) 
-0.102 
(0.108) 
-0.003 
(0.064) 
-0.071 
(0.111) 
MTB 
-0.012       
(0.140) 
-0.027 
(0.103) 
-0.020 
(0.144) 
0.065             
(0.040) 
0.045  
(0.036) 
0.054  
(0.040) 
-0.086** 
(0.043) 
-0.061 
(0.040) 
-0.093** 
(0.043) 
0.176*** 
(0.064) 
0.145*** 
(0.056) 
0.168*** 
(0.064) 
LEV 
0.315*** 
(0.117) 
0.332*** 
(0.090) 
0.324*** 
(0.121) 
0.273*** 
(0.040) 
0.256*** 
(0.034) 
0.274*** 
(0.040) 
0.212*** 
(0.043) 
0.182*** 
(0.036) 
0.218 
(0.043) 
0.361*** 
(0.067) 
0.387*** 
(0.054) 
0.356*** 
(0.067) 
GROWTH 
0.031        
(0.088) 
0.012  
(0.077) 
0.027  
(0.091) 
-0.032       
(0.049) 
-0.036 
(0.040) 
-0.038 
(0.049) 
-0.032 
(0.047) 
-0.033 
(0.039) 
-0.041 
(0.047) 
-0.033 
(0.079) 
-0.010 
(0.067) 
-0.030 
(0.079) 
RET 
-0.077      
(0.212) 
-0.080 
(0.174) 
-0.115 
(0.224) 
0.172*** 
(0.057) 
0.099** 
(0.040) 
0.183*** 
(0.057) 
0.118 
(0.079) 
0.040 
(0.047) 
0.113 
(0.079) 
0.153* 
(0.081) 
0.130** 
(0.062) 
0.162** 
(0.081) 
CF 
0.178         
(0.219) 
0.127  
(0.115) 
0.222  
(0.231) 
0.009        
(0.044) 
0.118*** 
(0.040) 
0.011  
(0.044) 
0.105* 
(0.058) 
0.277*** 
(0.049) 
0.116** 
(0.058) 
-0.066 
(0.065) 
-0.058 
(0.058) 
-0.065 
(0.065) 
GIM 
0.056*  
(0.034) 
 
0.062* 
(0.035) 
-0.013       
(0.014) 
 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
BOARD_SIZE 
0.285*** 
(0.091) 
 
0.293*** 
(0.098) 
-0.024      
(0.043) 
 
-0.007 
(0.043) 
0.005 
(0.044) 
 
0.019 
(0.045) 
0.071 
(0.066) 
 
0.080 
(0.066) 
BOARD_INDEP 
-0.037  
(0.084) 
 
-0.017 
(0.089) 
0.022 
(0.036) 
 
0.027  
(0.037) 
0.041 
(0.035) 
 
0.048 
(0.037) 
-0.026 
(0.060) 
 
-0.020 
(0.062) 
INC_STOCKS 
0.398  
(0.366) 
 
0.479   
(0.436) 
0.361**          
(0.167) 
 
0.358** 
(0.180) 
0.257* 
(0.150) 
 
0.344** 
(0.168) 
0.419 
(0.308) 
 
0.350 
(0.328) 
INC_OPTIONS 
1.301*** 
(0.473) 
 
1.354*** 
(0.487) 
0.035           
(0.213) 
 
0.027  
(0.215) 
0.253 
(0.198) 
 
0.283 
(0.199) 
-0.008 
(0.366) 
 
-0.119 
(0.373) 
CEO_AGE  
-0.042 
(0.084) 
0.016 
(0.106) 
 
-0.098*** 
(0.035) 
-0.105*** 
(0.039) 
 
-0.067* 
(0.037) 
-0.068* 
(0.040) 
 
-0.076 
(0.053) 
-0.106* 
(0.064) 
CEO_TENURE  
0.024  
(0.066) 
-0.010 
(0.096) 
 
0.073** 
(0.034) 
0.064   
(0.043) 
 
0.025 
(0.034) 
0.001 
(0.040) 
 
0.123** 
(0.055) 
0.115 
(0.074) 
CEO_DUALITY  
0.124  
(0.151) 
-0.160 
(0.188) 
 
-0.022 
(0.062) 
-0.090  
(0.071) 
 
0.008 
(0.067) 
-0.094 
(0.070) 
 
-0.030 
(0.096) 
-0.040 
(0.122) 
No of firms                    97  125 97 672 826 672 398 505 398 371 446 371 
R²                                  0.627   0.500 0.632 0.311 0.286 0.322 0.411 0.347 0.422 0.331 0.337 0.339 
Note.This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on investments during the crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
is measured during the fiscal year 2008 while the managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during the fiscal year 2006. Panel A display results using 
the managerial ability measure MA. Models (1)-(3) and (7)-(8) use firms where the CEO is classified as specialist (CEO holds a PhD and CEO with specific education, 
respectively) while models (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) use firms where the CEO is classified as generalist (CEO does not hold a PhD and CEO with MBA and/or CPA, respectively). 
In addition, models (1), (4), (7) and (10) include corporate governance variables as additional controls. Models (2), (5), (8) and (11) include CEO-level controls. Models (3), 
(6), (9) and (12) include corporate governance and CEO-level controls. Panel B displays similar estimations using the managerial ability measure MA_AV. All regressions 
include a constant and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is designated by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 1
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Table 9. Managerial ability and financing 
 
 CRISIS_CF CRISIS_RESOURCES CRISIS_FINCON 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MA 0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.007) 
0.018*** 
(0.007) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
SIZE 0.204*** 
(0.020) 
0.184*** 
(0.026) 
0.206*** 
(0.021) 
0.182*** 
(0.027) 
-0.049*** 
(0.008) 
-0.049*** 
(0.009) 
MTB 0.097*** 
(0.019) 
0.100*** 
(0.019) 
0.064*** 
(0.019) 
0.065*** 
(0.020) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
LEV 0.129*** 
(0.019) 
0.150*** 
(0.020) 
0.083*** 
(0.020) 
0.092*** 
(0.021) 
-0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
GROWTH -0.033* 
(0.018) 
-0.033* 
(0.019) 
-0.043** 
(0.020) 
-0.037* 
(0.021) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
RET 0.009  
(0.018) 
0.020  
(0.020) 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
ROE 0.063   
(0.053) 
0.060  
(0.053) 
0.028  
(0.025) 
0.021 
(0.025) 
0.001  
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
CF 0.111** 
(0.052) 
0.108** 
(0.053) 
    
RESOURCES   0.148*** 
(0.042) 
0.152*** 
(0.042) 
  
FINCON 
 
    0.915*** 
(0.009) 
0.923*** 
(0.009) 
NUM_ANAL  0.008  
(0.023) 
 -0.003 
(0.024) 
 0.002  
(0.006) 
RET_STD  -0.015 
(0.020) 
 -0.052** 
(0.022) 
 -0.004 
(0.006) 
 
No of firms 
2,748 2,689 2,529 2,471 2,695 2,642 
R² 0.168 0.171 0.147 0.149 0.937 0.939 
       
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MA_AV 0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.017*** 
(0.007) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
SIZE 0.203*** 
(0.019) 
0.183*** 
(0.026) 
0.205*** 
(0.020) 
0.180*** 
(0.027) 
0.048*** 
(0.008) 
-0.048*** 
(0.009) 
MTB 0.098*** 
(0.019) 
0.101*** 
(0.019) 
0.065*** 
(0.019) 
0.067*** 
(0.020) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
LEV 0.129*** 
(0.019) 
0.150*** 
(0.020) 
0.083*** 
(0.020) 
0.092*** 
(0.021) 
-0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
GROWTH -0.033* 
(0.018) 
-0.033* 
(0.019) 
-0.042** 
(0.020) 
-0.037* 
(0.021) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
RET 0.011  
(0.018) 
0.020  
(0.020) 
-0.014    
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
ROE 0.063  
(0.053) 
0.060  
(0.053) 
0.030     
(0.025) 
0.024 
(0.025) 
0.000  
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
CF 0.112** 
(0.052) 
0.110** 
(0.053) 
    
RESOURCES 
 
  0.146*** 
(0.042) 
0.151*** 
(0.042) 
  
FINCON     0.915*** 
(0.009) 
0.922*** 
(0.009) 
NUM_ANAL 
 
 0.008        
(0.023) 
 -0.002 
(0.024) 
 0.002       
(0.006) 
RET_STD  -0.015     
(0.020) 
 -0.051** 
(0.022) 
 -0.004   
(0.006) 
No of firms 2,748 2,689 2,529 2,471 2,695 2,642 
R² 0.169 0.171 0.147 0.149 0.937 0.939 
Note. This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on financing during the 
crisis period. The financing variable in models (1) and (2) is the crisis period cash flow (CRISIS_CF), in models 
(3) and (4) is the crisis period total financing resources (CRISIS_RESOURCES) and in models (5) and (6) is the 
Whited and Wu (2006) financial constraints index (CRISIS_ FINCON). The financing variables are measured 
during the fiscal year 2008 while the managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during 
the fiscal year 2006. Panels A and B display results using the managerial ability measures MA and MA_AV, 
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respectively. All regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is designated by 
‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%.       
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                  Table 10. Investments and firm value 
   LOWMA HIGHMA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CRISIS_INVESTMENT 4.729*** 
(0.569) 
3.672*** 
(1.238) 
-5.149*** 
(1.805) 
7.230***  
(1.410) 
SIZE 0.226*** 
(0.076) 
0.354 
(0.231) 
0.875*** 
(0.288) 
-0.545* 
(0.297) 
MTB 0.079** 
(0.033) 
0.103 
(0.072) 
-0.207** 
(0.095) 
0.565  
(0.092) 
LEV -2.119*** 
(0.530) 
-0.930 
(1.177) 
-0.649 
(1.458) 
2.370  
(1.549) 
GROWTH -0.104 
(0.233) 
-0.773 
(0.853) 
0.306  
(1.075) 
-2.482** 
(1.240) 
RD 
 
1.078** 
(0.483) 
2.325 
(1.868) 
-4.481* 
(2.690) 
6.747*** 
(2.030) 
INVESTMENT 
 
-0.026 
(0.059) 
0.603 
(0.742) 
2.862*** 
(1.055) 
-0.974 
(0.915) 
GIM  0.026 
(0.111) 
-0.437 
(1.776) 
-0.128 
(1.675) 
INC_STOCKS  -1.249 
(1.304) 
1.181  
(2.231) 
-0.541 
(2.253) 
INC_OPTIONS  0.502 
(1.724) 
-0.066 
(0.139) 
0.097  
(0.149) 
No of firms 2,866 914 503 411 
R² 0.052 0.071 0.061 0.199 
Note. This table reports regression coefficient estimates of investment (CRISIS_INVESTMENT) on firm value 
(CRISIS_Q) during the crisis period. CRISIS_INVESTMENT and CRISIS_Q are measured during the fiscal year 
2008. The remaining variables are controls and are measured during the fiscal year 2006. All regressions include 
constants and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is designated by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%.   
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Chapter 5  
 
Conclusion 
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Conclusion 
1. Key Findings  
This dissertation examines the role of two main managerial traits, namely power and 
ability on investment levels and efficiency, financing and firm value. CEO duality, signalling 
managerial power, appears to have an important and at the same time an idiosyncratic nature, 
making it difficult for firms to adopt a “one size fits all” approach as an act of best practice. In 
the absence of a clear hierarchical structure, board monitoring weakens (because power is 
concentrated in the hands of a sole agent) and agency problems, in the form of managerial 
entrenchment, manifest causing investment inefficiencies and harming overall value at the 
expense of the firm’s shareholders. Nonetheless, through the findings of this dissertation, it 
appears that the performance consequences of CEO duality are contingent on an array of CEO- 
specific, firm-specific, and board-specific factors that either attenuate or exacerbate the agency 
problems in a firm. As such, this dissertation informs strategic literature that whether CEO 
duality will beget self-interested behavior at the expense of shareholder depends on firm and 
compensation structure, as well as board and CEO characteristics. 
Beyond CEO duality as a structural regime which provides the CEO with legitimate 
power, this dissertation looks at managerial ability, to suggest that high managerial ability is a 
vital dimension of firm quality and performance during the crisis period.  A firm’s managerial 
ability is valuable to restrain underinvestment problems via gaining access to more resources 
that enhance firm value. This work overcomes the assumption of homogeneity in the 
managerial factor evident in past studies and signifies that the impact of managerial ability on 
firm policies and economic outcomes is fundamental, especially at times when the firm is 
financially distressed due to liquidity shortages and harsh finance provisions.  An important 
finding in this context is that general managerial skills (compared to specialized managerial 
skills) appear to be more immune to financially distress conditions, proving that general 
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knowledge and skills during such times are determinant dimensions of the CEO ability. This 
finding provides further support to the growing importance of general versus firm-specific 
skills in the market for CEOs. 
2. Limitations 
It should, however, be acknowledged that the dissertation is subject to limitations.  The 
first limitation arises in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 whose analyses rely heavily on segment 
information for the construction of firm level and segment level measures. Specifically, this 
relates to the appropriateness of CIS data in reporting segments and industry concentration. Ali 
et al (2009), document a poor correlation (13%) of CIS data on industry concentration with the 
equivalent US Census measures that include both public and private firm data.  In a different 
study, Villalonga (2004) utilizes the Business Information Tracking (BITS) database to find a 
premium in the value of diversified firms in relation to stand alone entities, which highly 
contradicted the well documented discount found in the value of diversified firms when using 
CIS data. These results suggest that estimates based on segment data, might yield different 
results if the analysis considers alternative databases.  Furthermore, the reporting of segments 
by management is at several times inaccurate or prone to change with no notable evidence of 
a change in operations.   
In Chapter 4, the main limitation relates to the construction of firm efficiency score, 
which requires the usage of accounting values and the preservation of a constant quality in 
financial reporting. This makes the efficiency score sensitive to the variation in financial reporting 
quality because of deliberate revenue or earnings management (Demerjian et al., 2011), hence, 
increasing the potential of inflated perceived efficiency.  Additionally, measurement error of the 
efficiency score may result from the dependence on accounting numbers which were formed 
based on the measurement rules of the US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  
Certain problems arise from this; for instance, historical cost appears noncomparable across 
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industries, R&D and capitalized operating leases measurement relies on researcher assumptions, and 
important intangibles must be excluded because of data constraints. Demerjian et al. (2012) identify 
that although these measurement errors do not systematically affect the managerial ability score, they 
could produce confounding effects on the efficiency score, thus affecting the implications drawn in 
chapter 4. Still referring to the managerial ability measure, the residual nature of the measure may also 
entail other factors not necessarily attributable to managerial ability. However, as it has already been 
mentioned, 67% of CEO fixed-effects in Chapter 4 are statistically significant in explaining 
managerial ability after controlling for firm fixed effects.  Finally, some accounting items of 
the DEA inputs (e.g. PP&E) are driven by both current and past managers, therefore the score 
reflects both current and past managerial ability. 
3. Future research paths 
Considering the findings in this dissertation, the need for a comprehensive 
understanding of the mechanisms taking place at the apex of the modern firms is still apparent. 
Provided that this dissertation explores two CEO / managerial traits, namely power and ability, 
future researchers are urged to examine other managerial attributes based on demographics, 
human or social capital or even board attributes. Such an assessment may prove valuable 
because it could inform about how and why certain types of firms attenuate or alleviate 
investment inefficiencies evident across years or, particularly, in certain periods of economic 
shortfalls. For instance, managerial prestige may interact with ability to facilitate access to 
financing; likewise, politically connected managers or boards with directors linked to financial 
institutions may have a more favourable treatment by lenders.   
 Furthermore, given that internal capital markets constitute a good point of reference 
for intra firm investigations of the firm’s sensitivity to projects’ growth opportunities, future 
research avenues could also seek for new insights on managerial ability in diversified firms. 
This will enable an assessment of its role on internal capital or debt service allocation. 
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Researchers can look at both its direct relation to these outcomes or its moderating effects on 
the relationship between firm characteristics and firm outcomes. Likewise, it would be 
interesting to look at the impact of CEO duality on firm outcomes at times when external 
financing is hard to obtain. It could be argued that, during hardship times, duality becomes 
beneficial to the firm because of its cohesive nature and speed of decision making which are 
essential in these settings. Perhaps such an investigation could help explain why an intrusive 
number of firms continue to maintain the two roles combined, despite the wide proposals 
against it. 
Additionally, it is evident that the performance implications of managerial power and 
ability are contingent on a range of environment, firm, and CEO/manager factors, only some 
of which have already been identified; thus, future research should examine its implications 
through the lenses of such moderating or mediating variables. Further, a renewed consideration 
of more complex interactions and classifications could identify other outcomes than the ones 
highlighted in this dissertation; for example, instead of looking at the relationship of CEO 
duality and firm outcomes, its moderating effects could instead be assessed to identify 
conditions where it strengthens or weakens the effects of firm characteristics on performance 
outcomes. Given the focus on large public firms of most of studies evaluating both CEO duality 
and managerial ability, future researchers are also urged to look whether their identified effects 
hold on small, private, young or entrepreneurial firms. Lastly, it is proposed that instead of only 
scrutinizing these traits via quantitative investigations, much can be learned qualitatively from 
executive interviews and narratives in the press or proxy statements. To add on this, conducting 
in-depth interviews with executives and chairs of boards can prove valuable in identifying the 
mechanism through which managers operate and the range of approaches evident to their role. 
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Appendix 
 
Definitions of the Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent Variables 
  
          RVA Relative value added, calculated when firm- and 
industry-adjusted segment investment are weighted by 
the difference between the industry median Tobin’s q 
for that segment and the sales-weighted average q for 
the firm. RINV is the sales-weighted sum of firm- and 
industry-adjusted investment in high q segments minus 
the sales-weighted sum of firm- and industry-adjusted 
investment in low q segments (Rajan et al.,2000). 
RVA is multiplied by 100.  
  
            RINV 
            
Relative investment is the sales-weighted sum of firm- 
and industry-adjusted investment in high q segments 
minus the sales-weighted sum of firm- and industry-
adjusted investment in low q segments. (Ahn and 
Dennis, 2004). 
RINV is multiplied by 100. 
  
           Marginal Profitability The spread of value over cost, equal to the total market 
value of a firm net of book value of its assets divided 
by the book value of its assets (Fama and French, 
1998). 
 
           Segment Investment Industry-adjusted segment investment, defined as the 
segment’s capital expenditure-to-sales ratio minus the 
capital expenditure-to-sales ratio of the median peer-
focused firm operating in the same three-digit SIC 
industry as the segment (requiring at least five focused 
firms in the industry). 
  
           Crisis Investment  Capital expenditures in fiscal year 2008 divided by 
lagged net assets .  
  
          Crisis CF Operating income before depreciation in fiscal year 
2008 divided by lagged net assets. 
 
          Crisis Resources Issuance of long term debt minus reduction of long term 
debt plus operating activities in fiscal year 2008 divided 
by lagged net assets. 
  
          Crisis Fincon A financial constraints measure estimated as in Whited 
and Wu (2006) for fiscal year 2008. 
  
 
 
137 
 
 
Crisis Q Market equity plus total debt plus preferred stock 
liquidating value minus deferred taxes and investment 
tax credits all divided by book assets.  
Firm- level Independent 
Variables  
 
  
  
CEO Duality   A dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the firm-
years that the CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 
otherwise. 
  
Rer Eff 2006 Residual efficiency resulting from a Tobit regression in 
the spirit of Demerjian et al. (2012) that regresses firm 
efficiency score on a set of industry and firm-specific 
variables (see, RES_EFF term in Eq. (2) Ch.3). This 
measure is estimated using data from fiscal year 2006. 
  
Res Eff Av Residual efficiency resulting from a Tobit regression in 
the spirit of Demerjian et al. (2012) that regresses firm 
efficiency score on a set of industry and firm-specific 
variables (see, RES_EFF term in Eq. (2) Ch.3). This 
measure is estimated using the average residual 
efficiency, per firm, across the fiscal years 2002-2006. 
   
MA Assigned a value between 0 and 9 according to the decile 
ranking of RES_EFF_2006. 
  
MA AV Assigned a value between 0 and 9 according to the decile 
ranking of RES_EFF_AV.   
  
GA General Ability Index in the spirit of Custodio et al. 
(2013). It summarizes information on CEOs skills and 
allows the classification among generalists and 
specialists. 
  
Firm Risk The variance of monthly stock returns of the firm minus 
the risk-free rate during the fiscal year. The risk-free 
rate is the US government security with a 1-year yield 
period. 
 
CEO Own The proportion of CEO ownership in the firm 
ownership structure, defined as the ratio of the number 
of common shares held by the CEO to the total shares 
outstanding of the firm. 
 
             Firm size  The natural logarithm of total sales. 
  
Number of Segments The number of the firm’s discrete segments. 
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 R&D The firm’s industry-adjusted ratio of R&D/Sales, which 
is equal to R&D expenditures divided by sales 
revenues. 
  
            Investment  The firm’s industry-adjusted Capx/Sales, equal to 
firm’s capital expenditure divided by sales revenues. 
  
Tobin’s q The firm’s industry-adjusted Tobin's q, equal to the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of 
assets. 
 
CEO Tenure The natural logarithm of the length of time between the 
date when the person became the CEO and the current 
fiscal year end. 
  
Institutional Own The proportion of institutional ownership in the firm 
ownership structure, defined as the ratio of the number 
of common shares held by institutional investors to the 
total shares outstanding of the firm 
 
MTB The firm’s market value divided by book value of 
equity in the end of fiscal year 2006. 
 
LEV Book value of debt divided by book value of total 
assets in the end of fiscal year 2006. 
 
Growth The difference from 2005 to 2006 in total assets 
divided by the year 2005 total assets. 
 
RET The 12-month compounded stock return (excluding 
dividends) spanning the fiscal year 2006. 
 
ROE Earnings before interest and taxes in the end of fiscal 
year 2006 deflated by lagged net assets. 
  
CF Operating income before depreciation at the end of 
fiscal year 2006 divided by lagged net assets. 
FinCon A financial constraints measure estimated as in Whited 
and Wu (2006) for fiscal year 2006. 
 
Resources Issuance of long term debt minus reduction of long 
term debt plus operating activities in fiscal year 2006 
deflated by lagged net assets. 
 
Investment Capital expenditures in the fiscal year 2006 divided by 
lagged net assets. 
 
             Num Anal The natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts 
covering the firm in the end of fiscal year 2006. 
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Ret Std Standard deviation of daily returns spanning the fiscal 
year 2006. 
 
GIM The index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) for 
year 2006 (Andrew Metric’s website).   
 
Board Size The number of members in a firm’s board of directors. 
 
Board Independence The percentage of outside directors in a firm’s board 
of directors. 
 
Inc Stocks The CEO stock holdings incentives ratio estimated as 
in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). 
 
Inc Options The CEO option holdings incentives ratio estimated as 
in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). 
 
CEO Age The natural logarithm of the CEO age. 
  
CEO Edu A categorical variable that takes the value of 0 when the 
CEO has no university education, the value of 1 when 
the CEO has a bachelor degree, the value of 2 when the 
CEO also holds a master degree and a value of 3 when 
the CEO holds a PhD degree. 
 
RD Research and development expense in the fiscal year 
2006 divided by lagged net assets. 
 
  
Segment-level Independent 
Variables 
 
  
Segment Size The natural logarithm of the sales of the segment. 
 
Relative Segment Size Segment’s sales divided by the sum of sales across all 
segments of the firm.  
 
Segment CF Industry-adjusted operating income to sales ratio for the 
corresponding segment (requiring at least five peer-
focused firms in the industry). 
  
Other Segment CF Industry-adjusted operating income to sales ratio for the 
firm’s remaining segments (requiring at least five peer-
focused firms in the industry). 
 
Industry Tobin’s q The Tobin’s q of the median peer-focused firm in the 
three-digit SIC industry for the corresponding segment, 
with Tobin’s q being equal to the market value of assets 
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divided by the book value of assets (requiring at least 
five peer-focused firms in the industry). 
  
High-q Segment A dummy variable set equal to one if the Tobin’s q of 
the median peer-focused firm in the segment’s three-
digit SIC industry is greater than the sales-weighted 
Tobin’s q for the firm as a whole, and zero otherwise 
(requiring at least five peer-focused firms in the 
industry). 
Moderating Variables  
  
Incentive ratio CEO’s equity-based incentive ratio is estimated as in 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). The incentive 
measure is calculated such that it that captures the share 
of a given CEO’s total compensation that would result 
from a 1% increase in the value of the equity of his or 
her company. Specifically, 
 
Incentive Ratio = ONEPCT / (ONEPCT + SALARY + 
BONUS), 
 
where ONEPCT = 0.01*PRICE × (SHARES + 
OPTIONS); PRICE is the firm share price; SHARES is 
the number of shares held by the CEO; OPTIONS is the 
number of options held by the CEO; and SALARY and 
BONUS are the CEO salary and bonus, respectively.  
 
Delta  A CEO’s equity portfolio price sensitivity is estimated 
as the change in the risk-neutral value of the executive’s 
portfolio for a 1% change in the price of the underlying 
stock. The parameters of the Black and Scholes formula 
follow the definitions as in Core and Guay (2002). 
  
FCF Free cash flows calculated as income before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation expense scaled by 
total assets  
  
Staggered Board  In a given year, a firm has a staggered board if not all 
members of the board are elected at the same time.  
 
Complex Firm The sales concentration ratio, which declines with the 
number and variety of firm activities 
 
Managerial Ability An index developed by Demerjian et al. (2012).  The 
measure results from the use of data envelopment 
analysis (DEA), which calculates unit-specific relative 
efficiency to produce an estimate of how efficiently 
managers use their firms’ resources. Because the 
efficiency measure generated by the DEA estimation is 
attributable to both the firm and the manager, 
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Demerjian et al. (2012) purge the DEA-generated firm 
efficiency measure of key firm-specific characteristics 
that are expected to aid (firm size, market share, 
positive free cash flow, and firm age) or hinder the 
management’s efforts (complex multi-segment and 
international operations). The residual efficiency 
resulting from a Tobit regression in the spirit of 
Demerjian et al. (2012) is the efficiency attributable to 
the management team of the firm. 
  
  Internally Promoted CEO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Long-lived Business Segment 
 
This dichotomous variable identifies firms with CEOs 
that are internally (or externally) promoted. Founder 
CEOs, and appointed CEOs who have tenure of at least 
365 days in the firm are classified as internal. If the date 
of joining the firm is not available, then the CEO must 
have executive directorship tenure of at least one year 
to be classified as internally promoted.  
 
This dichotomous variable identifies business segments 
with a long (or short) life-span in the firm. Following 
Adelino et al. (2017), the cut-off point of five years is 
used, to differentiate between long-lived and short-
lived business segments. The age of the segment is the 
number of years the segment has been listed on the 
Compustat Industrial Segment (CIS) database. 
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